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Abstract
In this dissertation, we empirically investigate the relationship between trade
openness and economic growth across countries over the period 1960-2000.
The main contribution of this dissertation is that we handle the model un-
certainty problem by employing model averaging techniques, instead of esti-
mating and reporting a number of cross-country growth regressions. Differ-
ently from many previous cross-country growth studies, our findings do not
support the proposition that openness has a direct robust relationship with
long run economic growth. However, we conclude that economic institu-
tions and macroeconomic uncertainties relating to inflation and government
consumption are key factors in explaining economic growth in the long run.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Why Study Economic Growth?
Economics as a social science explores and explains social and economic
phenomenon such as; “Some countries are very rich and some are very
poor. Some economies are growing rapidly and some are not growing at
all.” Economics is also a normative discipline and offers polices in or-
der to solve many economic and social issues. What is the ultimate goal
of economic policy : Price stability, a balanced government budget, re-
ducing domestic and foreign debt, providing current account surplus or
deficit, removing government interventions, openness to international
trade and so on.
In my opinion, none of these are important per se, since the main
aim of economic policy should be promoting economic growth and de-
velopment. Unless a convincing and satisfactory link is established
between these factors and economic growth, they will not be mean-
ingful as objectives of economic policy. Why is economic growth so
important? Why should we care about economic growth? The answer
is simply that it raises our living standards. Easterly (2001, p.3) starts
his elusive quest for the sources of economic growth by emphasising
1
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this simple fact:
We care because it betters the lot of the poor and reduces
the proportion of people who are poor. We care because
richer people can eat more and buy more medicines for their
babies.
There is no doubt that sharing the pie is as important as the growth
of the pie in order to improve living standards. However, there is
no credible evidence that economic growth leads to income inequality.
Rather, many studies document that poverty declines with economic
growth.1 It is obvious that if the degree of income inequality remains
the same, both the poor and the rich will be better off if the economy
grows. Therefore, whilst one way to reduce poverty is to redistribute
income from the rich to the poor, another way is to accelerate economic
growth.
1.2 What is the Engine of Growth?
Once we acknowledge the importance of economic growth, a pertinent
question arises immediately: What is the engine of economic growth?
This is question that Adam Smith (1776) directly addressed in his
study: An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
The modern examination of this question by economists started
after the publication of two noteworthy studies by Solow (1956) and
Swan (1956). The neoclassical growth model developed by these au-
thors emphasised the role played by physical capital accumulation over
time and predicted a steady state growth path for each economy. The
key conclusion of this model was that the steady state growth rate of
1See, for instance Dollar and Kraay (2001), Harrison and McMillan (2007) amongst
others.
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per capita income is determined by the exogenous rate of technological
progress. After a silent period during the 1960s, research on economic
growth received renewed interest in the 1970s. The first cross-country
growth studies investigated the impact of export or outward orientation
on macroeconomic performance. Interest on cross-country growth re-
search then accelerated in the mid 1980s because of theoretical work on
endogenous growth and because of the availability of Summers-Heston
data set. The studies by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Barro (1991)
and Mankiw et al. (1992) are milestones for the empirical cross-county
growth literature.
The recent empirical cross-country growth studies are mainly based
on the extended versions of the neoclassical growth model in spite of
the contribution of recent endogenous growth models. In this respect,
the pioneering work by Mankiw et al. (1992) augments the neoclassi-
cal growth model with the inclusion of human capital. The framework
suggested by this study has become the workhorse in the empirical
cross-country growth literature. Conceptually, there are two main em-
pirical approaches, namely growth accounting and growth regression,
quantifying the following relation:
Output = F (Production Factors, Technology)
It is obvious that the accumulation of production factors and tech-
nological progress (whether exogenous or endogenous) are proximate
determinants of economic growth. Beyond the proximate determi-
nants, explaining the fundamental sources of growth differences across
economies is the main question of the empirical cross-country growth
literature. To answer this question, the cross-country growth studies
apply a wide range of different theories. The most outstanding char-
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acteristic of these new growth theories is that they are open-ended,
such that the inclusion of one growth theory does not preclude that
the causal role of others, as pointed out by Brock and Durlauf (2001).
Wacziarg (2002, p.907) nicely summarises this phenomenon:
All-encompassing hypotheses concerning the sources of eco-
nomic growth periodically, and with the support of ade-
quately chosen cross-country correlations, enjoy their fifteen
minutes of fame. Over the last few decades, the list of pro-
posed panaceas for growth in per-capita income has included
high rates of physical-capital investment, rapid human-capital
accumulation, low income inequality, low fertility, being lo-
cated far from the equator, a low incidence of tropical dis-
eases, access to the sea, favorable weather patterns, hands-
off governments, trade-policy openness, capital-market de-
velopments, political freedom, economic freedom, ethnic ho-
mogeneity, British colonial origins, a common-law legal sys-
tem, the protection of property rights and the rule of law,
good governance, political stability, infrastructure, market-
determined prices (including exchange rates), foreign direct
investment, and suitably conditioned foreign aid. This is a
growing and non-exhaustive list.
Whilst the sentiment of Wacziarg (2002) rings true, trade-policy open-
ness has enjoyed more than its fifteen minutes of fame. Openness has
been famous as an engine of economic growth, but “Does openness re-
ally deserve its fame?” This is the question which we explore in this
dissertation.
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1.3 Openness and Growth: What Does the Evi-
dence Tell Us?
As mentioned above, the empirical cross-country studies of the openness-
growth connection date back to the 1970s. The early cross-country
work (for instance Balassa (1978, 1985), Feder (1982), Ram (1985,
1987) inter alia) investigate the relationship between openness and
growth in the framework of neoclassical growth accounting. They con-
sider exports as a proxy for trade openness, and almost all of them
conclude that export or outward trade orientation increases economic
growth. This issue received renewed interest in the early 1990s, partly
because of new analytical tools provided by endogenous growth theories
and partly because of a considerable number of liberalisation reforms
in developing countries during the 1980s. Like the early cross-country
comparisons, these studies find a strong and positive relationship be-
tween openness and growth. More to the point, they are considered
to provide much stronger and more convincing evidence for the propo-
sition that openness to international trade is beneficial for economic
growth (see, for instance, Krueger (1997)).
However, both the early and recent cross-country studies have been
subject to criticism, e.g. Edwards (1993) and Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000) heavily criticise the findings of this literature.2 Their criticisms
focus on the lack of robustness. In particular, these surveys emphasise
two important drawbacks of the literature: First, the openness mea-
sures are poor proxies of the trade policy stance, and in most cases they
are correlated with other aspects of macroeconomic policy and growth
determinants. Second, most studies investigating the openness-growth
link employ simple growth models and ignore other important growth
2Edwards (1993) also carefully investigates the detailed multiple country case studies.
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theories. More importantly, these papers remind us that we do not
have a certain and conclusive theoretical justification concerning the
impact of trade openness on economic growth. For instance, Edwards
(1993, p.1361) points out that “[t]hese studies have not been able to
provide a fully convincing theoretical framework that links commer-
cial policy, trade orientation and growth.” Similarly, Rodr´ıguez and
Rodrik (2000, p.272) argue that “ [t]here is no determinate theoretical
link between trade protection and growth once real-world phenomena
such as learning, technological change, and market imperfections are
taken into account.”
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical link between openness
and growth.
1.4 Openness and Growth: What Does the The-
ory Tell Us?
The relationship between openness and economic growth was, until
recently, assessed in the framework of traditional Ricardian-Hecksher-
Ohlin trade theory. This theory points out that openness to interna-
tional trade brings only a one-time increase in output, since the country
allocates its resources more efficiently after the openness, conditional on
comparative advantage. However, this theory does not suggest any cer-
tain implications for long run growth. As we noted before, the neoclas-
sical growth model concludes that the growth rate of per capita output
is determined by the exogenous technological progress. According to
the neoclassical growth model, an increase in the savings rate generates
a temporary rise in the growth rate. Of course, openness may impact
on the long run growth rate if there is a technology stimulating effect of
6
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openness. However, neither the traditional Ricardian-Hecksher-Ohlin
trade theory nor the neoclassical growth model provides a theoretical
framework for the proposition that openness stimulates technological
progress.
In this regard, only the newer endogenous growth theories pay at-
tention to implications of trade openness on long-run growth since
openness facilitates easier access to new technology embodied in im-
ported inputs, directs domestic resources towards more research in-
tensive sectors and increases market size. However, as we discuss in
the next section, endogenous growth theories do not unambiguously
conclude that openness promotes the long run growth.
1.4.1 Openness and Endogenous Growth Theories
Endogenous growth theories emerged to a great extent from the con-
tributions of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), stress the role of capital
accumulation on long run economic growth. In contrast to the neo-
classical growth model, these theories define capital more broadely and
included ideas (or knowledge), learning-by-doing and human capital.
The crucial aspect of the endogenous growth models is that the accu-
mulation of capital is not subject to diminishing returns and is thus
central to long run growth. We can summarise the basic mechanisms
of endogenous growth theories by using the following diagram:
Ideas =⇒ Nonrivalry =⇒ Increasing Returns =⇒ Imperfect Competition
As pointed out by Romer (1990), ideas as the fundamental premise of
endogenous growth models are different from other economic goods in
some aspects: They are nonrival. That is, once an idea is produced it
can be used by different persons and firms simultaneously. In addition,
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ideas are at least partially excludable such that access to ideas can be
restricted by their owner, at least for some time period. The nonrival-
rous and partly excludable features of ideas have two important impli-
cations for economic growth: First, ideas can be accumulated without
bound on a per capita basis; Second, ideas spill over across economic
units.
As long as an idea has productive value, output will not be subject
to constant returns to scale with respect to all production inputs. In
other words, if the stock of knowledge and other inputs double, then
the level of output will more than double. The inclusion of ideas as a
productive input into production function results in another important
conclusion. In the presence of increasing returns to scale, factors are not
paid their marginal products. This means that standard competitive
market assumption will not be valid.
In summary, the inclusion of ideas as nonrival production inputs
and hence increasing returns to scale and imperfect competitive market
environment play an important role in the endogenous growth models.
Introducing human capital and learning-by doing into this framework
brings about some extra complexities, yet basic mechanisms remains
the same.3
What are the implications of endogenous growth theories for the
relationship between openness and economic growth? First of all, ac-
cording to endogenous growth models, economic policy can affect the
rate of growth in the long run as pointed by Rebelo (1991). In this
regard, the models of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991, Chapters 6 and 9) provide a firmer theoretical
framework linking trade policy to long run economic growth.
3See, for instance, Aghion and Howitt (1999) and Jones (2005).
8
Chapter 1: Introduction
For simplicity, these models consider a small economy producing
and trading two final goods at given world prices. These final goods
are produced by two production factors; namely labour and interme-
diate inputs. There are three types of agents in this model: First, in
the final-goods sector producers combine labour and intermediate in-
puts in order to produce final goods; Second, research and development
(R&D) firms use resources to invent new varieties of intermediate in-
puts (or to increase product quality); Third, on the demand side there
are households trying to maximise their utility in the framework of
a conventional instantaneous utility function, subject to budget con-
straint.
Each final good is produced according to the conventional Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. We can
write the production function for the final good i, i = 1, 2
Yi = AiD
β
i L
1−β
i , 0 < β < 1 (1.1)
where Y is output, A is an arbitrary constant reflecting the overall
measure of productivity, D is an index of the intermediate inputs and
L is labour input employed in sector i. Since each sector employs
different type of labour, the production function in equation (1.1) can
be expressed for good 1 and good 2 as follows
Y1 = A1D
β
1H
1−β
1 , 0 < β < 1
Y2 = A2D
β
2U
1−β
2 , 0 < β < 1
where H is the skilled labour (or human capital) and U is unskilled
labour. That is, the first final good is intensive in skilled labour. In
9
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addition to the final goods sector, the R&D sector employs skilled
labour in order to increase the number of intermediate inputs. Firms
may enter freely into the R&D sector, but they have monopoly power
because of patent protection of ideas. Thus, intermediate inputs can
be sold to the final goods sector at a price that is higher than their
marginal costs. The profitability of production of new type of interme-
diate inputs determines the rate at which new ones are produced. As
can be seen from the production function of final goods in (1.1), the
faster the rate at which new intermediates are supplied, the higher will
be the rate at which production of final goods sector increases. Since
the R&D sector also employs skilled labour, the higher the fraction of
economy’s skilled labour that works in this sector, the greater is the
rate at which new intermediates are invented and hence the faster the
rate of economic growth. Therefore, in these models, activity in R&D
sector directly determines the economic growth.
In this framework, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991) point out that openness to international trade has
four different effects on the long run economic growth:
i) Communication Effect: Openness to international trade pro-
vides channels for communications with foreign counterparts that fa-
cilitate the transmission of technology.
ii) Duplication Effect: In the absence of international trade some
ideas and technologies are duplicated in many countries. Openness en-
courages firms to invent new and distinct ideas and technologies pre-
venting duplication of R&D effort.
iii) Allocation Effect: Trade openness leads countries to spe-
cialise according to traditional (Ricardian- Hecksher-Ohlin) compara-
tive advantages which are determined by factor endowment. Hence, the
10
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relative domestic prices of factors will change after the trade openness
(due to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem). If a country has a compara-
tive advantage in a sector which is unskilled labour intensive (e.g. final
good 2), trade openness reduces the domestic relative wage of skilled
labour compared to unskilled labour. This leads to a rise in the level
of R&D activities, and hence in the long run growth rate because the
cost of R&D decreases and/or the fraction of skilled labour endowment
employed in R&D increases. Exactly, the opposite is true in a country
that specialises in skilled labour intensive goods (say final good 1).4
iv) Integration Effect: Trade openness increases the size of the
market available to firms. Assuming intermediates are traded across
countries as well as final goods, the enlarged market size of the R&D
sector raises R&D activity and hence economic growth since this sec-
tor is subject to increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, after
trade openness, the domestic R&D sector will face foreign competi-
tion and hence this sector may lose market share at home leading to
a slowdown in economic growth. For instance assuming intermediates
are not traded, Feenstra (1996) concludes that the integration effect
is not beneficial to smaller countries. Alesina et al. (2000, 2005) de-
velop a theoretical model such that there is an inverse relation between
openness to international trade and country size.
It is obvious that, among these different effects, only the communi-
cation and duplication effects necessarily raise economic growth. How-
4In this regard, the study by Matsuyama (1992) provides a two sector-agriculture and
manufacturing- model of endogenous growth in which the engine of growth is learning-by-
doing in the manufacturing sector. Due to the assumption that income elasticity of demand
for the agricultural good is low, this model establishes a positive link between agricultural
productivity and economic growth for the closed economy case, while it predicts a negative
link for the open economy case. That is, if a country specialises in manufacturing according
to traditional comparative advantages, the openness to international trade raises long run
economic growth. If a country joins international trade specialising in agriculture, then
trade openness leads to a decrease in the long run growth rate.
11
Chapter 1: Introduction
ever, the allocation and integration effects are not unambiguously pos-
itive. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the influence of open-
ness to international trade on long run economic growth depends on
the magnitude and dominance of these different effects.
1.4.2 New Trade Theories
The 1980s witnessed the development of “new trade theories”, in which
market structures are characterised by imperfect competition and in-
creasing returns. These new theories seek to explain intra-industry
trade. Krugman (1986, p.5) argues that “[t]he classical case for free
trade may have been more in tune with the working of the economy
in 1880 or even 1950 than with the world economy of 1984. In part it
is because we have become more sophisticated about how the markets
actually work. In either case the point is that although economists
may continue to advocate free trade, they will have to update their
arguments if they expect to retain their credibility”. As a result of
the changing character of international trade, in particular the imper-
fectly competitive market structure, Krugman (1986) and others point
out that comparative advantages are determined by neither underlying
country characteristics (natural resource and factor endowments) nor
by the static advantages of large scale production. Rather, comparative
advantages are determined by the knowledge or technology generated
by firms through R&D and experience or learning by doing.
The key message of this literature is that when a country undertakes
international trade, the government may increase aggregate welfare by
implementing an interventionist trade policy. The main body of this
literature evaluates international trade and trade policy in terms of
aggregate welfare and thus it might be worth remembering that whilst
12
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welfare and growth are related, they are in essence different concepts.
However, in the light of the new trade theory it is possible to reach some
useful conclusions about economic growth. Moreover, since industrial
sectors of many developing countries are imperfectly competitive, the
new trade theory also has important implications for these countries
as pointed out by Rodrik (1988) and Krugman (1989).5 Therefore, if
certain high technology sectors generate large technological spillovers
to the rest of the economy, one can conclude that promoting these sec-
tors through protection, export subsides, tax allowances and so on may
have the potential to increase GDP. For instance, Krugman (1984) pro-
vides a model in favour of trade protection in order to support exports
and hence production. His model is based on two important assump-
tions: First, markets are both oligopolistic and segmented; Second,
there are some scale economies in the form of static economies of scale
(i.e. a declining marginal cost curve) or of dynamic scale economies
(i.e. learning-by-doing or competition in R&D). Using a multi-market
Cournot model, Krugman (1984) demonstrates that protecting import-
competing sectors increases scale economies of domestic firms while re-
ducing those of foreign competitors. Due to the economies of scale,
protection leads to an expansion of the market share of domestic firms
in both domestic and international markets. Krugman (1984) argues
that this model is more satisfactory in explaining the successful export-
ing performance of East Asian countries such as Japan.
In summary, both endogenous growth models and new trade the-
ories provide powerful analytical tools linking openness with growth.
However, these models do not necessarily predict that openness leads
5However, others such as Srinivasan (1989) and Corden (1989, 1990) question this
claim. According to these authors, increasing returns and imperfect competition are
irrelevant to developing countries.
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to economic growth in all circumstances and for all countries. In other
words, whether openness causes economic growth depends on country
specific conditions. Despite these facts, there is a common presumption
that openness leads to higher output level and growth in developing
countries. In our opinion, this presumption stems mainly from the bad
reputation of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) experiences in
developing countries during the post-war era. In the next section, we
briefly summarise ISI experience and discuss the main criticisms of this
development strategy.
1.5 Industrialisation, Economic Development and
Trade Policy: A Brief Review
The role of industrial strategy has always been a crucial issue in eco-
nomic development. The most important reason is that almost all
economists and policy makers have considered industrialisation as a
necessary condition of economic growth and development during the
most part of the 20th century. In spite of this consensus, a debate
arises from different industrialisation strategies. The role of the trade
policy is given particular emphasis in this debate as noted by Green-
away et al. (2002).
Through the 1950s, economists and policymakers reached a consen-
sus that an inward-oriented ISI strategy was the best way for devel-
oping countries to stimulate industrialisation and hence for achieving
economic and social development. The most important reason is that
the static comparative advantage theory does not reflect the true op-
portunity costs of internationally traded goods due to the differences
in income and price elasticities of primary and manufactured goods
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as argued by Prebisch (1959). This means that the growth rate of
per capita income in developing countries (or in periphery according
to Prebisch’s terms) should be lower than that in industrial centres if
both blocks grow under a balanced international trade. If per capita
income grows at the same rate in two blocks, the demand in the pe-
riphery for industrial exports grows at a higher rate compared to the
growth rate of its primary exports. This leads developing countries to
chronic trade deficits against industrial centres. In order to prevent a
trade deficit, Prebisch (1959, p.254) suggests that, “[e]ither the rate of
increase of demand for imports would have to fall, by means of import-
substitution, or industrial exports would have to be added to primary
ones, or a combination of two.”
The other important premise of ISI strategy is the infant industry
argument. This argument was accepted by the majority of economists
including both classical and neoclassical ones as a major exception for
free international trade as noted by Baldwin (2004). However, dur-
ing the 1950s, Prebisch (1959) and others argued that infant industry
argument can be applied to the whole industrial sector rather than a
single industry (Bruton (1989)). Therefore, the ISI strategy was al-
ways implemented with trade protection, since substitution of imports
with domestic production required protection of domestic market from
foreign competition.
During the post-war area, many developing countries, especially
those in Latin America and Asia followed the advanced stage of the
ISI strategy which aims substitution of imported capital goods and
durable consumer goods. Since this stage required the larger scale
investment projects and the superior technology, the ISI strategy led to
a considerable increase in imported inputs and so a growing demand for
15
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foreign exchange. Especially, trade deficits and hence foreign debt stock
of developing countries increased sharply due to oil crises during the
1970s. The story came to an end with debt crises and growth collapses
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In response to debt crises, more
than 100 developing countries launched liberalisation programs since
the beginning of the 1980. 6
The ISI strategy has been heavily criticised by many authors.7 Be-
fore evaluating these criticisms, we should remind ourselves of some
simple stylized facts about the economic growth over the 1960-2000
period. Table 1.1 reports the growth statistics by decades and regions.
The most outstanding fact is that except for East and South Asia,
the growth rate in both aggregate and per worker levels is higher over
the period 1960-1980 than 1980-2000. Therefore, the claim that the
ISI strategy led to economic stagnation may be mistaken. We briefly
discuss the important criticisms on the ISI strategy.
ISI Discriminates against Exports
The most common criticism is that an ISI strategy discourages exports.
According to Krueger (1997), the reason for this is the consideration
of that both global income and price elasticities of primary products
are low. Therefore, export earnings would not grow rapidly. In addi-
tion, many developing countries followed fixed exchange rate regimes
in order to make imports of capital goods cheaper and so to increase
investments. The result was real appreciation of domestic currency,
exchange control regimes and a considerable bias against exporting
6Most of these liberalisation efforts were brought into practice under the supervision of
the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL). See Greenaway and Milner (1993)
for details and see Rodrik (1992) for a critique of the SAL programs.
7See, for instance, Balassa (1989), Krueger (1980, 1997, 1998), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(2002), Panagariya (2002).
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Table 1.1: Economic Growth by Region and Period, 1960-2000
Annual Growth in Output (%)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000
World 5.1 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.0
Industrial Countries 5.2 3.3 2.9 2.5 3.5
Latin America 5.5 6.0 1.1 3.3 4.0
Africa 5.2 3.6 1.7 2.3 3.2
Middle East 6.4 4.4 4.0 3.6 4.6
South Asia 4.2 3.0 5.8 5.3 4.6
East Asiaa 6.4 7.6 7.2 5.7 6.7
Annual Growth in Output per Worker (%)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000
World 3.5 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.3
Industrial Countries 3.9 1.7 1.8 1.5 2.2
Latin America 2.8 2.7 -1.8 0.9 1.1
Africa 2.8 1.0 -1.1 -0.2 0.6
Middle East 4.5 1.9 1.1 0.8 2.1
South Asia 2.2 0.7 3.7 2.8 2.3
East Asiaa 3.7 4.3 4.4 3.4 3.9
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003)
a China is excluded.
sectors.
Whilst it is true that the ISI experiences during 1950-1980 period
discriminated against exports, this is more the result of the methods
of implementation of the ISI strategy, not the strategy itself. The ISI
strategy has anti-export bias for primary products, not for manufac-
tured exports because of the differences of income elasticities.
ISI Creates Rent-Seeking Activity
Krueger (1974) stressed rent-seeking as a negative by-product of the ISI
experiences. According to this argument, economic resources were used
to obtain valuable import-licenses which provides quota-rent to their
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owners. This kind of activity not only led to ineffective use of economic
resources but also had a negative effect on income distribution.
However, Krueger’s argument about rent-seeking is debatable. It is
obvious that rent-seeking, or more generally corruption has a detrimen-
tal effect on long run economic growth (see for instance Mauro (1995),
Keefer and Knack (1997, 2002)). What is not clear is that the ISI strat-
egy necessarily leads to corruption. Why did some import-substituting
countries such as those in Latin America and Africa suffer from cor-
ruption while some others, for instance some East Asian countries did
not? As we note in Chapter 6, the relationship between corruption
and economic growth includes many different factors, such as insti-
tutional environment, legal structure, ethnolinguistic fragmentation,
religious and cultural affiliates, abundance of natural resources and so
on. Therefore, explaining corruption as an inevitable result of the ISI
stragey does not seem satisfactory.8
Export Orientation Brings Higher Productivity
Probably the most important criticism on the ISI strategy emphasises
the positive effect of exports on economic growth and development. In
other words, outward or export-oriented industrialisation is suggested
as an alternative to and better development strategy than industri-
alisation via import-substitution. Since the beginning of the 1980s,
economists have argued that exports increase the rate of growth by
extending the market, improving the technology and increasing the
8In her seminal paper, Kureger (1974) gives Turkish economy as an example of rent-
seeking as well as India. But, we can give a similar example from the same economy for
the open trade policy period. During the 1980s, a considerable amount of tax allowances
was given to exporters. This incentive was an important reason for the export success of
Turkish economy in this period. However, many firms gained extra profits via imaginary
exports. Yeldan (1996) indicates that these rent-seeking activities are an important reason
for the deterioration of public finance during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
18
Chapter 1: Introduction
productivity (See for instance Balassa (1989), Falvey and Yu (2005)).
This argument is based on the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, such
that exporters of developing countries may increase productivity as a
result of contact with their foreign counterparts. Second, export ori-
entation stimulates innovation by reducing the internal slack in firms
(X-efficiency), while the ISI strategy increases entrepreneurial slack
in protecting import-competing sectors, (X-inefficiency) (Holmes and
Schmitz Jr. (2001)). Third, in a world where trade barriers are substan-
tial, exporters are more able to overcome with the trade impediments
due to their ability to adopt new and more efficient technologies com-
pared to protecting the import-competing sectors. The reason is again
that exporters have strong incentives to cut managerial slack as pointed
out by Falvey and Yu (2005).
Even though these arguments are strong, it seems that they are
not conclusive. In particular, the key premise that foreign competi-
tion leads to X-efficiency is not clear. Indeed this premise contradicts
the standard profit-maximising-firm assumption in economics. Even
if we accept that protection of import-competing sectors increases X-
inefficiency, by the same logic this raises the X-efficiency in exporting
sectors as pointed out by Rodrik (1995). Moreover any economic policy
encouraging exports must increase the slack in exporting firms. Simi-
larly, if a world where trade impediments are significant leads exporters
to be more efficient, then a world with free international trade must
encourage entrepreneurial slack in exporters.
Therefore, there is no a priori reason to accept that exports in-
duce superior technology and hence increase productivity due to the
competition in foreign markets. Indeed, until recently the relationship
between exports and productivity improvement has not been well un-
19
Chapter 1: Introduction
derstood in economic theory in spite of the substantial empirical liter-
ature which provides a positive correlation between these two.9 These
studies show that exporting firms and/or sectors are more productive,
have better technology and are more capital intensive, yet they are
generally silent concerning the exact mechanism and causality between
exports and productivity. In this regard, Clerides et al. (1998) argue
that it is highly likely that larger and more efficient firms become ex-
porters due to the additional (sunk) costs of exporting. Using data
on Colombia, Mexico and Morocco, these authors conclude that the
association between exporting and productivity stems mainly from the
self-selection of more-efficient firms into the export market rather than
learning by exporting. Similarly, Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2004)
provide evidence for U.S. plants and firms and Delgado et al. (2002)
document evidence for Spanish sectoral levels in favour of self-selection
hypothesis.
In sum, most of the criticisms against the ISI strategy concern the
policy making process in developing countries, rather than the strategy
per se. In this context, the outward or export orientated strategy has
also paid little attention to difficulties related to the policy decisions
and policy changing mechanisms in developing countries. Moreover, as
indicated by Shapiro and Taylor (1990), import-substitution precedes
production for exports. In spite of theoretical possibility, it is unlikely
that a country will export every product at the same day it starts to
produce. Thus, in reality there is always a lag between domestic pro-
duction and exports. In our opinion, these two strategies are actually
complementary, rather than being alternatives to each other.
9Nishimizu and Robinson (1984), Handoussa et al. (1986), Chen and Tang (1987), Aw
and Hwang (1995), Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Aw et al. (2000) and Delgado et al.
(2002) are few examples amongst others.
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1.6 Summary and Overview
In this chapter, we have briefly reviewed the modern literature on the
link between trade openness and economic growth. In light of this
review, it is possible to highlight two important results as follows:
• We do not have a theoretical justification for the proposition that
trade openness unambiguously leads to economic growth. Hence,
this is basically an empirical issue.
• Previous empirical cross-country studies on the openness-growth
connection are subject to methodological and econometric prob-
lems. In particular, they fail to provide a satisfactory measure for
openness and generally ignore the model uncertainty problem.
In this dissertation we empirically investigate the relationship be-
tween trade openness and economic growth across countries over the
period 1960-2000. The contributions of this dissertation are threefold:
First, in contrast to previous studies, which mainly focus on the 1970-
1990 period, this dissertation analyses the openness-growth link over
a much longer time period. This enables us to account for both trade
policy stance and growth dynamics in the long run. Second, we em-
ploy a myriad of openness measures suggested in the literature and so
provide a wider picture to evaluate existing openness variables. Third,
this dissertation handles the model uncertainty problem by employ-
ing model averaging techniques, instead of estimating and reporting a
number of cross-country growth regressions.
This dissertation consists of seven chapters including this introduc-
tion. Chapter 2 reviews the previous empirical cross-country growth
literature. Chapter 3 describes the general theoretical framework which
constitutes the basis for most cross-country growth work. The model
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uncertainty problem and its possible solutions are also discussed in this
chapter. Chapter 4 estimates the augmented neoclassical growth model
suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992) for 1960-2000 in order to provide a
benchmark model for investigating the relationship between long run
economic growth and openness. Chapter 5 investigates the empirical
relationship between openness and growth in a sample of countries em-
ploying a wide range of measures. Chapter 6 applies Bayesian model av-
eraging technique to the cross-country data to take into account model
uncertainty while investigating openness-growth link. Finally, Chapter
7 concludes.
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Trade Openness and
Economic Growth:
Assessment of Cross-Country
Empirical Literature
2.1 Introduction
Even though economists have discussed the impact of trade openness
on long run economic growth for a long time, there is not a complete
consensus. This still continues now, especially after the contribution of
Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000). There are several reasons for this: First,
during the twentieth century, except its last two decades protectionist
theories and policies were very popular in the majority of develop-
ing countries. Moreover, these theories and policies were in general
supported by multilateral institutions such as IMF, WB and OECD
and industrialised countries especially during the 1950s and the 1960s;
Second, defining openness raises some conceptual and methodological
problems. It is possible to say that the impact of trade openness on
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economic growth is assessed according to the debate on the merits of
alternative trade regimes and this issue became increasingly confused
through the late 1980s. In other words, what is meant by trade open-
ness is not clear and some times the definition is very sensitive to the
assumptions made by the authors. Some authors define openness in
narrow terms including only export orientation without considering
trade barriers on imports while others define the openness in broad
terms encompassing the exchange rate and domestic policies as well as
removing trade barriers on import and subsidies on exports. Third,
lack of detailed and adequate data creates another source of disagree-
ment. This is especially true for the broad cross-country econometric
studies and led researchers to country case studies, particularly during
the 1970s.1
The main objective of this chapter is to review the empirical litera-
ture on the relationship between trade openness and economic growth.
Our review is focused on the cross-country work rather than the de-
tailed country case studies. The main reason is that it is difficult to
reach broad generalisations from the country case studies, although
they provide valuable information on the relationship between trade
policy and growth. In addition, it is possible to say that the main
body of the literature on the openness-growth connection consists of
the cross-country studies.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 reviews
the early cross-country growth studies carried out in the 1970s and
the 1980s. Section 3 discusses the recent cross-country growth work.
Finally, Section 4 summarises and concludes.
1See, for instance Little et al. (1970), Balassa (1971), Krueger (1978), Bhagwati (1978).
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2.2 The Early Cross Country Comparisons
At the beginning of the 1970s, the relative benefits of outward ori-
ented export-led and inward orientated import substitution strategies
received much attention. A number of cross-country empirical studies
tested the hypothesis that export oriented policies are better for eco-
nomic growth. Almost all of these studies provided evidence that de-
veloping countries following export oriented policies experienced higher
growth rates than the inward oriented countries.
The cross-country studies from the 1970s through the 1980s investi-
gated the effect of exports on economic growth by using the neoclassical
production function. The theoretical arguments behind the claim that
exports promote growth were based on two different channels. The
first is that exports increase the factor productivity in export oriented
sectors due to the optimal resource allocation according to compara-
tive advantage, greater capacity utilisation, economies of scale and an
exploitation of superior technology (direct effect). Secondly, exports
create positive externalities for non-export sectors by generating tech-
nological improvements and efficient management in response to foreign
competition (indirect effect). Thus an increase in the volume of exports
stimulates economic growth because of its direct and indirect effects.
In this framework, empirical studies employed the neoclassical pro-
duction function and then included exports as a third input, with cap-
ital and labour in order to explain cross-country differences in rates of
economic growth such that
Yt = F (Kt, Lt, Xt) (2.1)
where Y is level of output, K is capital stock, L is labour stock and
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X is exports at time t (for simplicity the time subscript t is dropped).
In this specification, X replaces the technology variable in the original
neoclassical production function. In other words, technology is implic-
itly assumed to be a function of exports. It is very easy to rewrite this
production function in terms of growth rates of variables by totally
differentiating. Differentiation of equation (2.1) with respect to time,
division by Y and rearrangement of terms yield
Y˙
Y
= (
FKK
Y
)(K˙/K) + (
FLL
Y
)(L˙/L) + (
FXX
Y
)(X˙/X) (2.2)
where a dot over the variables indicates a time derivative and FK ,
FL and FX are the factor marginal products. Substituting αK =
(FKK/Y ), βK = (FLL/Y ) and γX = (FXX/Y ) gives the basic growth
equation for cross-country comparisons;
Y˙
Y
= αK(K˙/K) + βL(L˙/L) + γX(X˙/X) (2.3)
where αK , βL and γX are the elasticity of output with respect to capital,
labour and exports, respectively. Since the rate of growth of capital is
not known for most countries, equation (2.3) can be written in terms
of the investment-income ratio by replacing αK(K˙/K) by the K˙/Y , as
follows
Y˙
Y
= λ(I/Y ) + βL(L˙/L) + γX(X˙/X) (2.4)
where λ is the marginal product of capital and I is the gross investment.
The last equation is used in the early empirical research to examine the
impact of exports on economic growth.
Using this framework, a highly influential paper by Balassa (1978)
pooled data on ten semi-industrialised countries and concluded the
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following regression result (t-statistics in parentheses): 2
(Y˙ /Y ) = 0.15
(3.33)
+ 0.23
(2.40)
KF + 0.97
(1.99)
L+ 0.04
(3.57)
X,R2 = 0.77
whereKF is the average current account balance that represents investment-
income ratio and X current dollar value of exports. In addition to
this regression, Balassa (1978) reported two other regression results in
which the current dollar value of exports is replaced by the purchasing
power of exports and by the incremental export-GNP ratio, respec-
tively. The results obtained in all three regressions show that exports
contributed significantly to the rate of growth as well as explanatory
power of estimated equations. Balassa (1978, p.188) used these find-
ings to point out that “[e]xport growth favourably affects the rate of
economic growth over the contribution of domestic and foreign capi-
tal and labour, the estimates presented in this paper provide evidence
on the benefits of export-orientation as compared to polices oriented
towards import substitution.”
However, the sample size of Balassa (1978) is small for such strong
claims. In addition, the sample includes high growth performers such
2During this period, another highly influential paper is the work by Michaely (1977) in
which Spearman rank correlations between rate of export and growth rate of per capita
GDP were used in order to investigate the impact of export expansion on growth perfor-
mance. Since exports are part of the GDP, in order to remove autocorrelation between
growth rates of exports and per capita GDP, Michaely (1977) employed the growth rate
of the proportion of exports in GDP. Using the sample of 41 developing countries, he
concluded that Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.38 and significant at 1 percent
level for the 1951-1973 period. Moreover, Michaely (1997) indicates that the correlation
coefficients are stronger for more developed countries while weaker or absent for less de-
veloped ones. Michaely (1977) assessed this result as evidence that higher exports growth
yields higher economic growth, yet this happens if countries achieve some minimum level
of development. After publishing the paper by Michaely (1977), many studies (for example
Balassa (1978); Tyler (1981)) used Spearman rank correlation for testing the hypothesis of
that export expansion yields the higher growth as well as the regression analysis. However,
this approach has two important shortcomings. First, excluding the other determinants
of economic growth yields biased results. Second, the causality between export growth
and economic growth is not clear.
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as Taiwan and South Korea and poor performers such as India and
Chile. To meet these criticisms Tyler (1981) extended Balassa’s (1978)
study for 49 middle-income developing countries (six OPEC countries
excluded) for the 1960-1977 period and confirmed his results.
Feder (1982) developed an alternative approach to assessing differ-
ential of factor productivities between exports and non-exports sectors.
He assumes that economy consists of two distinct sectors such that one
produces goods for the domestic market whilst the other produces ex-
portable products. Instead of an aggregate production function, he
expresses the two sectors’s output as a function of capital and labour
allocated to sectors at time t such that (again for simplicity time sub-
script t dropped)
N = F (KN , LN , X) (2.5)
X = G(KX , LX) (2.6)
where KN and KX are capital stocks, and LN and LX are labour stocks
in non-exports and exports sectors, respectively, and X indicates the
volume of export. As can be seen, output of the non-exports sector de-
pends on the volume of exports as well as labour and capital. Assuming
that the ratio of relative marginal productivities of capital and labour
deviates from unity by a factor δ between exports and non-exports
sectors, then the following equation is obtained
(GK/FK) = (GL/FL) = 1 + δ (2.7)
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives, i.e. FK and GK are
the marginal productivities of capital and FL and GL are the marginal
labour productivities in non-exports and export sectors, respectively.
As can be seen, δ measures the productivity differential of capital and
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labour between two sectors. If δ = 0, then there is no productivity
differential between the sectors and capital and labour allocations are
at an optimum. However, if productivity is higher in the exports sector
due to reasons (the direct effect of export on growth) mentioned above,
then δ > 0. Differentiation of equations (2.5) and (2.6) gives
N˙ = FKIN + FLL˙N + FXX˙ (2.8)
X˙ = GKIX +GLL˙X (2.9)
where IN and IX are sectoral gross investments, L˙i is the sectoral
change in labour stock (i = N,X) and FX is the marginal productivity
of exports in the non-export sector. Positive externalities of exports to
non-export production are captured by FX , i.e. the indirect effect of
exports on growth. Since by definition, output level denoted by Y , is
the sum of the production of two sectors, then it follows that
Y˙ = N˙ + X˙ (2.10)
Defining total investment I(≡ IN + IX) and change in total labour
stock L˙(≡ L˙N + L˙X), and assuming that the marginal productivity of
labour in a given sector is a linear function of output per labour (Y/L)
in the economy such that FL = α(Y/L) and GL = β(Y/L), where α
and β are constants, then manipulating expressions in (2.8), (2.9) and
(2.10) yields
Y˙
Y
= µ(I/Y ) + β(L˙/L) + [(δ/1 + δ) + FX ](X˙/X)(X/Y ) (2.11)
where µ = FK . Equation (2.11) is the basis of Feder’s (1982) empirical
research. By using the sample of 31 semi-industrialised countries (SICs
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henceforth) over the 1963-1973 period, Feder (1982) estimates equation
(2.11) and concludes that there are substantial differences in marginal
factor productivities between export and non-export sectors and the
export sector provides positive effects on productivity in other sector.
Moreover, Feder (1982) decomposes the direct and indirect effects of
exports on economic growth while adding the growth rate of exports
as an additional variable into the equation (2.11)3 and concludes that
indirect or externality effect of exports is large. Therefore, Feder (1982)
points out that even after the optimal resource allocation according to
the comparative advantage, exports continue to stimulate economic
growth due to the externality affect.
Following the study by Feder (1982), subsequent works employed
either neoclassical production function approach expressed by equation
(2.4) or Feder’s equation (2.11) and formed a consensus in favour of
export oriented trade polices (see Table 2.1). It is fair to say that the
main objective of these studies was to increase the sample size in order
to reach broader and stronger results. Not only did these studies em-
ploy larger sample of developing countries but also they divided their
samples into low-income developing countries and middle-income de-
veloping countries. The rationale for this separation was to test the
hypothesis of whether a minimum level of development is necessary
in order to benefit export orientation. Moreover, many studies report
3In order to decompose higher factor productivity in exports sector, i.e. δ > 0 and
externality effect of exports, i.e. FX , Feder (1982) assumed that exports affect the pro-
duction of non-exports sector with constant elasticity such that
N = F (KN , LN , X) = X
θ(KN , LN )
This implies that marginal productivity of exports in non-exports sectors is FX = θ(N/X),
where θ is a parameter. Then equation (2.11) can be rewritten as follows
Y˙
Y
= µ(I/Y ) + β(L˙/L) + [(δ/1 + δ)− θ](X˙/X)(X/Y ) + θ(X˙/X)
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cross-country regression results for pre-1973 and post-1973, to answer
the question of whether export orientation yielded its theoretical ben-
efits during the period of oil shocks of 1970s, when the world economic
environment significantly deteriorated.4
4For instance, Ram (1987) using a large sample of 88 developing countries estimated
both equations (3.4) and (3.11) separately for the period 1960-1982. His estimations
were also based on the different samples namely low income and high income developing
countries and on different time periods such as periods 1960-1972 and 1973-1982. Further
Ram (1987) provided the time series estimations of individual countries over the 1960-1982
period. Both results of individual country estimates and those of cross-country regressions
for different samples and time periods are consistent in the manner that exports have a
positive impact on growth. The coefficients of exports variable in both model are positive
and significant for the majority of countries over the period 1960-1982. Similar results are
obtained from cross-country estimates for all samples and periods except for the sample of
low income developing countries over the 1960-1972 period and the size of exports variable
is higher in the period 1972-82.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Early Cross-Country Studies
Study Sample Period Dependent
variable
Openness Mea-
sure
Methodology Result
Michaely (1977) 41 DCs 1950-73 Per capita
GNP growth
Growth of Ex-
ports ratio
Spearman
Rank Correla-
tions
Significant, +. Zero
for low income DCs
Balassa (1978) 10 SICs 1960-73
1960-66
1966-73
GNP Growth Exports, Growth
of Exports ratio
OLS, Equation
(2.4)
Significant, +.
Heller & Porter (1978) 41 1950-73 Nonexport-
GNP growth
Growth of Ex-
ports ratio
Spearman
Rank Correla-
tions
Significant, +. Close
to zero for low in-
come DCs.
Tyler (1981) 41 DCs 1960-77 GDP Growth Export Growth OLS, Equation
(2.4)
Significant, +.
Feder (1982) 31 SICs 1964-73 GDP Growth Export Growth
times Export ra-
tio
OLS, Equation
(2.11)
Significant, +.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Kavoussi (1984) 73 DCs 1960-78 GNP Growth Export Growth OLS, Equation
(2.4)
Significant, +.
Balassa (1985) 43 DCs 1973-79 GNP Growth Export Growth OLS, Equation
(2.4)
Significant, +.
Higher for post-1973
peirod
Rana (1988) 43 DCs 1966-73
1973-79
GNP Growth Export Growth
& Export growth
times Export ra-
tio
OLS, Equa-
tions (2.4) &
(2.11)
Significant, +.
Smaller for post-
1973 period.
Jung & Marshall (1985) 37 DCs 1950-81 GNP growth Export Growth Granger
Causality Test
Significant, + for 4
DCs. Casuality is
significantly from
output growth to
export growth for 10
DCs.
Kohli & Singh (1989) 31 SICs 1960-70
1970-81
GDP Growth Export growth
times Export
ratio
OLS, Equation
(2.11)
Significant, + for
1960-70. Insignifi-
cant, + for 1970-81
period.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Singer & Giray (1988) 52 & 51 1967-73
1977-83
GNP Growth Export Growth Spearman
Rank Correla-
tions
Significant, +. Weak
for 1977-83 period.
Ram (1985) 73 DCs 1960-70
1970-77
GNP Growth Export Growth OLS, Equation
(2.4)
Significant, +.
Larger for 1960-77
period & for middle
income DCs.
Kormendi & Meguire (1985) 47 1950-77 Per capita
GDP growth
Per capita Ex-
port Growth
OLS, Cross-
Country
Growth Re-
gression
Significant, +.
Ram (1987) 88 DCs 1960-82
1960-72
1973-82
GDP Growth Export Growth
& Export growth
times Export ra-
tio
OLS, Equa-
tions (2.4) &
(2.11)
Significant, + ex-
cept low income DCs
for 1960-72 period.
Higher for 1973-82
period.
Edwards (1989) 28 1960-82
1982
GDP Growth Intervention in-
dex by Leamer
(1988)
WLS, Endoge-
nous growth
model
Significant, -.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2.1 – Continued
Syrquin & Chenery (1989) 108 1960-70
1970-82
GDP Growth Outward Orien-
tation Index
Growth Ac-
counting
On average +.
Esfahani (1991) 31 SICs 1960-73
1973-81
1980-86
GDP Growth,
Export
Growth, Im-
port Growth
Export Growth 2SLS, Equa-
tion (2.11)
Significant, +. Once
import included in-
significant.
Note: DCs and SICs refer to developing countries and semi-industrialised countries, respectively. OLS, WLS and 2SLS denote ordinary least
squares, weighted least squares and two stage least squares, respectively.
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As pointed out by many authors (Taylor (1991)), Edwards (1989,
1993), Rodrik (1995), Pritchet (1996), Harrison (1996), Frankel and
Romer (1999) are few examples) these studies have numerous theo-
retical and methodological drawbacks. We briefly, but systematically
summarise these drawbacks as follows.
Definition of Trade Liberalisation
According to the literature during the 1970s and 1980s, trade “liberal-
isation” was defined as a narrow term including only “export promo-
tion” or “outward orientation” without considering direct barriers on
imports and other domestic polices (such as subsidy policy) that can
affect international trade. The most important reason for this defini-
tion is that the impact of trade policy on economic growth was assessed
according to relative superiority of two alternative strategies for eco-
nomic growth namely, inward-looking import substitution growth on
the one hand and outward-oriented export-led growth on the other.
Since import substitution strategy had always been implemented with
trade protection and most of the import substitution experiences had
anti-export bias particularly through exchange rate policy, an outward
oriented economy was considered as liberalised with regard to its trade
regime.
Moreover, what is meant by outward orientation was not clear and
became increasingly confused through the late 1980s. For instance,
Krueger (1997) uses outward trade policy to mean open trade policy.
Balassa (1989) defines this term as a policy regime that provides simi-
lar incentives to sell in both domestic and foreign markets. The World
Bank (1987, p.78) defined outward orientation in a very similar way:
“[A]n outward oriented strategy in which trade and industrial policies
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do not discriminate between production for the domestic market and
exports, nor between purchases of domestic goods and foreign goods.”
According to this definition, one can easily claim that a country remov-
ing all trade barriers on imports, but introduces subsidies for exporters
would not be classified as an outward oriented country since it discrim-
inates in favour of exports against imports.
Theoretical Link between Trade Policy and Growth
Using a definition of trade liberalisation equivalent to export orienta-
tion, the early literature established a theoretical link between trade
policy and growth mainly based on export side of international trade.
Put differently, the early literature emphasised the role of exports com-
pared to the importance of imports due to the dynamic effects of ex-
ports on growth such as economies of scale, learning by exporting and
especially generating technological improvements. By the end of the
1970s, the argument of that physical capital formation is vital for eco-
nomic growth was replaced by the idea of that technological change and
productivity increases are key to growth. Since the beginning of the
1980s, many development economists argued that exports increase the
rate of growth through the extending market, inducing technology and
increasing productivity (see for example, Balassa (1989) and Krueger
(1997)).
However, using theoretical framework of the early literature in order
to argue that export expansion leads to higher economic growth is not
conclusive. First, exploiting economies of scale and greater capacity
utilisation are static effects of exports on economic growth. These
effects run in a short period after the export expansion, yet do not
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provide higher steady state growth rates.5 Second, there is no a priori
reason for the belief that exports induce superior technology and hence
increase productivity, as noted in Chapter 1. Similarly, the effect of
exports on economic growth through physical capital accumulation is
not clear. In other words, there is no clear answer of why export
expansion leads to an investment boom theoretically.
It is obvious that firms can obtain or improve new technology and
thus increase productivity through several sources. Pack and Page
(1994) suggest seven different sources. These are importing of goods
and services with embodying technology, foreign direct investment,
purchasing licenses for domestic production or the use of new process,
reverse engineering, obtaining knowledge from purchasers of exports,
obtaining knowledge from nationals who were educated and/or worked
abroad and finally R&D activities. As mentioned before, the early lit-
erature did not pay attention to the role of imports as much as that
of exports. However, imports probably are more important than ex-
ports in obtaining knowledge and technology and hence in increasing
productivity and economic growth. In this point, it is more likely that
exports have an indirect effect through removing or easing foreign ex-
change constraints to finance imports.6
Moreover, the most important point is that the claim that exports
or imports is good for growth is different from the claim that trade
5Export orientation does not necessarily require economies of scale. For instance, in
Taiwan, suggested a good example for the success of export orientation by the early
literature, the considerable part of manufactured products are produced and exported by
a large number of small and medium size firms. According to Park (1990), in 1986, 98
percent of Taiwan’s firms had less than 300 workers, and approximately half of these firms
employed 5 or less employees.
6Esfahani (1991) points out that in many developing countries contribution of exports
to GDP growth is a result of their role in increasing the supply of foreign exchange and
hence imports due to the import rationing in most of these countries. Therefore, he
emphasises the importance of distinguishing between foreign exchange shortage reducing
and externality effects of outward oriented polices.
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liberalisation brings higher growth. The latter is inconclusive and, as
pointed out in the previous chapter (Section 1.4), theoretically the
impact of trade liberalisation on economic growth is ambiguous.
Causality and Simultaneity between Export Orientation and Growth
As a natural result of definition of trade liberalisation in narrow terms
and the inadequate theoretical link between growth and exports, the
causal relationship between export orientation and economic perfor-
mance is not clear. That is, whether countries grow faster as a result
of higher export performance or countries export more because of faster
growth remains an open question. Very few studies addressed this issue
during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Jung and Marshall (1985),
a reverse causality between exports and economic growth is possible as
follows: learning and technological change which may be unrelated to
any special export promoting incentives in a few industries may foster
economic growth, even in the absence of export promoting incentives.7
Given this rapid expansion in these industries, it is highly unlikely
that domestic demand for these industries grows as much as produc-
tion. This leads producers in these sectors to sell their goods in export
markets. In this situation, causality occurs from economic growth to
exports growth.8 Employing Granger casuality test for 37 developing
countries over the 1950-1981 period, Jung and Marshall (1985) provide
statistical evidence in favour of export orientation yielding higher eco-
nomic growth for only four countries namely Indonesia, Egypt, Costa
Rica and Ecuador. Jung and Marshall (1985) suggest these results
7The booms in these industries my be related to the accumulation of human capital,
cumulative production experience, foreign technology transfer through licensing or direct
investment or physical capital accumulation.
8In addition, a negative correlation between economic growth and export growth is
plausible since output expansion may increase domestic demand and thus a decrease in
exports
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cast some doubts on the previous evidence in favour of export orienta-
tion. Leamer (1994) claims that the Granger casuality test which Jung
and Marshall (1985) employ is not an appropriate technique to make
clear the casuality between exports and economic growth. However,
this does not remove the importance of their question and arguments.
Rather, as mentioned above, a reverse casuality from investment and
productivity to exports is more likely.
Undoubtedly, when cross-country growth regression is specified in
the form of equation (2.4) and/or equation (2.11), a simultaneity prob-
lem is clear due to the fact that exports are a component of GDP. This
link is also possible between GDP and imports since countries whose
income levels are higher may import more. For instance Frankel et al.
(1996) indicate that a country may import more if the foreign con-
sumption goods are superior than domestic ones. In addition, many
developing countries import capital and intermediate goods in order to
increase their physical capital accumulation. This implies that coun-
tries with higher income for reasons other than trade will import more.
However, the degree of this problem is likely to be higher in the case
of exports than of imports. Therefore, a positive association between
GDP growth and the ratio of exports to GDP is almost inevitable.
This point is heavily criticised by Taylor (1992, p.110-111): “[s]howing
a positive regression coefficient of output growth on exports growth has
become a thriving cottage industry in recent years . . . [T]he results from
regressing one trending variable on another are statistically significant
but the rationale is hardly convincing.”
It is well-known fact that, in the case of simultaneity problem be-
tween dependent variable and explanatory variable, the estimation of
regression equation by ordinary least squares (OLS henceforth) pro-
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duces inconsistent estimates of coefficients. Indeed, as we will discuss
in the next chapters simultaneity is an important problem and in spite
of many suggestions by econometric theory for solving this problem, a
solution is not easy in the context of cross-country growth regressions.
Esfahani (1991) is the one of the few early cross-country works deal-
ing with simultaneity problem. According to Esfahani (1991) the pre-
vious studies examining the relationship between growth and exports
neglected the role of exports in providing foreign exchange for imported
intermediate and capital goods, especially in semi-industrialised coun-
tries and put too much emphasis on the externality effects of exports. If
exports reduce or eliminate the foreign exchange constraint for imports
(i.e. import shortage), regressing growth of GDP on exports by OLS
yields biased results due to the simultaneity problem. In order to over-
come this problem and to differentiate the externality effect and import
shortage reducing effect of exports, Esfahani (1991) adds intermediate
goods, aggregating imported and domestically produced intermediates
into the production functions of non-exports and exports sectors ex-
pressed in equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively. Then, he specifies a
second equation that relates exports growth to GDP growth. Esfahani
(1991) also specifies a similar equation for import growth and estimates
the three equation system of GDP, export and import growth by two
stage least squares for the periods 1960-1973, 1973-1981, and 1980-
1986 using a sample of 31 SICs with and without an import growth
term. His estimation results show that when the import growth enters
the regressions, the coefficient of the export variable loses its signifi-
cance and even its sign becomes negative. Esfahani (1991, p.111) uses
these results to point out that “[m]ost SICs have on average suffered
from import ‘shortage’ and their exports have mainly provided foreign
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exchange relieving this input constraint.” Moreover he concludes that
this reducing import shortage effect is stronger for the period 1973-1981
than for the periods 1960-1973 and 1980-1986.
Measuring Trade Orientation
The assessment of early cross-country studies up to now shows that
the ratio of export to GDP is not a good indicator of trade orienta-
tion, or more precisely openness to international trade. In spite of the
importance of imports, almost no study employed the ratio of trade vol-
ume (exports plus imports) to GDP during the 1970s and 1980s. Even
though the ratio of trade volume in GDP is not a perfect measure for
openness, it is a better measure compared to the ratio of exports or
the ratio of imports in GDP.
More importantly, very few studies attempted to use direct mea-
sures for trade policy in this period. For example Balassa (1985) con-
structs a trade orientation index defined in terms of deviations of actual
from hypothetical values of per capita exports. He concludes that this
variable significantly and positively effects economic growth. As can
be seen, Balassa’s trade orientation index is again based on export
orientation.
Three measures of outward orientation or trade policy were devel-
oped through the 1980s and have been used by the recent round of
cross-country studies in the next section. These are outward orien-
tation index by the World Bank World Development Report (1987),
trade intervention index by Leamer (1988) and trade orientation index
by Syrquin and Chenery (1989).
World Bank World Development Report 1987 (WBWDR87 here-
after) classifies 41 countries according to their trade orientation for
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the periods 1963-1972 and 1973-1985. The classification are based on
four criteria namely effective rate of protection, direct trade controls
such as quotas and import licensing schemes, export incentives and de-
gree of exchange rate overvaluation. Then by using these criteria the
report classifies countries as strongly outward, moderately outward,
moderately inward and strongly inward.
Table 2.2 displays the WBWDR87 classification of developing coun-
tries according to the trade orientation. As can be seen, there are only
three East Asian countries namely Hong Kong, South Korea and Sin-
gapore classified as strongly outward in both periods. On the other
hand some countries changed their status over the periods 1963-1972
and 1973-1985. Countries such as Chile, Turkey, Uruguay shifted to
more outward trade polices while others such as Sri Lanka and Tunisia
moved in the opposite direction between two periods. Countries such as
Argentina, Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana
and Zambia are strongly inward looking during the two periods. Al-
though the report accepts some disagreements concerning two inter-
mediate subgroups namely moderately outward and inward countries,
it concludes that extreme cases are more conclusive. After this classi-
fication, WBWDR87 concludes that the macroeconomic performances
of outward oriented countries are better than those of inward oriented
ones simply comparing some specific indicators such as average annual
growth rates of real GDP and of per capita GDP, gross domestic saving
rate and so on.
As can be seen from Table 2.2, there is a strong positive associa-
tion between growth rate of per capita GDP and outward orientation
during both periods. For instance, three countries Singapore, Hong
Kong and South Korea classified strongly outward have the highest
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Table 2.2: Outward Orientation Index by World Bank World Development
Report (1987)
1963-1973 1973-1985 1983-1985
country Trade
orientation
Exports
ratio (%)
Growth† Trade
orientation
Exports
ratio (%)
Growth† Owtia Owqib
Argentina SI 6.65 0.033 SI 7.98 -0.010 0.294 0.055
Bangladesh SI 8.41 -0.024 SI 5.16 0.024 0.409 0.497
Bolivia MI na 0.009 SI na -0.007 0.129 0.042
Brazil MO 7.03 0.056 MO 8.86 0.021 0.159 0.047
Burundi SI 10.49 0.040 SI 11.23 -0.006 0.221 0.006
Cameroon MO 22.36 -0.006 MI 27.06 0.046 0.261 0.143
Chile SI 13.37 0.017 MO 21.85 0.003 0.213 0.098
Colombia MO 12.93 0.030 MI 14.35 0.016 0.310 0.520
Costa Rica MO 26.82 0.029 MI 32.73 -0.001 0.157 0.703
Cote d‘Ivoire MO 35.82 0.034 MI 39.18 -0.008 na na
Dominican Republic SI 18.58 0.027 SI 21.42 0.019 na na
El Salvador MI 25.74 0.019 MI 29.89 -0.016 0.133 0.043
Ethiopia SI na 0.016 SI 9.65 -0.020 0.200 0.174
Ghana SI 19.05 0.037 SI 11.21 -0.018 0.330 0.200
Guatemala MO 17.44 0.029 MI 18.91 0.006 0.084 0.823
Honduras MI 27.86 0.025 MI 30.99 0.006 na na
Hong Kong SO 82.16 0.072 SO 91.15 0.050 0.000 0.001
India SI 4.02 0.012 SI 5.92 0.023 1.319 0.888
Indonesia MO 12.71 0.035 MI 26.18 0.047 0.137 0.101
Israel MO 25.18 0.047 MO 39.87 0.010 na na
Kenya MI 29.92 0.030 MI 28.37 0.002 0.275 0.203
Korea, Republic of SO 12.57 0.068 SO 30.03 0.057 0.137 0.100
Madagascar MI 15.64 0.003 SI 13.93 -0.018 0.255 0.007
Malaysia MO 39.81 0.038 MO 49.54 0.039 0.087 0.045
Mexico MI 7.67 0.037 MI 11.73 0.018 0.082 0.064
Nicaragua MI 28.02 0.013 MI 26.15 -0.021 0.148 0.684
Nigeria MI 10.71 0.011 SI 19.98 -0.012 0.447 0.016
Pakistan SI 9.60 0.042 MI 11.24 0.029 0.411 0.075
Peru SI 16.58 0.027 SI 17.88 -0.011 0.409 0.370
Philippines MI 18.10 0.022 MI 22.38 0.002 0.221 0.467
Senegal MI 23.15 -0.013 MI 33.07 0.001 0.189 0.049
Singapore SO na 0.073 SO na 0.052 0.016 0.005
Sri Lanka SI 29.76 0.018 MI 29.33 0.028 0.280 0.080
Sudan SI 15.41 -0.015 SI 10.24 0.004 0.331 0.075
Tanzania SI na 0.045 SI na 0.004 0.172 0.284
Thailand MO 16.63 0.048 MO 21.33 0.041 0.294 0.055
Tunisia MI 21.66 0.043 MO 33.77 0.032 0.218 0.543
Turkey SI 4.78 0.027 MO 7.78 0.018 0.133 0.872
Uruguay SI 13.90 0.008 MO 18.49 0.002 0.207 0.030
Yugoslavia MI na na MI na na 0.091 0.370
Zambia SI 51.42 0.008 SI 38.45 -0.020 0.183 0.000
Note: SO is strongly outward orientation; MI is moderately outward orientation; SI is
strongly inward orientation; MI is moderately inward orientation.
†: Annual growth rate of per capita GDP. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
a Own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods. Source:
Barro and Lee (1994a)
b Own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
Source: Barro and Lee (1994a)
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growth recorded amongst the countries. However, WBWDR78 does
not provide a clear data source concerning the classification criteria
namely effective rate of protection, direct controls and export incen-
tives. Instead report only indicates that data source for classification
is the World Bank database and the background paper by Greenaway.9
With the consideration of the difficulties about comparable and reliable
data sources particularly for direct trade controls across countries, this
implies that report classification is mainly based on subjective infor-
mation rather than objective measures. Therefore, report classification
includes some inconsistencies: Firstly, defining South Korea as strongly
outward especially for the period 1963-1972 does not seem plausible.10
The last two columns in Table 2.2 present the own-import weighted
tariff rates and non-tariff frequency ratios for the period 1983-1985, re-
spectively. When the countries are ranked according to these two mea-
sures in a descending way, South Korea takes a place as 13th country
for the import tariff, 22nd country for the non-tariff barriers. Countries
such as Malaysia, El Salvador and Bolivia are considered less outward
oriented than Korea even though both tariff rates and non-tariff barri-
ers of these countries have lower than those of South Korea (Note that
the export ratio in Malaysia is also higher than that ratio in South
Korea in both periods). The same thing is true for Indonesia, which is
classified as less outward than South Korea although the exports ratio
and trade policy measures of both countries are almost equal to each
other during the two periods. Similarly, Turkey and Tunisia whose non-
9See, Greenaway and Nam (1988).
10World Bank World Development Report (1987, p.82) defines a country as strongly
outward oriented in which “[T]rade controls are either nonexistent or very low in the
sense that any disincentives to export resulting from import barriers are more or less
counterbalanced by export incentives. There is little or no use of direct controls and
licensing arrangements, and the exchange rate is maintained so that the effective exchange
rates for importables and exportables are roughly equal.”
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tariff coverage ratios are considerably higher classified as moderately
outward in 1973-1985 period. On the other hand Zambia with a rela-
tively low tariff rate and zero non-tariff frequency as well as relatively
higher export ratios is defined as strongly inward in both periods.
Leamer (1988), using three digit SITC data (for 183 commodities),
estimated net exports and trade intensity ratios for 53 countries. His
estimation is based on a multi-product Hecksher-Ohlin model. The
difference between the actual and predicted intensity ratios is defined
as a openness measure by Leamer (1988). This measure of openness
takes into account only trade restricting policies and thus the greater
the difference between actual and predicted values implies the less in-
tervention or more openness to trade. Yet, due to the trade promoting
policies, Leamer (1988) develops another measure based on the extent
of trade distortion by the policy. These measures have many desirable
features. The latter takes into account all kind of trade distortions
and both are objective measures that evaluate countries’ trade policy
stance. However, as pointed out by Leamer (1988) the most important
shortcoming is that predicted trade intensity ratios are estimated in the
absence of actual trade barriers. Leamer (1988) also only calculated
these measures for 1982. Edwards (1989) is the first author who used
Leamer’s openness and intervention measures.
A final trade orientation or openness measure is trade orientation
index of Syrquin and Chenery (1989, SCOUT hereafter). Syrquin and
Chenery (1989) firstly classify countries as large or small according to
their population in 1965. They then divide them into two groups based
on the predominance of primary or manufactured goods in their ex-
ports. Subtracting the predicted difference between shares of primary
and manufactured exports in the total merchandise exports from the
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actual shares, Syrquin and Chenery (1989) conclude a trade orientation
index:
SCOUT = (XP −XM)− (XˆP − XˆM) (2.12)
where XP and XM , the share of primary and manufactured exports
in the total merchandise exports, respectively. XˆP and XˆM are the
predicted values. Primary and manufactured exports are estimated
in the framework of separate regressions based on country size (small
and large) and period (pre- and post-1973) over the period 1965-1980
by Syrquin and Chenery (1989). Countries with positive values of
SCOUT classified as primary oriented while those with negative val-
ues of SCOUT as manufacturing oriented. In the second step, Syrquin
and Chenery (1989) classify countries according to their actual share
of merchandise exports in GDP relative to the predicted share for 1965
and 1980, again in the framework of separate regressions by size and
period. A country with a relatively high export level is considered as
outward oriented while a country with a relatively low level export
is assessed as inward oriented. In the final step, combining these two
classifications, the authors define countries according to four categories
namely primary outward oriented, primary inward oriented, manufac-
tured outward oriented and manufactured inward oriented. Obviously,
even though the relative export level is influenced by trade polices,
this trade orientation index is not solely based on trade policy mea-
sures since export level is predicted by country size and time period.
However, an important advantage of this classification with respect to
WBWDR87 is that SCOUT takes into account initial conditions and
country differences in terms of size. In addition it allows to construct a
dummy variable over the period 1965-1980 for the cross-country com-
parisons.
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Heterogeneity among Countries
Another important issue in the early cross-country growth works is
the heterogeneity of countries. This is particularly important for pol-
icy evaluation. Consider the cross-country growth regression in equa-
tions (2.4) or (2.11). Obviously, early cross-country works assumes that
countries are homogeneous in terms of regression parameters. However,
it is very difficult to accept this assumption. Put differently, almost
all early works concludes that export expansion brings higher economic
growth. However, interpreting regression results such that effects of ex-
ports growth are exactly the same for Korea and Turkey or Argentina
seems very unrealistic.
Heterogeneity among countries is another important difficulty in
any cross-country growth study and dealing with this problem is not
easy. Early studies generally divide their sample into two sub samples
as low income and middle or high income developing countries. Yet,
the main motivation for this separation is to answer whether a mini-
mum level of development is necessary for the benefiting from export
expansion. In other words, the concern about heterogeneity among
countries is not very clear. Moreover, criteria for classification of coun-
tries is not satisfactory. As pointed out by Edwards (1993) in many
studies, a country with a per capita income of US $ 360 (in 1978 val-
ues) or less was defined as a low income developing country. After
this arbitrary classification the early literature estimated cross-country
growth regression for two samples and then just compared the pa-
rameters. No study attempted to employ formal econometric tests of
parameter stability. At a very simple level, there are many remaining
questions. Is the impact of export orientation on economic growth the
same for different regions? For small or large countries? For countries
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that are landlocked? The early literature is completely silent on these
questions. Obviously, these questions are closely related to another
important drawback concerning the model selection.
Model Selection
As mentioned before, most early cross-country studies worked on a
linearised neoclassical production function. However, as has long been
recognised in the literature, the results of such growth models are highly
likely to suffer from omitted variables. At a very simple level, no study
considered the initial (income) conditions in spite of the well-known
convergence prediction of the neoclassical growth model.
As will be shown in Chapter 3, probably the most important prob-
lem in cross-country growth regressions is identifying a model which
represent the true production function across countries, at least on av-
erage. This is particularly important if policy implications are to be
drawn from the results of cross-country growth regressions. If there
are other variables which are important for economic growth, then the
problem of omitted variable bias may be large. More importantly,
if other variables are interacted with the openness variable, a cross-
country growth regression including only the openness variable as well
as capital and labour yields misleading results.
2.3 The Recent Cross-Country Work
Since the late 1980s the impact of trade liberalisation on economic
growth has generated renewed interest. There are two important rea-
sons for this. First, the new endogenous growth theories pay much more
attention to international trade and provide some analytical links be-
tween trade policy and economic growth. Second, the 1980s witnessed a
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considerable number of liberalisation reforms in most developing coun-
tries, which has continued up to present. An important result of this
liberalisation period is that economists have the opportunity to com-
pare pre-liberalisation period with post-liberalisation period.
Almost all studies in this period concluded a strong positive rela-
tionship between trade openness and economic growth. The outstand-
ing feature of these studies is that they employ new openness measures
directly addressing trade policy and trade orientation. Moreover, these
studies substantially benefit from the contributions of Barro (1991)
and Mankiw et al (1992) to cross-country growth empirics. Thus,
accounting for important growth determinants researchers tested to
openness-growth link properly. For instance employing an openness
measure based on international price deviations, Dollar (1992) con-
cludes that openness is positively associated with economic growth.
Edwards (1992, 1998) provides strong evidence supporting that more
open countries grow faster. In his later study, out of nine alternative
openness and trade intervention measures, eight are found to be sig-
nificant with the expected signs.11 Ben-David (1993) finds absolute
convergence in per capita income in a sample of open countries whilst
closed countries do not tend to converge. Bend-David (1996) also shows
that countries tend to converge to income level of their trading partners
and hence undertaking to trade, poor countries catch up their richer
trading partners. Lee (1993), constructing a composite indicator on the
basis of “free trade openness” (which is equal to import share in the
absence of trade barriers) shows that the import-weighted tariff rate
11The list of openness measures employed by Edwards (1998): The Sachs and Warner
(1995) openness dummy, The World Development Report (1987) Outward Orientation
Index, Leamer’s (1988) openness index, average black market premium, average import
tariff on manufacturing, average coverage of non tariff barriers, The Heritage Foundation
index of distortions in international trade, collected trade taxes ratio and, Wolf’s (1993)
index of import distortions.
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and the black market premium are harmful for economic growth. In-
troducing a new openness measure, perhaps the most influential paper
by Sachs and Warner (1995) concludes a large positive effect of open-
ness on growth. These authors also confirm Ben-David’s (1993) result
such that open countries tend to converge whilst closed ones do not.
Harrison (1996) shows that various openness measures are significantly
correlated with economic growth when a fixed effects growth model
is estimated using panel data. Vamvakidis (1999) obtains a similar
result between openness and investment in fixed effects growth regres-
sions. Another influential study is Frankel and Romer (1999). Using
geographic component of trade as an instrument, Frankel and Romer
(1999) show that the international trade and per capita income (hence
economic growth) is strongly and positively associated and argue that
the casuality for this association runs from trade to income level.
Amongst the recent cross-country studies, four papers deserve spe-
cial emphasis and hence we detail them in what follows:
Dollar (1992)
An important feature of this study is that Dollar (1992) developed
a measure of outward orientation of economy based on two separate
indices namely real exchange rate distortion and real exchange rate
variability.
Dollar (1992) uses data of international relative price levels prepared
by Summers and Heston (1988) in order to construct his outward ori-
entation measure. The Summers- Heston data include relative price
levels of the same consumption goods in different countries. By us-
ing the United States as the benchmark country, Summers and Heston
(1988) define the index of relative price level (RPL) for country i as
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follows
RPLi = 100× ePi/PUS (2.13)
Where e is the exchange rate defined as dollars per unit of domestic
currency and Pi is the consumption price index for country i. As noted
by Dollar (1992), the expression in (2.13) is very similar to usual real
exchange rate formulation. In the case of free international trade, law of
one price were held for all internationally traded goods and the measure
in expression (2.13) would be 100 for each country. In this framework,
cross country variation of these price levels could be used as a measure
of inward or outward orientation induced by trade policy. However,
because of existence of non-tradable goods and of their different prices
across countries, this measure will not be equal to 100 even in the case
of free international trade. To overcome this difficulty, Dollar (1992)
suggests regressing price levels on country factor endowments due to
the fact that if factor prices are not equalised, prices of non-tradables
differ across countries according to their relative factor endowments.
Then, the actual price level divided by this predicted price level is
defined as an index of real exchange rate distortion and average value
of this index over ten years (1976-1985 period) is used to remove short-
term fluctuations.12 In addition, Dollar (1992) develops a measure of
variability of real exchange rate, simply coefficient of variation of each
country’s distortion index during the same period and indicates that
Asian countries have low variability while the Latin American countries
12Dollar (1992) uses real per capita GDP as a proxy of factor endowment and population
density as a rough measure of land availability compared to labour force. In order to
estimate the relationship between price level and factor endowments, different regression
equations are estimated by Dollar (1992). Assuming that regression of RPL on the level
and square of real per capita GDP as well as regional dummies for Latin America and
Africa and year dummies reflects the true relationship between price level and endowments,
Dollar (1992) concludes that Africa is extremely and Latin America mildly inward oriented
while Asia is moderately outward oriented.
52
Chapter 2: Trade Openness and Economic Growth: Assessment
of Cross-Country Empirical Literature
show considerably higher variability.
By using these indices, Dollar (1992) concludes that his outward
orientation measure is highly correlated with per capita GDP growth
in a large sample of 95 countries for the period 1976-1985 and suggests
liberal trade policies for better economic performance. The following
view belongs to Dollar (1992, p.540): “[T]hese results strongly imply
that trade liberalisation, devaluation of the real exchange rate, and
maintenance of a stable real exchange rate could dramatically improve
growth performance in many poor countries.”
However, Dollar’s (1992) study is criticised by Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000) in many aspects. First, even if the law of one price always holds,
the impact of equivalent taxes on import and export on relative price
level will be different. As can be easily seen from equation (2.13) an
import tax will raise domestic prices of import competing goods rela-
tive to world prices and so, RPLi will increase. On the other hand,
an equivalent export tax will decrease RPLi since domestic price of
exportable goods declines compared to world prices. In this case, the
country is assessed as an outward oriented by Dollar (1992). That
is why, Dollar’s distortion index is affected by the different kinds of
trade restrictions and it fails in the case of trade restriction on exports
(both tax and subsidy). Second, the assumption that law of one price
is always held in the case of free trade has some practical flaws. Dol-
lar’s time horizon (1976-1985 period) may not be enough to eliminate
deviations unrelated to trade barriers from the law of one price and
it is possible to consider the cross country differences in price levels
as a result of monetary and exchange rate polices instead of trade re-
strictions. Finally, Dollar’s (1992) growth regression excludes other
important determinants of growth.
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Levine and Renelt (1992)
The most important characteristic of this study is that Levine and
Renelt (1992) directly address the model uncertainty problem in the
cross-country growth studies. For this purpose, the authors employ a
variant of Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis in order to test the
robustness of coefficient estimates for a wide range of policy indicators
to alterations in the other explanatory variables. Using the various
measures of trade openness, Levine and Renelt (1992) conclude no ro-
bust relation between openness and long run economic growth. They
also carry out the same analysis for the investment rate and show that
the only trade share is robustly and positively associated with invest-
ment rate. Levine and Renelt (1992) evaluate this result as evidence
that openness affects economic growth by stimulating capital accumu-
lation rather than via the productivity channel.13
Sachs and Warner (1995)
Undoubtedly, among the recent cross-country growth studies, the most
influential work is the paper by Sachs and Warner (1995). Their
methodology is different from the previous studies in two aspects:
First, they construct a single openness measure covering all major
kind of trade restrictions; Second, they examine growth performance
within the subset of open economies as well as within open and closed
economies. Sachs and Warner (1995) define a country as closed trade
policy if it has at least one of the following criteria for the 1970-1989
period:14
13The study by Levine and Renelt (1992) and the extreme bound analysis are detailed
in Chapter 3.
14According to Sachs and Warner (1995, p.25-26), these five criteria are chosen in order
to take into account all of major types of trade restrictions: “[T]ariffs and non-tariff
barriers (mainly quotas) are most obvious. The black market premium (BMP) is a measure
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• Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or more
• Average tariff rates is 40 percent of total exports or higher
• Black market premium for exchange rate exceed 20 percent, on
average, during the 1970s and the 1980s
• A socialist country
• A state monopoly on major exports.
Their openness measure is defined as a dummy variable such that a
value of zero indicates a closed economy while the value of one is for an
open economy. In order to test the proposition that openness improves
growth performance, Sachs and Warner (1995) estimate various growth
regressions and conclude that their openness measure gives a high and
statistically significant result in each regression.15
In summary, Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that their regression
results provide strong evidence that protectionist trade policies directly
have a negative impact on overall growth performance and indirectly
affect the rate of accumulation of physical capital. The Sachs-Warner
openness measure has been used in many subsequent cross-country
of exchange control: a large BMP is evidence of the rationing of foreign exchange, which
tends to be a form of import control. The socialist classification is used as an indicator
to cover countries like Poland and Hungary, which relied on central planning rather than
overt trade policies (for example, tariffs) to maintain a closed economy. Exports controls
are symmetrical with import controls in their effects on closing an economy, as A.P.
Lerner first established. The sub-Saharan African countries relied extensively on export
monopolies on foodstuffs, in part to maintain low domestic prices of food for urban areas.”
15Especially, the regression result, in which average income growth is regressed on initial
level of income, investment rate, primary and secondary school enrolment rates, govern-
ment consumption spending as well as openness measure indicates that the open economies
grow, on average by 2.45 percentage points more than closed ones. In addition, Sachs and
Warner (1995), conduct another growth regression including a composite dummy vari-
able representing extreme political conditions as well as the other explanatory variables
mentioned above. The regression result indicates that the variable related to political
conditions is statistically significant at 10 percent level and suggests that property rights,
safety from violence and freedom are additional important determinants for higher growth.
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growth studies. For instance Edwards (1998), Wacziarg (2001), Green-
away et al. (2002) using this measure as well as other openness in-
dicators, they all find a positive relationship between openness and
growth. Moreover, Sachs-Warner openness variable is found to be one
of the robust growth determinants in the studies taking into account
model uncertainty and/or model selection problem (such as Sala-i-
Martin (1997a), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Hoover and Perez (2004),
and Hendry and Krolzig (2004)). Finally, Wacziarg and Welch (2003)
update and extend the Sachs-Warner openness dummy over the 1990-
2000 period. These authors conclude that this variable is no longer
significant in the 1990s. However, they investigate the time paths
of growth within countries over the 1950-1998 period and conclude
that after the trade liberalisation countries experienced, on average,
increases in their annual growth rates by 1.5 percentage points com-
pared to pre-liberalisation period. However, this result is questionable
since Wacziarg and Welch (2003) attribute all growth accelerations to
trade liberalisation ignoring the fact that other factors may also stim-
ulate economic growth. In addition, many trade liberalisation efforts
are accompanied by other macroeconomic policy changes, such as IMF
structural reforms or the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans
(SAL) programs. Since these reforms are generally launched after eco-
nomic recessions, whether data evidence by Wacziarg and Welch (2003)
reflects the long run relationship between trade openness and economic
growth or business cycle effect remains unanswered. For instance, us-
ing a dynamic panel framework and three different openness indicators,
including the Sachs-Warner openness measure Greenaway, Morgan and
Wright (1998, 2002), conclude that the positive effect of liberalisation
on output level is lagged and relatively modest. The authors find a J
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curve response such that output first decreases and then increases.
On the other hand, the Sachs-Warner openness measure is strongly
criticised by Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000). Using the components of the Sachs-Warner openness measure
separately, Harrison and Hanson (1999) replicate the Sachs-Warner
analysis. They find that the effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers
on economic growth are small and statistically insignificant. The au-
thors show that the significance of the Sachs-Warner openness mea-
sure is driven by other factors which are not directly related to trade
policy, namely socialist country dummy and the black market pre-
mium. Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) find a similar result. In or-
der to highlight which components explain the strength of the Sachs-
Warner openness measure, Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) reconstruct
the openness dummy according to only the criteria on socialist country
dummy, tariffs and non-tariff barriers and conclude that the Sachs and
Warner openness dummy is insignificant when this variable is used in
the growth regressions. However, the authors show that the Sachs-
Warner openness measure is strongly significant when they employ
the openness dummy based only on the information relating to the
black market premium and state monopoly of major exports. Ro-
drik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) argue that the export monopoly compo-
nent of the Sachs-Warner openness variable acts like a sub-Saharan
Africa dummy since the Sachs-Warner analysis is based on the World
Bank (1994) study including only 29 African economies which were sub-
ject to structural adjustment programs during the period 1987-1991.
This leads to two important shortcomings about sample selection in
Sachs-Warner’s variable and so causes biased regression results: First
non-African economies with state monopoly on major exports (e.g. In-
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donesia) and second, the other African countries which were not under
structural adjustment programs from 1987 to 1991 (e.g. Mauritius)
are neglected. Therefore, it may be concluded that the criterion on a
state monopoly on major exports, one of the most important sources
of explanatory power of Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness dummy
is not a good measure for trade policy and can cause biased regression
results. In addition, Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) indicate that the
existence of large black market premium is as a result of policy failures
and bad macroeconomic conditions. Since these conditions are associ-
ated with poor growth performance, this component has a considerable
effect in the explanatory power of growth regression. However, the au-
thors claim that it is more reasonable to accept that the black market
premium is a good measure for macroeconomic imbalances rather than
trade policy.
Frankel and Romer (1999)
Emphasising the simultaneity problem between trade and income in
cross-country growth regressions, Frankel and Romer (1999) directly
question whether trade causes growth. The authors argue that coun-
tries’ geographic characteristics are a powerful determinant of bilateral
trade. Thus, assuming countries’ geographic characteristics are not
affected by their income or by government polices and other factors
that influence income, Frankel and Romer (1999) offer an IV for ac-
tual trade to GDP ratios on the basis of predicted trade shares from a
gravity model for bilateral trade in order to overcome the simultaneity
problem between income and trade.
They first estimate a bilateral trade equation and then aggregate the
fitted values for each country to estimate a geographic component of
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countries’ overall trade as an IV. Therefore, different from the conven-
tional gravity equations for bilateral trade, their trade model includes
only geographic characteristics: countries’s size (measured by area and
population), their distances from another, whether they share a com-
mon border, and whether they are landlocked. More formally, Frankel
and Romer (1999) estimate the following gravity equation:
πij = log(Tij/GDPi) = a0 + a1log(Dij) + a2log(Ni) + a3log(Ai)
+ a4log(Ni) + a5log(Ai) + a6(Li + Lj)
+ a7Bij + a8Bijlog(Dij) + a9Bijlog(Ni)
+ a10Bijlog(Ai) + a11Bijlog(Nj)
+ a12Bijlog(Aj) + a13Bij(Li + Lj)
(2.14)
where Tij is bilateral trade between countries i and j, Dij is distance
between them, N is population, A is area, L is a dummy for land-
locked countries, and B is a dummy for a common border between two
countries. Frankel and Romer (1999) construct the IV for country i by
aggregating the predicted values of country i’s trade with country j,
πˆij which is obtained from the equation (2.14) as follows
Tˆi =
∑
j 6=i
eπˆij (2.15)
Assuming income level as a function of both domestic and international
trade, Frankel and Romer (1999) regress per capita GDP on interna-
tional trade and within country trade (which is measured by coun-
try size). Both OLS and IV estimates show that coefficient of trade
share is positive and statistically significant. The outstanding finding
is that the coefficient of openness in IV estimates in which trade share
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is treated endogenous and hence predicted trade share is used as an in-
strument is found to be higher than it is in the OLS estimates. In light
of these findings, Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that simultaneity is
not a serious problem in appraising the effect of openness on growth
as many have thought and international trade raises the income level
and thus economic growth.
However, geographical component of international trade is corre-
lated not only with trade but also independently with economic growth
since geography affects income level directly and through other chan-
nels than just trade. Therefore, the positive effect of the Frankel-Romer
predicted trade share on economic growth might not be a result of in-
ternational trade per se. Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) show that the
result by Frankel and Romer (1999) disappears once geographical vari-
ables such as absolute latitude and fraction of land area in tropics are
included into regression. Irwin and Tervio¨ (2002) extend the Frankel-
Romer analysis throughout the 20th century and confirm their result.
However, this result is not again robust to inclusion of absolute lati-
tude.
Ongoing Debate on Primacy of Institutions, Geography and Open-
ness
As mentioned before, one important criticism of Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000) is that empirical studies investigate the openness-growth con-
nection in the framework of simple growth model ignoring other im-
portant growth determinants. Therefore, the recent empirical research
has turned to examining the relationship between openness and growth
accounting institutions and geography. More clearly, applying “kitchen
sink” exercises, these studies carry out a “horse race” among geograph-
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ical, institutional and trade-related determinants of economic growth.
Generally they estimate the variants of following the kitchen sink re-
gression model:
log(GDP per capita)i = π0 + π1Opennessi + π2Institutionsi
+ π3Geographyi + π4Other Controlsi + εi
(2.16)
As can be seen, the dependent variable in this regression is the level of
per capita GDP rather than growth rate. This is based on the assump-
tion that initial income levels were very similar across countries in the
distant past and thus the current cross-country income differences have
been a result of different growth performances over the very long run.
Therefore, it may be possible to capture the long-run growth deter-
minants from the specification in (2.16).16 The other important point
is that it is very difficult to attribute this specification to reflect the
true casual relationship between income and institutions or trade since
except geography both trade and institutions are endogenous. In order
to overcome this problem, a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
procedure on the basis of first stage regressions in which institutions
and trade are regressed on all other exogenous variables is employed
in these studies. They generally use settler mortality rate in the coun-
tries colonized by Europeans suggested by Acemoglu et al (2001) and
Frankel and Romer (1999) predicted trade share as IV for the present
institutions and international trade, respectively.
In this regard, Easterly and Levine (2003) estimate the income
level regressions in (2.16) employing various measures of endowments
of tropics, germs and crops, institutions and macroeconomic policies.
16Obviously this approach implicitly assumes that countries are currently in and/or very
close to their steady-states.
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They measure macroeconomic policies by three indicators namely frac-
tion of open years based on Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar’s (1992)
real exchange rate distortion index, and inflation rate. Easterly and
Levine (2003) conclude that institutions have a strong influence on eco-
nomic development. However, their findings indicate that geography
affects development through institutions. In other words, geography
does not have an independent and direct effect on development. Sim-
ilarly, macroeconomic polices do not have any effect on development
once institutions are controlled.
Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004) argue that international trade is a signif-
icant and robust determinant of aggregate productivity when country
size, geography and institutional quality are taken into account. The
key insight of this study, these authors measure openness by which they
refer to as “real openness.” According to Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004),
the traditional measure of openness as the ratio of imports plus ex-
ports in current prices to GDP in current prices may be a misleading
variable for reflecting openness. The reason is that productivity in-
creases due to international trade are greater in the tradable sector
than those in nontradable sector (Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis). As-
suming demand for nontradables is relatively price inelastic this leads
to a rise in the relative price of nontradbales and hence a decrease in
standard measure of openness which Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004) call as
“current openness.” In order to overcome this drawback, these authors
suggest real openness as an alternative way for measuring openness:
Real openness is defined exports plus imports in US dollar relative to
GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollar. Alcala´ and Ciccone
(2004) argue that real openness is a better measure of openness with
respect to current openness in the presence of trade driven productiv-
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ity gains. However, Rodrik et al. (2004) put forwards some conceptual
and empirical problems about this measure.
Giving less emphasis on geography, Dollar and Kraay (2003a,b)
examine the interaction amongst the growth, institutions and trade.
These authors find that in the second stage regression the significance of
both trade and institutions coefficients disappear when they instrument
for both trade and institutions using the instruments suggested by the
literature and once outlying countries are dropped.17 The reason is that
instruments for trade and institutions themselves are highly correlated
and both sets of instruments have strong explanatory power on both
endogenous variables. Thus, their main argument is that disentangling
the partial effects of institutions and trade on growth in the long run
is subject to a serious identification problem. In order to overcome
this problem, adapting the approach of Caselli et al. (1996) and using
appropriate lags of the endogenous variables as instruments, Dollar and
Kraay (2003a) estimate the regressions of changes in decadal growth
rates on instrumented changes in trade and changes in institutional
quality and conclude a strong effect of trade and a small impact of
institutions on economic growth. Dollar and Kraay (2003a) assess these
results as evidence of important joint role of both trade and institutions
in the long run, but relatively larger role for trade over the short run.
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) estimate equation (2.16)
in order to highlight the respective contributions of institutions, geog-
raphy and trade in determining income level by using settler mortality
rate and Frankel-Romer predicted trade shares as instruments for in-
stitutions and trade, respectively. Their main finding is that trade has
17These authors construct Frankel-Romer predicted trade shares using a gravity model
where bilateral trade as a fraction of GDP at PPP rather than current prices is regressed.
Therefore, their instrument for openness is identical to real openness once the geographical
characteristics of the countries are controlled.
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no direct effect on income while geography at best weak direct effects,
once institutions are controlled. According to their regression results,
international trade is often found to be insignificant with a negative co-
efficient estimate, whereas geography variable (absolute latitude) enters
the regressions with an insignificantly positive coefficient. Moreover,
the authors carry out some robustness checks on the side of trade.
Especially, they replace their trade variable which is equal to the ra-
tio of imports plus exports in current prices to GDP in current prices
with real openness suggested by Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004). However,
this does change their main finding such that the coefficient estimate
of trade variable is again insignificantly negative. In addition, Rodrik
et al. (2004) put forward some conceptual and empirical arguments
against the real openness. Their main criticism is that the positive
correlation between real openness and income level is spurious. The
most important reason is that all productivity gains whether or not
related to international trade lead to an increase in the price of non-
tradables at home and thus the price level of an economy with respect
to others. Adjusting for this by GDP in PPP makes the real openness
upward biased. Since the traditional trade ratio in current prices does
not suffer from this problem, these authors do not find real openness
as a compelling measure.
Finally, Jeffrey Sachs (2003) points out that absolute latitude used
in these papers is not appropriate for measuring the effect of geography.
Employing malaria incidence rate as a proxy, he shows that geography
directly affects the income level after controlling institutions.
Undoubtedly, these studies provide valuable information in order to
understand relative contributions of openness, institutions and geogra-
phy to income level and hence economic growth. However, these studies
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are still subject to model uncertainty as pointed out by Durlauf et al.
(2007) since they are based on specific choices of growth determinants.
Time Period
Most of the recent cross-country studies are based on the 1970-1990
period while investigating openness-growth connection. Of course, the
important reason is that until recently, Penn World Tables (Version 5.6)
covered the 1950-1992 period. However, some researchers still focus on
the period 1970-1990 in spite of the available data over the period 1950-
2000 period (Penn World Tables Version 6.1). For instance, Warner
(2003) stresses that time period for empirical investigation, especially
for tariff-growth connection, should be 1970-1990 since the majority
of developing countries liberalised their trade regimes during the late
1980s and early 1990s.
However, given the available data, investigating the relationship be-
tween openness and growth over the 1970-1990 period may be trouble-
some. First, as pointed out by Vamwakidis (2002), during the 20th cen-
tury protectionism was a general rule except its last two decades. Look-
ing at historical data from 1870 to 1990, Vamwakidis (2002) finds no ev-
idence for a positive growth-openness connection before 1970 whilst he
concludes a positive association between these two over the 1970-1990
period. According to Vamwakidis (2002), the positive growth-openness
connection during the 1970-1990 period is an exception.18 Therefore,
investigating openness-growth connection after 1970 may lead to biased
results. The reason is that most developing countries experienced rel-
18According to Vamwakidis (2002), the correlation between openness and growth is
negative for the period 1920-1940. Similarly, using data on 35 high and low income
countries, Clemens and Williamson (2002) investigate tariff-growth connection over the
period 1870-1990 and find that tariff rate and economic growth is positively associated
pre-1950 period. In particular, this association is strong and statistically significant for
the period 1873-1912.
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atively higher growth performance during the 1960s and hence a time
period starting from 1970 does not include the growth information of
the 1960s. Second, the post-1990 experience also provides impor-
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Figure 2.1: Growth rate versus Tariff rate: 1990-2000
tant information on the openness-growth connection. For instance,
Rodr´ıguez (2007) argues that data evidence does not show significant
differences in growth rates between open and closed economies after
1990. Figure 2.1 display the graphical visualization of the relationship
between growth rate of per worker GDP and unweighted tariff rate pro-
vided by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) over the period 1990-2000. As can
be seen, there is no significant association between these two. Similarly,
neither imports nor exports are significantly correlated with economic
growth during the 1990s (see figure 2.2). Hence, excluding the 1990s
from the data analysis again may lead to biased results. Therefore, we
believe that the 1960 to 2000 is a more plausible period for investigat-
ing the openness-growth link because it is sufficiently long to reflect
both changes in trade policy stance and growth dynamics in the long
run.
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Figure 2.2: Trade and Growth in the Nineties
2.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed the empirical cross-country growth
studies on the openness-growth connection. Most of the previous stud-
ies, especially those in the 1980s and the 1990s concluded that openness
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influences economic growth significantly and positively in the long-run.
These studies were subsequently used to support policy recommenda-
tion of trade liberalization. However, a close look at these studies
highlights some stylized facts:
• A myriad of openness measures have been suggested in the em-
pirical work. This reflects the fact that none of them adequately
captures all elements of openness, and as noted by Pritchet (1996)
in many cases the correlations among them are weak. Indeed,
most openness variables in the literature generally tend to mea-
sure only one aspect of trade policy. More importantly, these
variables often fail to classify countries according to their degree
of openness. Of course, overcoming of these problems is chal-
lenging due to the complex nature of trade policy, disagreements
between the economists what determines openness and the lack
of good data across countries and over time.
• The substantial part of existing studies focuses on the period
1970-1990. Given the available data for a longer time period, it
is highly likely that investigating the openness-growth connection
over the 1970-1990 period leads to biased results.
• The causality between openness and growth has remained unclear.
In our opinion, providing a clear and decisive causal relationship
from cross-country growth studies is almost impossible due to the
lack of valid instrumental variables. Moreover, as Rodrik (2005)
points out that the endogeneity problem between growth and a
policy variable in the cross-country growth regressions is a bigger
problem because policy interventions are also a response to larger
market failures or poor growth performance.
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• Model uncertainty is an important problem since most studies
tend to investigate openness-growth relation employing simple
growth models. As Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) argue, given
a wide number of growth theories and their proxies, the strong
results in favour of openness may arise from model misspecifation
and/or openness measures may be acting as a proxy for other
macroeconomic policies or other important factors such as insti-
tutions and geography.
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the cross-country studies fail
to provide a robust and convincing evidence on the relationship between
openness and growth and this issue is still highly controversial.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to describe the basic framework used in subsequent
chapters and then to highlight model uncertainty in the empirical
cross-country growth literature. Following the seminal studies by Ko-
rmendi and Meguire (1985), Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), a
large number of empirical works have emerged to explain cross-country
growth differences, with the hope of providing some policy suggestions
for economic growth. This renewed interest arose from recent devel-
opments in the theory of endogenous growth and the increasing avail-
ability of multi-country growth data sets, e.g. the Penn World Tables,
(Summers and Heston (1988, 1991)).
However, as pointed out by Temple (1999a) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004), in spite of recent theoretical developments, the empir-
ical studies are mainly based on extended versions of the neoclassical
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growth model. An important reason for neglecting endogenous growth
theory in cross-country growth empirics is that the inclusion of techno-
logical change (via learning by doing, production of new ideas and R&D
activities) in the neoclassical growth model is difficult, since standard
competitive market assumptions will not be valid. Furthermore, en-
dogenous growth theories have less explanatory power for understand-
ing cross-country growth differentials even though growth economists
have reached a general consensus that whilst basic technological change
is the most important determinant for understanding why the world
economy as a whole has been growing indefinitely in per capita terms.
For instance Barro (1997, p.8) argues that “[I]t is surely an irony that
one of the lasting contributions of endogenous growth theory is that
it stimulated empirical work that demonstrated the explanatory power
of the neoclassical growth model.” Therefore, the neoclassical growth
model firstly developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) is a starting
point of most cross-country growth studies.
The key aspect of the neoclassical growth model is the assumption
of a neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale and
diminishing returns to each input (both capital and labour). Taking
rates of saving, population growth and technological progress as ex-
ogenous, the neoclassical growth model emphasises the accumulation
of physical capital over time in determining the steady state growth
path for each economy. Despite its simplicity, the neoclassical growth
model has many testable predictions concerning sources of economic
growth and cross-country growth differences.1 In this context, a semi-
nal study by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) augments the neoclassi-
cal model with the accumulation of human capital. Furthermore, this
1See Mankiw (1995) for a nice summary of these well-known predictions.
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study provides a coherent theoretical framework for empirical cross-
country growth studies and a large body of empirical cross-country
growth literature is based on Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Islam
(1995) and others further adapt the framework of Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) for panel estimation.
However, as we noted in Chapter 1, the accumulation of physi-
cal and human capital, population growth and technological progress
are proximate determinants of economic growth. In other words, even
though these factors explain a considerable part of cross-county growth
differences and in spite of the common consensus concerning these fac-
tors as potential growth determinants, these facts bear a pertinent
question: Why are countries different in terms of proximate growth
determinants? In their ability to answer this question, recent endoge-
nous growth theories are not superior to the neoclassical growth model.
In other words, recent endogenous growth models (for instance Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)) suggest that a country that
allocates more resources to innovative activities and/or R&D sectors
will have a higher growth rate in the long run. However, which fac-
tors determine the incentives and preferences of resource allocation for
innovation remains unanswered. That is why growth economists have
investigated the deeper sources of economic growth and suggested many
new theories in order to explain growth differences across countries.
The most striking feature of these new growth theories is that they
have always had an empirical basis. A typical study, firstly presents
a theory, then suggests a proxy variable for that theory and finally
concludes a cross-country growth regression including this new theory
as well as the proximate determinants.2 Whilst recent efforts provide
2Typically such cross-country growth regressions include the initial income level, the
investment ratio and a measure of human capital such as primary and secondary school
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valuable information, such studies are subject to many econometric
problems (e.g. model uncertainty, endogeneity, outliers, measurement
errors, parameter heterogeneity).
Probably, the most important of these problems is model uncer-
tainty. There are two important reasons for this. First, unlike the prox-
imate determinants of growth, there is no common consensus among
the new growth theories. Whilst almost all studies include the same
proximate determinants, the new growth theories change from study
to study. In other words, there is no clear answer as to which of these
new growth theories is more important. Indeed, it is likely that new
growth theories are complementary, not exclusive, as Durlauf (2002)
points out. The consequence of this is that a vast number of explana-
tory variables appears in the empirical cross-country growth literature.3
Second, we have a limited number of observations since the number of
countries in the world is limited. Furthermore, when running cross-
country growth regressions, many observations are missing due to data
availability. 4
The objectives of this chapter are threefold: First, it describes the
general theoretical framework which constitutes the basis for the most
empirical cross-country growth works. Second, it addresses the model
uncertainty problem which is indeed immense but generally ignored
in the empirical cross-country growth literature. Third, the chapter
highlights the importance of model uncertainty for policy evaluation.
enrolment rate, as well as some proxy variables for the new theory. Regressions of this kind
are also known as “Barro type regression” due to the pioneering work by Barro (1991).
3Another reason for this proliferation is the difficulties arising from construction of
proxy variables for new theories. For instance, a theory pointing out that openness to
international trade is important for economic growth does not provide a clear answer as
to how we measure openness.
4As noted by Sala-i-Martin (2001), empirical cross-country growth works are subject
to small sample econometrics. Therefore, the econometric problems discussed in cross-
country growth empirics are common to other applied studies with small samples.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic framework for the recent cross-country growth literature. Sec-
tion 3 deals with the model uncertainty problem. Section 4 briefly
evaluates cross-country growth studies in terms of policy evaluation.
Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Framework
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework for cross-country
growth regression. Special emphasis is focused on Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) since this study suggests a benchmark equation for much
of the subsequent cross-country growth literature.
Following the standard notation, we denote the level of output by
Y (t), labour stock by L(t) and level of labour-augmenting technology
by A(t) at time t. Assuming that production function exhibits constant
returns to scale and labour and technology grow exogenously at rates n
and g such that L(t) = L(0)ent and A(t) = A(0)egt, output per unit of
labour; y(t) = Y (t)/L(t) and output per unit of effective labour; y˜(t) =
Y (t)/A(t)L(t) are defined. As indicated by many authors both Solow-
Swan or Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans versions of the neoclassical growth
model for closed economies conclude that the growth rate of per capita
output is inversely related to initial level of per capita output.5 This
implies that
λ = −∂(
˙˜k(t)/k˜(t))
∂logk˜(t)
(3.1)
where k˜ denotes the physical capital stock per unit of effective labour
and λ measures the speed of convergence (defined as how much the
5See for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), Mankiw
(1995), Islam (1995), Durlauf et al. (2005).
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growth rate decreases when the capital stock increases proportionally).
Notice that in equation (3.1), the speed of convergence is defined with
a negative sign since the derivative is negative due to the marginal di-
minishing return to capital. Therefore, λ must be positive, and its size
depends on the parameters of the model. The other important point
is that λ is not constant. This means that λ decreases monotonically
while capital stock converges to its steady-state value. Put differently λ
is implicitly a function of k˜(t) and becomes zero when the capital stock
reaches its steady-state level. Therefore, we denote speed of conver-
gence in the neighborhood of steady-sate by λ∗. Since the production
function is assumed to have constant returns to scale, equation (3.1)
can be applied for the output per unit of effective labour, i.e. speed of
convergence can be alternatively defined for y˜(t):
λ = −∂(
˙˜y(t)/y˜(t))
∂logy˜(t)
(3.2)
Equation (3.1) implies that the first-order Taylor approximation of
logk˜(t) around the steady state yields
˙˜k(t)/k˜(t) ∼= −λ∗[log(k˜(t)/k˜(t)∗)] (3.3)
Similarly, equations (3.2) and (3.3) imply that
˙˜y(t)/y˜(t) ∼= −λ∗[log(y˜(t)/y˜(t)∗)] (3.4)
As can be seen, equations (3.3) and (3.4) are first-order differential
equations. Equation (3.4) can be written more explicitly as follows
dlogy˜(t)
dt
= λ∗logy˜(t)∗ − λ∗logy˜(t) (3.5)
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Solving (3.5) gives
logy˜(t) = (1− e−λ∗t)logy˜(t)∗ + e−λ∗tlogy˜(0) (3.6)
Equation (3.6) can be expressed for output per labour instead of output
per unit of effective labour as follows
logy(t)− logA(t) = (1− e−λ∗t)logy˜(t)∗ + e−λ∗tlogy(0)− e−λ∗tlogA(0)
(3.7)
and so
logy(t) = gt+ (1− e−λ∗t)logy˜(t)∗ + (1− e−λ∗t)logA(0)) + e−λ∗tlogy(0)
(3.8)
Subtracting the logarithm of the initial level of output per capita from
both sides of equation (3.8) and dividing by time t yields the following
growth equation
t−1(logy(t)− logy(0)) = g + η[logy˜(t)∗ + logA(0)− logy(0)] (3.9)
where η = t−1(1 − e−λ∗t). The left-hand side of equation (3.9) shows
the growth rate of output per labour between 0 and t.6 As can be
seen from equation (3.9), the growth rate of per capita output may be
decomposed into two main factors. The first one is the growth rate
of technological progress, g. The second one is the distance between
initial level of output per unit of effective labour and its steady state
6Notice that the growth rate in equation (3.9) is defined per unit of time. If the unit
of time is a year, the left-hand side of equation (3.9) measures the average growth rate
of output per labour annually. On the other hand one can construct the growth rate
as the log difference between initial and end of period values such that logy(t) − logy(0)
since equation (3.9) is based on the log-linear approximation of output per unit of effective
labour in the vicinity of steady state. As long as it is explicitly expressed, both approaches
are in essence the same, and choosing between these two depends on the researchers’
preferences.
76
Chapter 3: Cross-Country Growth Empirics and Model
Uncertainty
value, logy˜(t)∗ − logy˜(0). In order to show the second factor more
explicitly, equation (3.9) can be written as
t−1(logy(t)− logy(0)) = g + η[logy˜(t)∗ − logy˜(0)] (3.10)
It can be seen from equation (3.10) that, the growth rate of per capita
output is inversely related to the initial level of output per unit of
effective labour while it is positively related to the steady state level
of output per unit of effective labour and hence its determinants. As
time approaches infinity, i.e. as an economy converges to its steady
state, the effect of the second factor vanishes, and at the steady state,
is equal to zero. This means that in the long run, the growth rate of
per capita output is determined by the rate of technological progress,
g.
If we assume that rate of technological progress, g and the deter-
minants of the steady state level of output per unit of effective labour
are constant across countries, then each economy approaches the same
steady state in the long run. That is why, countries with a lower initial
level of output per unit of effective labour grow faster than those with
a higher initial level of output per unit of effective labour during the
transition period. This result is known as the absolute convergence hy-
pothesis and predicts that countries tend to catch up those with higher
initial values of capital labour ratio and per capita output. However, if
the countries have different values of g and determinants of steady state
value of output per unit of effective labour, then steady states will be
different across countries. Therefore, each economy will converge to its
own steady state rather than a common steady state, and the speed of
this convergence will be inversely related to the distance of the initial
level from the steady state. This property is a result of the assumption
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of diminishing returns to capital, so that economies which have less
capital per head relative to its steady state level tend to have higher
rates of return and so faster growth. In this situation, the neoclassi-
cal growth model implies conditional convergence instead of absolute
convergence in the sense that an economy with a lower initial value of
per capita output tends to generate higher growth rate of per capita
output if g and determinants of the steady state value of output per
unit of effective labour are the same across countries or their effects are
controlled .
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) are the basis for the estimation of cross-
country growth regressions in the empirical growth literature. Adding
an error term µ, which is independent from all right-hand side variables,
yields the following cross-country growth regression
t−1(logyi(t)− logyi(0)) = gi + ηlogy˜i(t)∗ − ηlogyi(0) + ηlogAi(0) + µi
(3.11)
where subscript i denotes the country i. This last equation is the basic
cross-country growth regression in discrete time which is derived from
continuous time neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model.
In this context, the seminal study by Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992, MRW hereafter) augments the Solow-Swan version of neoclassi-
cal growth model by adding the accumulation of human capital. They
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function such that production at
time t in country i is given by
Yi(t) = Ki(t)
αHi(t)
β(Ai(t)Li(t))
1−α−β (3.12)
where the notation here is again standard such that Y is output, K is
physical capital, H is the stock of human capital, L is labour, and A is
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level of technology. MRW (1992) assumes that α+β < 1, which means
that there are decreasing returns to both kinds of capital. Labour stock
and the level of technology are assumed to grow exogenously at rates
n and g, respectively as before.
The production function in equation (3.12) can be written in its
intensive form. More clearly, it can be expressed in terms of per unit
of effective labour since it has constant returns to scale.
y˜(t) = k˜(t)αh˜(t)β (3.13)
where h˜ is the stock of human capital per unit of effective labour and the
remaining variables are as before. The model assumes that a constant
fraction of output is invested in both physical and human capital such
that sK is the fraction of income invested in physical capital and sH
is the fraction of income invested in human capital. Defining δ as the
depreciation rate of both physical and human capital, yields
˙˜k(t) = sK y˜(t)− (n+ g + δ)k˜(t) (3.14)
˙˜h(t) = sH y˜(t)− (n+ g + δ)h˜(t) (3.15)
Equations (3.14) and (3.15) imply that the economy converges to a
steady state defined as follows
k˜(t)∗ =
(
s1−βK s
β
H
n+ g + δ
)1/1−α−β
(3.16)
h˜(t)∗ =
(
sαKs
1−α
H
n+ g + δ
)1/1−α−β
(3.17)
Substituting equations (3.16) and (3.17) into the production function
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gives the steady state level of output per unit of effective labour:
y˜(t)∗ =
[
sαKs
β
H
(n+ g + δ)α+β
]1/1−α−β
(3.18)
Using the definition of speed of convergence expressed in equation (3.2)
with the equations from (3.13) to (3.18), the convergence coefficient in
the vicinity of the steady state can be defined by7
λ∗ = (1− α− β)(n+ g + δ) (3.19)
λ∗ measures how rapidly a country’s output per unit of effective labour
approaches its steady state value in the neighbourhood of the steady
state. For instance, if we assume that the sum of rates of population
growth, technological progress and depreciation is seven percent and
capital shares are one-third, then λ∗ would be equal to 0.023. This
means that 2.3 percent of the gap between a country’s steady state
and its current income level is eliminated each year and halfway to
convergence takes approximately 30 years, in the absence of any other
shocks.8
In order to get a cross-country growth regression, we need to sub-
stitute expression (3.18), i.e. steady state level of output per unit of
7See Appendix for derivation of convergence coefficient in the augmented neoclassical
growth model.
8According to the equation (3.6), the half-way convergence to steady state requires the
condition 1 = 2e−λ
∗t. Therefore, the half-life convergence to steady state is log(2)/λ∗.
Similarly, elimination of a three-quarter gap must satisfy the condition 1 = 4e−λ
∗t, and
takes 2log(2)/λ∗. For instance in the example above, three-quarters of convergence to
steady state takes 2log(2)/0.023 = 60.3 years.
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effective labour into equation (3.11). This produces
t−1(logyi(t)− logyi(0)) = g + η α
1− α− β logsi,K + η
β
1− α− β logsi,H
− η α + β
1− α− β log(ni + g + δ)− ηlogyi(0)
+ ηlogAi(0) + µi
(3.20)
As can be seen from the last equation, MRW assume that rates of
technological progress and of depreciation are constant across countries.
On the other hand, logarithm of initial level of technology is assumed
to be different across countries and be equal to the sum of a fixed
parameter, a and a country specific shock, εi such that
logAi(0) = a+ εi (3.21)
According to MRW, the level of initial technology represents not only
the technology but also the resource endowment, institutions, climate
and so on. Therefore, initial differences across countries are reflected
by the term εi. Substituting equation (3.21) into equation (3.20) yields
the following cross-country growth regression;
t−1(logyi(t)− logyi(0)) = g + ηa− ηlogyi(0)− η α + β
1− α− β log(ni + g + δ)+
η
α
1− α− β logsi,K + η
β
1− α− β logsi,H + µi + ηεi
(3.22)
The most critical assumption of MRW (1992, p.411) is that “[t]he rates
of saving and population growth are independent of country-specific
factors shifting the production function.” This means that si,K , si,H ,
and ni are independent from the country specific shocks εi and thus, a
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cross-country growth regression expressed as in equation (3.22) can be
estimated by OLS.
The cross-country growth regression in equation (3.22) can be writ-
ten in its reduced form
̺i = π0+π1logyi(0)+π2log(ni+g+δ)+π3logsi,K+π4logsi,H+υi (3.23)
where
̺i = t
−1(logyi(t)− logyi(0))
π0 = g + ηa
π1 = −η
π2 = −η α + β
1− α− β
π3 = η
α
1− α− β
π4 = η
β
1− α− β
υi = µi + ηεi
Equation (3.22) and its reduced form in (3.23) are the basis of the
augmented neoclassical growth model. MRW estimated the augmented
neoclassical growth model for 98 countries (oil producing countries are
excluded) over the 1960-1985 period. The share of investment in GDP
and the fraction of working-age population enrolled in secondary school
are used as proxy variables for sK and sH , respectively. All right-
hand side variables, except the initial level of GDP per worker are
entered into the regression as period averages instead of their initial
value.9 Regression results show that the average growth rate of GDP
9Note that theory does not provide a clear answer for choosing between period averages
and initial values, since these variables are considered as constant over the period and
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per worker is positively correlated with the investment to GDP ratio
and secondary school enrolment rate and negatively with the initial
income level and population growth. Moreover, MRW estimate the
augmented neoclassical model imposing the restriction that coefficients
on log(n + g + δ), logsK and logsH add up to zero. Finding that this
restriction is not rejected, MRW conclude the regression estimates of
λ∗ = 0.0142, α = 0.48 and β = 0.23, which denote the convergence rate,
physical and human capital shares in the vicinity of the steady-state,
respectively. According to MRW, their estimation results produce a
lower convergence rate than the standard neoclassical growth model
excluding human capital and remove some anomalies which are not
captured by the standard model. In other words, with the inclusion of
human capital, differences in saving, education and population growth
produce a consistent explanation for cross-country growth variations.
Even though MRW provide a coherent framework to explain cross-
country growth differences, it is subject to a number of criticisms. The
most important one is that it is unlikely that variations in the initial
level of technology are uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables.
As mentioned before, the initial level of technological efficiency is omit-
ted from the cross-country regression since it is not observed. Yet, if
initial income, saving rates and population growth are correlated with
the initial technological efficiency, then coefficient estimates of regres-
sors will be biased. As suggested by Islam (1995), one solution to this
problem is to employ panel data estimation methods. Since the initial
level of technology is time invariant, it can be considered as a country
fixed effect. Islam (1995), Caselli et al. (1996) Lee et al. (1997) amongst
others apply the augmented neoclassical growth model on panel data.
exogenous. Yet, the common practice in the literature is to use average values over the
period.
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An outstanding result of these studies is that they find a higher rate
of conditional convergence compared to cross-sectional studies. In ad-
dition, they generally conclude that other explanatory variables, espe-
cially human capital, either are insignificant or have wrong signs.
The second criticism is that the secondary school enrolment rate is
not an appropriate proxy for the investment rate in human capital. An
important issue concerning school enrolment rates is that this variable
is sometimes used as a proxy for level of human capital sometimes as a
measure of change in human capital. It is however more appropriate to
use school enrolment rate as a flow variable for human capital as indi-
cated by Barro (1991) and Barro and Lee (1994b). Indeed, in the cross-
country growth literature there are many studies (such as Barro (1991),
Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b), Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004)) as well as Mankiw et al. (1992) that employ school enrolment
rate as a proxy for accumulation of human capital and find that school
enrolment rate is positively and significantly associated with economic
growth. However, there are also other studies strongly criticizing these
findings. For instance Bils and Klenow (2000) argue that strong em-
pirical relation between growth and school enrolment rate is spurious
since it is more likely that both variables are correlated with other
omitted factors such as openness to international trade or institutions.
In addition, according to these authors there is the possibility that this
relation reflects reverse causality. Similarly, Pritchett (2001) points
out secondary school enrolment rate is an extremely poor proxy for
growth in average years of schooling because school enrolment rates,
especially those in developing countries, substantially increase over the
time period in the cross-country growth analysis. Due to these criti-
cisms, there is a tendency in the literature about the schooling years
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per person published by Barro and Lee (1994a, 2000) as a more reliable
measure for the level of human capital. However, some studies such
as Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (2001) employ average
years of schooling as a measure of human capital stock and conclude
that the relationship between change in years of schooling and growth
of per capita income is insignificant and mostly negative. One possibil-
ity for this adverse relation is outlier effect. Temple (1999b) concludes
a positive and significant relation between change in schooling year and
growth when a number of extreme observations are omitted. Another
possibility is that these studies are based on growth accounting frame-
work rather than standard cross-country growth regression and hence
their regression results may have suffered from omitted variable bias.
However, in spite of these possibilities, an important conclusion from
these studies is that neither school enrolment rates nor average years
of schooling are good proxies for human capital. The most important
reason is that they do not directly measure cognitive skills of labour
force. This leads some researchers to employ alternative variables mea-
suring directly the quality of labour force such as teacher-student ratio
or math and science test scores.10 On the other hand, some authors (for
example Temple (1999a), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Krueger and
Lindahl (2001), Bils and Klenow (2000), Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu (2007)) suggest measures of
human capital based on returns to schooling or some measures based
on the findings of other micro studies, specifically Mincerian approach
to human capital.11
10For instance Hanushek and Kimko (2000) employing international math and science
test scores from 31 countries conclude a significant and positive correlation between this
variable and growth. Similarly, Jones and Schneider (2006) find that national average IQ
test score is positively correlated with growth. Their finding is robust such that IQ test
score passes a Bayesian model averaging test at 99.8 significance level.
11According to this approach, human capital is an exponential function of years of
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There is no doubt that the relation between growth and schooling
(hence human capital) is a complex one. We expect a positive relation
between these two due to the fact that education directly increases
productive skills of labour force. In addition, schooling can stimulate
economic growth through other channels such as reducing corruption,
better conflict management, increasing health quality and so on. How-
ever, an increase in school attainment is necessary but not sufficient
condition for accumulation of human capital. As pointed by Pritchett
(2001) institutional environment and demand for human capital are
important factors. Yet, it is more likely that schooling significantly
contributes to the level of human capital since it teaches how to learn
and thus help to adapt and use new technological advances (Phelps
(1995)). Therefore, variables measuring school attainment can still be
used as a proxy for human capital, especially in the absence of better
data.12 MRW argue that if secondary school enrolment rate is propor-
tional to saving rate for human capital (a reasonable assumption), then
it can be used in the cross-country growth regressions. Of course prob-
lems such as data quality or measurement error associated with school
enrolment rate are important. However, it may be worth reminding
that all proxy variables in the cross-country literature are not free of
these problems. As pointed out by Mankiw (1995), many variables in
the literature are crude proxies at best.
Thirdly, the assumption that the rate of technological progress is
constant across countries is criticised. According to MRW, technol-
ogy differs across countries due to the differences in initial level of
schooling.
12Recently, Cohen and Soto (2007) have provided a new data set for average years of
schooling over the period 1960-2000 as an alternative to schooling years published by Barro
and Lee (2000). These authors replicate the previous studies which concluded negative
and insignificant relation between growth and schooling and find that their new series is
positively and significantly correlated with growth.
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technology, not differences in technological improvements. Put differ-
ently, they consider that technology is a public good freely and equally
spreading over the world. Therefore, differences in growth are a re-
sult of differences in saving rates and population growth. However,
as pointed out by Temple (1999), there is no logical reason to expect
that countries with initially different levels of technology experience
the same rate of technological improvement. For instance, Lee, Pe-
saran and Smith (1997) point out that rates of technological progress
vary across countries, even among industrial ones. Therefore, it seems
difficult to explain growth miracles after the Second World War, such
as Japan and South Korea, as purely a result of capital accumulation.
On the other hand, one may conclude that this assumption is less un-
realistic in the long run. More clearly, even if the level of technology
is different across countries, in the long run the rate of technological
progress will be the same over the world since countries try to access
all technology available everywhere.13
Finally, some authors (for example Hall and Jones (1999), Frankel
and Romer (1999), and Acemoglu et al. (2001)) suggest that the the-
oretical framework provided by MRW can be used for income level
regression instead of growth regressions.14 Even though this sugges-
tion seems reasonable since the primary objective of growth studies is
to explain growth and ultimately income differences across countries,
the disadvantages of income level regressions are twofold. First, the
13Of course, the fact that the level of technology grows at the same rate across coun-
tries in the long run does not necessarily mean that one can assume a common rate of
technological progress for any given sample. See Temple (1999) and Aghion and Howitt
(1999) for further discussion.
14Taking the logarithm of the steady state value of output per unit of effective labour
expressed in equation (3.18) and rearranging it, produce the following level regression
log
Y ∗i (t)
L∗i (t)
= a+ gt− α+ β
1− α− β log(ni + g+ δ) +
α
1− α− β logsi,K +
β
1− α− β logsi,H + εi
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possible endogenity problem between the dependent variable and re-
gressors is more obvious and finding good instruments in order to solve
this problem is almost impossible. Second, this approach explicitly
requires the assumption that countries are in their steady states.
Despite these problems, the large body of empirical cross-country
growth literature consists of extended versions of the baseline specifica-
tion in equation (3.23). A recent extension of this specification occurs
through adding proxy variables suggested by the new growth theories
as
̺i = π0 +π1logyi(0)+π2log(ni+g+δ)+π3logsi,K +π4logsi,H +ψZi+υi
(3.24)
where Z is a vector of additional explanatory variables. The extended
versions of the augmented neoclassical growth model in (3.24) can be
rewritten in its generic form which is sometimes useful as follows
̺i = γ + πXi + ψZi + υi (3.25)
where γ is constant term and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables
suggested by the augmented neoclassical growth model, i.e. proximate
determinants of growth. However, there are some unclear points in the
extended versions of MRW, as argued by Temple (1999a).
Firstly, whether recent extensions attempt to explain differences in
initial level of technology or to allow differences in the rate of techno-
logical progresses across countries is unclear. Put differently, whether
Zi determines the steady state level of income or long run growth rate
is not defined. As can be easily seen, the only difference between the
cross-country growth specification by MRW and its recent extensions
is that the term g+ ηa+ ηεi in equation (3.22) is replaced by the term
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g+ ηa+ψZi + ηεi in equation (3.24). This would lead one to interpret
the introduction of ψZi to relate to initial differences in the level of
technology, since extended versions of MRW ignore the fact that the
term log(ni + g + δ) should be replaced with the term log(ni + gi + δ)
if new growth theories affect the rate of technological progress. Of
course, allowing new growth theories to affect the rate of technological
progress is not easy since this makes the cross-country growth regres-
sion nonlinear via the term log(ni + gi(Zi) + δ).
Secondly, if Zi is correlated with the initial level of technology, then
Zi enters the cross-country growth regression with the expected sign
even if Zi does not have any effect on the long run growth rate. For
instance, if initially more efficient countries are more open to interna-
tional trade, then an openness variable will have a positive sign even
though openness does not affect growth in the long run. Yet, in spite of
these facts, one can claim that Zi has an effect on the long run growth
rate. The reason is that many cross-country growth works cover 20 or
30 years and it is not reasonable to assume that countries experience
the same rate of technological progress over the time period. As sug-
gested by Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005), whether Zi affects the
income level or growth rate in the long run depends on the researcher’s
prior beliefs.
However, even if it is plausible to assume that the interpretation
of Zi depends on the researcher’s beliefs, another important problem
related to Zi remains. As mentioned earlier, while the Xi variables
are generally constant in empirical cross country studies, there is no
consensus about the Zi variables in the literature. Therefore selecting
Zi variables is problematic and the selection differs from one study to
another and thus raise the model uncertainty problem in cross-country
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growth regressions.
3.3 Model Uncertainty and Cross-Country Growth
Regressions
Probably the most fundamental and controversial problem with cross-
country growth regressions is model uncertainty and this issue has been
acknowledged by many authors since the important work by Levine
and Renelt (1992).15 Indeed, model uncertainty is a crucial problem
for any kind of empirical work in economics. However, the degree and
solution to this problem become more severe and difficult in the context
of cross-country growth regression since, as pointed out by Brock and
Durlauf (2001, p.234), growth theories are fundamentally open-ended
in the sense that “ [t]he idea that the validity of one causal theory of
growth does not imply the falsity of another.” Thus new growth the-
ories suggest a wide range of different explanations for cross-country
growth differences such as quality of institutions, political stability, re-
source curse, population heterogeneity, the role of geography and so on.
For instance, a recent survey by Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005)
concludes that 145 different proxies have been found to be statistically
significant in at least one study. This implies that identification of
explanatory variables is a very important task and thus the problem
of omitted variable bias in a particular cross-country regression is im-
mense. However, it is impossible to simply run a cross-country growth
regression including all variables suggested by new growth theories due
to large number of growth variables and the small sample at hand,
that is the limited number of countries in the world. Furthermore, the
15See for instance Mankiw (1995), Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b), Temple (1999a, 2000), Brock
and Durlauf (2001).
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number of countries in a particular cross-country growth regression is
considerably less than the actual number of countries because of data
availability. Of course, in the empirical cross-country growth literature,
there is no study attempting to employ all possible variables. Rather,
many studies chose a subset of explanatory variables and then report
a selected model with the results of diagnostic test to provide robust
evidence for one or more of the variables of interest. However, during
the last decade this approach has been criticised since the results of
these studies are very sensitive to included and/or excluded variables.
The main difficulty in these studies is that several different models may
all provide reasonable representations of the data, but lead to very dif-
ferent conclusions about what causes economic growth. Under these
conditions, presenting results of a single preferred model can often be
misleading.
Brock, Durlauf and West (2003, p.268) characterise the model un-
certainty in a more general context. These authors suggest that “[i]t
is useful in specifying a model space to consider several distinct lev-
els of model uncertainty and build up the space sequentially. ” They
then highlight three basic aspects of model uncertainty: First and most
importantly, “theory uncertainty” stems from disagreements over alter-
native theories used to explain the phenomenon. Of course, this dis-
agreement is closely related to the absence of strong empirical evidence
that would be conclusive for ranking alternative theories; The second
is “specification uncertainty”. Many empirical proxies for a particular
variable give rise to this kind of uncertainty. Therefore, specification
uncertainty is sometimes referred to as “proxy uncertainty”. How-
ever, specification uncertainty encompasses the possible nonlinearities
and lag length of variables as well as proxy uncertainty; The third is
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“heterogeneity uncertainty” stemming from the heterogeneity among
different observations. For example, in the growth context, the effect
of a particular theory and/or variable on Kenya will undoubtedly be
different from that on the United Kingdom. This is why one needs to
clarify whether there is heterogeneity in the growth process among the
countries or regions being considered. Different specifications of het-
erogeneity among countries and regions produce different models and
raise model uncertainty.
In short, theory, specification and heterogeneity uncertainties re-
lated to the model selection process produce different models.16 There-
fore, specifying the model space is the first step in handling the model
uncertainty problem. However, the specification of the model space
is generally based on the researcher’s judgment. For example, whilst
one researcher may interpret model uncertainty as proxy uncertainty,
another may emphasise only heterogeneity uncertainty in the context
of cross-country growth study.
Levine and Renelt (1992) is the first study to take into account
model uncertainty in the empirical cross-country growth literature.
Employing a variant of Leamer’s extreme bounds analysis (Leamer
(1983), Leamer and Leonard(1983)), these authors test the robustness
of coefficient estimates for a large number of policy indicators as other
explanatory variables alter. To illustrate the basic mechanism of a mod-
ified version of extreme bounds analysis (EBA hereafter) employed by
Levine and Renelt (1992), consider the generic representation of cross-
country growth regression expressed in equation (3.25) in the following
16As mentioned before, cross-country growth regression is a very good case for all levels
of model uncertainty. However, it is worth recalling that other applied works in economics
are not free from model uncertainty as defined here.
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form
̺i = γ + πXi + δpi + ψZi + υi (3.26)
where X is the vector of variables always included in the regressions
and consists of the initial level of real GDP per capita in 1960, the
investment share of GDP, the initial secondary school enrolment rate,
and the average annual rate of population growth; Z is a subset of
variables chosen from a pool of over 50 variables suggested by previous
growth studies and p is the variable of interest.
In order to carry out an EBA test, Levine and Renelt (1992) firstly
run the benchmark regression including only X variables and the vari-
able of interest, p. In the second step, the authors compute the regres-
sion results for all possible linear combinations of one to three variables
from the pool of variables and determine the highest and lowest val-
ues for the coefficient estimate of variable of interest, δˆ, and its the
corresponding standard error, σˆδ. The rationale for choosing up to
three Z variables from the pool is to avoid the possible multicollinear-
ity problem which inflates the standard errors of coefficient estimates.
In addition, Levine and Renelt (1992) restrict the number of pool vari-
ables to seven which are used as fiscal, trade, monetary, macroeconomic
uncertainty, and political stability indicators in the literature.17 Other-
wise, it is highly likely that the variable of interest loses its significance.
Finally, for every variable of interest, they further restrict the pool of
variables such that some variables are dropped from the pool if they
measure the same phenomenon with respect to the variable of interest.
Therefore, in this study, EBA is restricted such that total number of
17The pool of variables are the average rate of government consumption expenditures
to GDP, the ratio of exports to GDP, the average inflation rate, the average growth rate
of domestic credit, the standard deviation of inflation, the standard deviation of domestic
credit growth and an index of the number of revolutions and coups.
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explanatory variables included in any regression to be eight or less.
In this regard, Levine and Renelt (1992) identifies the upper extreme
bound as the highest value of δˆ plus two times its standard error and
define the lower extreme bound as the lowest value of δˆ minus two times
its standard error over all possible models for the variable of interest
and then conclude the EBA test such that the variable of interest, p
is robust if its coefficient is significant and has the same sign at the
extreme bounds (δˆ± 2σˆδ). If the coefficient of variable of interest does
not remain significant and/or changes its sign, then EBA test indicates
that this variable is fragile.
In short, Levine and Renelt (1992) investigate the robustness of
the relationship between growth and a variable of interest according
to the stability of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated
coefficient over all possible models. Using more than 50 variables over
the 1960-1989 period, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that only the
initial level of income and the share of investment in GDP are robustly
correlated with growth. In other words, except for these two, they
conclude that all variables are fragile.18
Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) criticises Levine and Renelt (1992) and ar-
gues that the EBA test is too extreme as they conclude a variable is
fragile if the coefficient estimate loses its statistical significance and/or
changes its sign even in one regression. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) sug-
gests that one should consider the whole distribution of δˆ, and assign a
level of confidence for the robustness test instead of labelling a variable
as robust or fragile according to extreme bounds. In order to compute
the cumulative distribution function of δˆ, he calculates the weighted
18In addition, Levine and Renelt (1992) carry out the same analysis for the invest-
ment rate and conclude that only trade ratio is robustly and positively associated with
investment.
94
Chapter 3: Cross-Country Growth Empirics and Model
Uncertainty
averages of all estimates of δ and its corresponding standard error for
each model as follows
δˆ =
M∑
i=1
ωiδˆi (3.27)
σˆδ =
M∑
i=1
ωiσˆδ,i (3.28)
where δˆ and σˆδ are the weighted averages of the coefficient of variable of
interest and of its standard error over all possible models, respectively.
The weights, ωi are the critical point of the analysis and calculated as
a proportion of the integrated likelihoods of each model as follows
ωi =
ℓδi∑M
m ℓm
(3.29)
where ℓm is the likelihood of each of the M models. Notice that∑M
m ωi = 1. As can be seen, the weighting scheme gives higher weights
to the regressions or models which are more likely to be the true
model. In order to measure the robustness of each variable, Sala-i-
Martin (1997a) calculates the cumulative distribution function as fol-
lows: First, he assumes that δˆ has a normal distribution over models, so
he uses the normal distribution tables; Second, he relaxes the assump-
tion that δˆ has a normal distribution and calculates the cumulative
distribution function as the weighted sum of a normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. The weights are again proportional to likelihoods.
For the sake of comparability with Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-
i-Martin (1997a,b) allows the model to include three fixed variables
namely income level in 1960, life expectancy in 1960 and primary school
enrolment rate in 1960. Combining these fixed variables with a variable
of interest and a trio from the pool consisting of 59 variables, Sala-i-
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Martin (1997a) estimated nearly 2 million regressions. Differently from
Levine and Renelt (1992), he tries every three combinations of doubt-
ful variables in order to reduce computational burden. Therefore, his
regressions always contain seven explanatory variables. Sala-i-Martin
(1997a,b) argues that if 95 percent of cumulative distribution function
of δˆ lies on each side of zero, then that variable can be considered ro-
bust. Put differently, a variable is robust if its statistical significance
and sign hold over 95 percent of all possible models. Unlike Levine and
Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1992a) concludes that 21 of 59 variables
are robustly correlated with growth. In his subsequent work, Sala-i-
Martin (1997b) introduced the average investment rate between 1960
and 1990 as an additional fixed regressor. The reason for including
average investment rate in the later study is to highlight the chan-
nels through which the variable of interest affects growth, namely via
effects on the level of efficiency. Therefore, Sala-i-Martin (1997b) esti-
mates two million more regressions combining four fixed variables with
the variable of interest and again trios from remaining 59 variables and
concludes that 17 of 59 variables are robustly correlated with growth.19
Even though the Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b)
versions of EBA provide useful information concerning the model un-
certainty problem in the cross-country growth literature, these studies
are subject to important drawbacks. Firstly, EBA is heavily criti-
cised by McAleer et al. (1985) and Hendry and Mizon (1990). One
criticism is that extreme bounds depend on the selection of doubtful
variables. In other words, different selections yield different extreme
bounds. Generally, most of EBA applications classify the variables
19Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) also carried out his approach for fixed variables in order to
gain same confidence about their robustness and found that initial income level, initial
primary school enrolment, initial life expectancy and average investment rate are all robust
determinants of growth.
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as fixed and doubtful variables as in the case of Levine and Renelt
(1992). This classification is sometimes arbitrary, even though it is
reasonable and defendable in the study by Levine and Renelt(1992).
Secondly, extreme bound levels can come from models which are un-
reasonable in some ways or even clearly poor. For instance McAleer
(1994) criticises Levine and Renelt (1992) since they present summary
statistics of extreme bounds without diagnostic tests and also ignor-
ing functional form misspecification. Therefore, Granger and Uhlig
(1990) propose reasonable EBA such that extreme bounds may come
from models having R2 values very close to maximum achievable value
of R2 over the model space. If this is done, then models with rela-
tively low goodness-of-fit will be eliminated. Similarly, Temple (2000)
suggests reporting a table listing models with the results of diagnos-
tic tests instead of presenting only upper and lower extreme bounds.
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, if one of the doubtful variables
is important in explaining the dependent variable, then fragile results
are inevitably obtained. More clearly, while testing for the sensitivity
of a particular variable of interest over all possible models, that key
variable will be sometimes omitted. Models excluding key varible(s)
certainly affect the sign and statistical significance of δˆ. Therefore,
it is possible to conclude that EBA is useful but not efficient and so
overstates model uncertainty. On the other hand one may argue that
Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) version of EBA is more reasonable than Levine
and Renelt (1992), but statistical properties of this approach, especially
the weighting scheme of models, are unclear since they are not based
on a formal statistical theory (as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) point
out).
In summary, both versions of EBA fail to provide satisfactory so-
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lutions to the problem of identifying the true determinants of growth.
Two approaches recently appeared in the literature. The general-to-
specific modelling (GETS henceforth) approach20 is based on the idea
that the true model can be characterised by a sufficiently rich regres-
sion. This means that a regression including all possible regressors has
all the information about the dependent variable. However, the infor-
mation presented by the general regression can be represented by a
parsimonious regression called the specific regression. Of course, this
specific regression must have some desirable properties such that it
must be well defined, it should encompass every other parsimonious
regression and so on. In short, the GETS approach starts with the
general model and then searches for a specific model comparing all
possible models in the model space according to some statistical cri-
terion. Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002), Hoover and Perez (2004), and
Hendry and Krolzig (2004) apply this approach to cross-country growth
regressions.
The paper by Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) is, in essence, based
on the encompassing test among three non-nested models for cross-
country growth regressions suggested by Sachs and Warner (1997b),
Barro (1997) and Easterly and Levine (1997). Even though these
three models have some common explanatory variables, Bleaney and
Nishiyama (2002) conclude that none of them dominates each other ac-
cording to non-nested hypothesis testing procedures. This means that
a model encompassing these three models fits the data better. There-
fore, they combine the explanatory variables of the three models and
eliminate them according to the GETS approach to derive a specific
model which passes a battery of statistical tests successfully. Accord-
20It is some times referred to as London School of Economics (LSE) methodology.
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ing to Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002), this model cannot be improved
by adding or omitting any variable, and can be used as a benchmark
model in order to test new growth theories.
Hoover and Perez (2004) and Hendry and Krolzig (2004) apply
the GETS methodology directly to the data set employed by Sala-i-
Martin (1997a,b) after some adjustment.21 In both studies, a linear
model including the number of revaluations and coups, the ratio of
equipment investment, fraction of confucians, fraction of open years
according to Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria and fraction of protes-
tants as explanatory variables of growth is estimated.22. An interesting
point concerning the results of these two studies is that the R2 values
of the regressions are found to be 0.42 and 0.44, respectively. This
implies that the selected models explain less than 50 percent of the
cross-country growth differentials. In addition, theoretically important
variables, such as initial income level and variables relating to human
capital, are not included in the final model.
One important criticism of the GETS methodology is that there can
be several simplification paths from the general model and there is no
guarantee that a particular simplification path leads to the true model.
That is why, the GETS approach is some times referred as “sophis-
ticated data mining”, as Hendry (1995) points out. However, Hoover
and Perez (2004) and Hendry and Krolzig (2004) argue that the GETS
approach employed in their papers is based on multiple-path searching
program in order to handle this objection. In other words, both stud-
ies implement the GETS approach by employing the automated search
21The original data set used by Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) contains 64 variables (including
the dependent variable) for 138 countries. After a number of variables and countries are
dropped from the data set in order to provide a complete data matrix, the resulting data
set includes 126 countries and 61 variables and the dependent variable.
22Hendry and Krolzig (2004) also apply the GETS methodology on the data set used
by Ferna´ndez et al. (2001b).
99
Chapter 3: Cross-Country Growth Empirics and Model
Uncertainty
algorithm first suggested by Hoover and Perez (1999) and improved by
Krolzig and Hendry (2001), in order to take into account competing
models derived from different search paths and to select one on the
basis of encompassing tests. In particular, the PcGets algorithm de-
veloped by Hendry and Krolzig (2005) is effective in reducing searching
costs when the initial model is more general than needed.
The selection process of the specific model is based on six stages:
First, assuming the true model is nested in a sufficiently rich model,
a general unrestricted model (GUM) is formulated. In the second and
third stages, a set of mis-specification tests and selection criteria are
applied for final selection between mutually encompassing congruent
models and then the GUM is estimated to check the congruence of the
specification. Therefore, after the second and third stages, the GUM is
reformulated as a baseline general model for the next steps. Fourth, a
pre-search reduction process is carried out. In other words, the highly
insignificant variables are eliminated using a less stringent significance
level in order to simplify large dimensional problems. Thus, this stage
is optional, not necessary. The fifth and main stage consists of multiple-
path reduction searches. In this stage, many possible reduction paths
are undertaken from each feasible initial deletion and each reduction is
diagnostically evaluated for the congruence of the final model. That is,
after a particular reduction path, if all diagnostic tests are successfully
passed and all remaining variables are statistically significant, then that
model is considered as a terminal specification. Next another reduc-
tion path is searched and hence another terminal model is selected and
so on. After all possible paths are investigated and all terminal mod-
els are determined, encompassing tests are carried out for each union
of terminal models to find an undominated encompassing contender.
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The union of surviving terminal models which is referred to as the
smaller GUM is employed for a new multiple-path reduction search.
The search process continues until a unique model, called the specific
model, emerges. In the sixth and final stage, the significance of every
variable in the final model is evaluated in two overlapping sub-samples
for reliability of the specific model. 23
The second approach is Bayesian model averaging (BMA hereafter)
which was developed by, inter alia, Madigan and Raftery (1994), Hoet-
ing (1994), Chatfield (1995), Draper (1995), Raftery et al. (1997).24
The basic idea of BMA is to incorporate the model uncertainty into
statistical inference such that the true model is considered as an un-
observable random variable. In this regard, BMA takes into account
model uncertainty over a variable of interest making inferences based
on the weighted averages of all possible models. Therefore, differently
from the GETS approach, the main aim of BMA is to provide a bet-
ter parameter estimate of the variable of interest rather than to find
the best model. Ferna´ndez et al. (2001b), Brock and Durlauf (2001),
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), Eris (2005), Masanjala and Papageorgiou
(2005, 2007), Durlauf et al. (2006, 2007) are examples of the applica-
tion of BMA in the cross-country growth context.25 BMA is detailed
in Chapter 6 in which we empirically investigate the openness-growth
connection applying this approach on the cross-country growth data.
Even though we prefer BMA in this dissertation, we do not purport
23While applying the PcGets algorithm, one can set any selection criteria for the sig-
nificance levels, from strong to weak. The program also provides two basic strategies
for these, namely liberal and conservative strategies. Both strategies are based on the
critical values depending on sample size and for large samples on the number of possible
explanatory variables. If there are many potentially irrelevant variables and few relevant
variables, the conservative strategy is suggested. Conversely, for few irrelevant and many
relevant variables, liberal strategy is better (Granger and Hendry (2005)).
24The basic paradigm for BMA was presented by Leamer (1978). See Hoeting et al.
(1999) for the historical development of BMA.
25The approach in Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) is close in spirit to that of BMA.
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that we have a negative view about the GETS approach. Obviously,
both approaches are valuable statistical techniques for tackling model
uncertainty and have their own advantages and disadvantages.26 There
is no doubt that the GETS approach is particularly useful if one needs
a specific model for some purpose, e.g. forecasting.27 On the other
hand, one advantage of BMA is that it provides a better framework for
policy evaluation as discussed in the next section.
3.4 Model Uncertainty and Policy Evaluation in
Cross-Country Growth Regression
Undoubtedly, the most important aim of cross-country growth studies
is to explain growth differences across countries and to suggest policy
implications which may be effective in promoting growth. Brock and
Durlauf (2001, p.230) argue that “[I]n emprical macroeconomics, efforts
to explain cross-country differences in growth behavior since World War
II become a predominant area of research. The implications of this
work for policymakers are immense. . . [I]n turn, the academic commu-
nity has used this new empirical work as the basis for strong policy rec-
ommendations.” However, as indicated by Brock and Durlauf (2001),
26There is a vast statistical literature debating classical versus Bayesian approaches
on model uncertainty and model selection problem. See, for instance Chatfield (1995),
Hoover and Perez (1999), Po¨tscher (1991), Granger and Hendry (2005), Hansen (2005).
It is obvious that the solution of the matter is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet,
we just remind that classical econometric model selection methods such as the GETS
approach suffer from four conceptual errors namely parametric vision, the assumption
of true data generating process, evaluation based on fit, ignoring the effect of model
uncertainty on subsequent statistical inference as noted by Chatfield (1995) and Hansen
(2005). Although BMA directly takes into account the impact of model uncertainty on
inference, as discussed in Chapter 6, specifying appropriate priors over different models is
challenging.
27Another advantage of the GETS approach is that it is labour saving as noted by
Hendry and Krolzig (2005). For instance, according to Hendry and Krolzig (2004), im-
plementation of GETS approach to Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b)’s data set by PcGets takes
approximately two hours, including stacking the data.
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Brock et al. (2003), Easterly (2005) and Rodrik(2005) this literature
largely fails with respect to the perspective of policy evaluation. While
Rodrik (2005) points out the endogeneity problem between the policy
variable and economic growth, Easterly (2005) argues that the strong
effects of policies obtained from cross-country growth regressions are
mainly a result of extreme observations. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and
Brock et al. (2003) emphasise the difficulty of macroeconomic policy
evaluation in the presence of model uncertainty.
According to Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock et al. (2003),
policy analysis can be carried out on the basis of two factors, namely
the policy maker’s preferences and a conditional distribution of the
outcome of interest given the policy and available information. The
authors argue that standard practice in the cross-country growth liter-
ature is uninformative from the perspective of policy evaluation since it
fails to appropriately define the policy maker’s preferences and ignores
model uncertainty. Hence, Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock et al.
(2003) propose that cross-country growth work for policy recommen-
dations requires an explicit decision-theoretic formulation. Using the
findings of modern statistical decision theory28, these authors integrate
model uncertainty into policy analysis.29 In this section, we briefly
summarise the implications of model uncertainty for policy evaluation
in the context of cross-country growth regressions.
Recall the generic representation of cross-country growth regression
28Wald (1950), Brainard (1967), Chamberlain (2000) Sims (1980), Berger (1985), Man-
ski (2000), Heckman (2001) Sims (2002) are few examples.
29Although Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock et al. (2003) focus mainly on the cross-
country empirical growth work, the framework developed by these authors are explicitly
subject to other macroeconomic empirical analysis in formulating policy recommendations
in the presence of model uncertainty. For a more general context concerning the issue see
Brock and Durlauf (2006) and Brock et al. (2007). In terms of policy analysis, a related
direction of the literature is carried by Hansen and Sargent (2001) that emphasise the
robust control theory to analyse macroeconomic policy under the model uncertainty.
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expressed in equation (3.26). The key question in the context of policy
evaluation is how a policy maker can use the cross-country growth re-
gressions in order to formulate policy recommendations for enhancing
the growth in country i.30 Suppose that variable p in equation (3.26)
represents a policy variable of interest which can be controlled by the
policy maker. The standard answer to this question in the growth lit-
erature is to make policy suggestions according to the hypothesis tests
for the coefficient corresponding with the policy variable of interest.
More precisely, a policy maker recommends a change in the magnitude
of the policy variable p for stimulating growth in country i according
to the statistical significance of δ, typically assessed at 5 percent level,
using a single model and a given data set. Obviously, this policy eval-
uation is conditional on the model employed by policy maker as well
as data set.
The first problem with this kind of policy analysis in the context of
cross-country growth regressions is that it neglects theory, specification
and heterogeneity uncertainties. Secondly, even if model uncertainty
can be eliminated, policy analysis based on statistical significance is
problematic from the perspective of policy maker’s preferences. In
order to explain these problems more clearly, following the notation of
Brock and Durlauf (2001) we define the policy maker’s preferences in
terms of utility (or objective) function as
V (̺i, Oi) (3.30)
where ̺i is growth rate of per capita GDP in country i, as previously
30As noted by Eris (2005), the term “policy maker” is used in a broader sense in the
manner that he or she may be an economist suggesting a government to implement a
particular policy, say openness to international trade, using some cross-country growth
regression.
104
Chapter 3: Cross-Country Growth Empirics and Model
Uncertainty
defined, and Oi indicates the set of characteristics in country i affecting
policy maker’s utility. In the context of policy maker’s utility function,
implementing or suggesting a policy change which is effective for en-
hancing growth depends on comparisons of policy maker’s utilities in
alternative settings. More clearly, if the policy maker believes that a
particular policy variable has some effect in increasing growth, then he
faces two options: either implementing or not implementing a policy
change. Therefore, denoting the level of policy variable by p, policy
maker’s decision set will be A = {0, dpi}, where dpi represents the pol-
icy change and for simplicity it is assumed to be positive. The objective
of empirical work is to develop a decision rule which is conditional on
observable data D. Since the cross-country growth regression in equa-
tion (3.26) is linear, the effect of a marginal change in p is δ. Therefore,
the growth rate in country i will be ̺i + δdpi in the case of a policy
change while it is ̺i in the absence of policy implementation. Policy
evaluation requires comparison of expected utilities of policy maker
with and without policy change
E(V (̺i + δdpi, Oi)|D)− E(V (̺i, Oi)|D) (3.31)
where E represents the expected value operator. The standard ap-
proach in the empirical cross-country growth literature is to compute
this comparison selecting one model as if it is true model and applying
a statistical significance test. A statistically insignificant coefficient is
taken to mean that a particular policy is not important for economic
growth while the statistical significance is used as strong evidence that
the policy is important for economic growth. This kind of decision rule
is implicitly assumed that the policy maker’s utility function is defined
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by
E(V (̺i + δdpi, Oi)|D)− E(V (̺i, Oi)|D) = [δ̂(dpi)− 2σˆδ(dpi)] ≥ 0
(3.32)
where δ̂ and σˆδ denote the OLS coefficient estimate of policy variable
p and its corresponding standard error, respectively. Obviously both
are conditional on a particular model. Then one would suggest policy
implementation in the form of dpi if the t-statistic in OLS regression
is equal or greater than 2 (2 is selected according to typical assess-
ment of statistical significance level at 5 percent). However, policy
analysis based on significance level is troublesome in many ways even
if the model used in OLS regression is true as argued by Brock and
Durlauf (2001), Durlauf (2002) and Brock, Durlauf and West (2003).
We emphasise two important problems: First, the policy maker evalu-
ates a particular policy only using the mean and variance of the policy
variable. However, the whole probability distribution of δ might be im-
portant for policy analysis. For instance, a policy maker may be more
sensitive to negative growth rates than positive ones or the effect of
growth on poverty can be asymmetric and a typical policy maker tries
to act in socially acceptable way. Second, even if the policy maker takes
into account only the mean and variance of policy variable of interest,
policy analysis based on statistical significance considers the effect of
policy change on the component of growth rather than the effect of
the policy change on growth per se. In other words, a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient of estimate shows the marginal effect of the policy
variable on growth and does not provide a clear answer whether policy
change should be implemented.
The message of these criticisms is that one should define more ap-
propriate utility functions and assess a policy change under alternative
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policy scenarios.31 Obviously, this policy evaluation will be based on
a particular model only if policy maker is certain that the model at
hand is true. Yet, since he is not certain about the true model, this
adds another uncertainty to the uncertainty over parameter δ. In the
case of model uncertainty, the policy maker will not want to evaluate
a policy change according to a particular model. Instead, he or she
will want to make expected utility comparison expressed in equation
(3.31), conditioning on data. This means that comparison of expected
utilities for a given policy should be based on the assumption that the
true model is not known. Since calculation of expected utility infor-
mation expressed in equation (3.31) contains all information for policy
evaluation, in the absence of information about the true model, this
expression explicitly requires accounting for model uncertainty since
expected utilities are conditional on only data not on possible models.
Therefore, this requires us to modify the expected utility comparison
equation as
E(V (̺i + δdpi, Oi)|D)− E(V (̺i, Oi)|D) =∑
k
P (Mk|D)E(V (̺i + δdpi, Oi)|D,Mk)−
∑
k
P (Mk|D)E(V (̺i, Oi)|D,Mk)
(3.33)
31Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock et al. (2003) explore policy implications of cross-
country growth analysis employing some alternative utility functions such as risk neutral-
ity, ambiguity aversion and so on. According to these authors, the utility functions that
they examine are not particularly compelling, but they are useful to illustrate in order to
interpret growth regressions for policy analysis in the presence of model uncertainty. For
instance, these authors indicate that EBA employed by Levine and Renelt (1992) corre-
sponds to an extreme risk aversion utility for policy maker. More compactly, according
to EBA a policy change is implemented only if
E(V (̺i + δdpi, Oi)|D)− E(V (̺i, Oi)|D) > 0
for every model in the model space. See Eris (2005) for a nice treatise showing what
kind of decision rules arise under the considerations of different assumptions for the policy
maker’s utility functions and policy robustness preference parameters accounting model
uncertainty.
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where P (Mk|D) is the probability that model Mk is the true causal re-
lationship between the growth rate and explanatory variables for given
data, D. Therefore, the last equation explicitly accounts model uncer-
tainty and as mentioned before, the aim of any policy relevant empirical
work is to compute these expected utilities.
As can be seen, equation (3.33) illustrates that the expected util-
ity comparison depends on the weighted averages of the coefficient of
the policy variable, and expected utility calculations are independent
of a particular model. Rather, the true model as an unobservable
random variable is integrated to this calculation. Hence, the second
important message is that identifying a particular model(s) according
to some model selection criteria does not have any intrinsic value from
the perspective of policy evaluation in the presence of model uncer-
tainty. In contrast, the standard practice in the literature evaluates a
policy change according to a particular model and sometimes compares
the coefficient estimates with those obtained from modified specifica-
tions of that model in order to provide robustness of data analysis.
This kind of policy analysis not only does ignore model uncertainty
but also does not provide a clear information for policy evaluation. For
instance, if the estimated coefficient of a policy variable is large in one
regression while small in another, drawing a conclusion concerning the
policy variable of interest is unclear. However, the calculation in equa-
tion (3.33) clearly removes this kind of concerns since each possible
model is integrated into the calculation. This methodology, known as
‘model averaging’ in the statistics literature, is a coherent way not only
in order to handle model uncertainty but also for policy evaluation.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the recent cross-country growth literature
aiming at explaining growth differences across countries using regres-
sion analysis and other statistical methods. Even though this literature
was mainly inspired by endogenous growth theories, the neoclassical
growth model, especially its augmented version by Mankiw et al. (1992)
is still the workhorse for cross-country growth empirics. For instance
Mankiw (1995) argues that “[I]f the goal is to explain why standard
of living is higher today than a century ago, then neoclassical model
is not very illuminating. . . [A] more challenging goal is to explain the
variation in economic growth that we observe in different countries in
different times ( p.280). . . [E]ndogenous growth models provide a plau-
sible description of worldwide advances in knowledge. The neoclassical
growth model takes world wide technological advances as given and
provides a plausible description of international differences (p.308).”
The most outstanding feature of the recent empirical cross-country
growth literature is that a large number of factors have been suggested
as fundamental growth determinants. Together with the small sam-
ple property, this leads to an important problem, model uncertainty:
Which factors are more fundamental in explaining growth dynamics
and hence growth differences are still the subject of academic research.
Recent attempts based on general-to-specific modeling or model aver-
aging are promising but have their own limits.
Closely related to model uncertainty, and indeed the ultimate goal
of the literature is policy evaluation. In spite of the fact that model
uncertainty has been recognised since the important work by Levine
and Renelt (1992), it is very surprising that cross-country studies have
been used for policy analysis without paying attention to model uncer-
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tainty. It is obvious that any policy recommendation derived from a
particular cross-country growth regression is troublesome since in the
presence of model uncertainty it is conditional on the selected model.
Although we emphasise model uncertainty in this chapter, other
econometric problems, especially parameter heterogeneity and outliers
are equally important in this literature. Due to these problems, cross-
country growth empirics can be considered as a mix of economic theory
and statistics and it might be more reasonable to refer to it as “growth
econometrics” as Durlauf et al. (2005) point out.
In conclusion, given the challenging econometric problems, the re-
sults of cross-country growth studies have been controversial in terms
of robustness. The implications of this are threefold: First, it is more
plausible to accept cross-country growth studies as a wider picture of
growth process. This means that combining findings of this literature
with detailed case studies is a worthwhile task. Second, it may be more
useful to shift research agenda towards more practical or pragmatic is-
sues rather than the international growth differences as suggested by
Pritchett (2000). Third, introducing new statistical tools and better
proxy variables will make cross-country growth studies more informa-
tive.
3.A Appendix: Derivation of Convergence Coeffi-
cient in the Augmented Neoclassical Growth
Model
Recall the intensive form of three factor Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion expressed in equation (3.13). The growth rate of output per unit
of effective labour is given by (for simplicity the time subscript t is
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dropped)
˙˜y/y˜ = α ˙˜k/k˜ + β ˙˜h/h˜ (3.34)
The last equation shows that the growth rate of output per unit of
effective labour is the weighted average of the growth rates of physical
and human capitals per unit of effective labour. We previously depicted
the evaluation of economy in equations (3.14) and (3.15). Substitute
the equations (3.14) and (3.15) into equation (3.34). This yields
˙˜y/y˜ = α[sKe
−(1−α)logk˜eβlogh˜ − (n+ g + δ)]
+β[sHe
αlogk˜e−(1−β)logh˜ − (n+ g + δ)]
(3.35)
Taking the log approximation of first-order Taylor series around the
steady-state gives
˙˜y/y˜ = {α[sKe−(1−α)logk˜∗eβlogh˜∗ ][−(1− α)]
+βα[sHe
αlogk˜∗e−(1−β)logh˜
∗
]}(logk˜ − ˜logk∗)
+{αβ[sKe−(1−α)logk˜∗eβlogh˜∗ ]
+β[sHe
αlogk˜∗e−(1−β)logh˜
∗
][−(1− β)]}(logh˜− logh˜∗)
(3.36)
Due to the fact that at the steady-state ˙˜k∗ = 0 and ˙˜h∗ = 0, we can
write the following expression
sK k˜∗
α−1
h˜∗
β
= sH k˜∗
α
h˜∗
β−1
= n+ g + δ (3.37)
Rearranging equation (3.36) by employing the last expression yields
˙˜y/y˜ = −(1−α−β)(n+g+δ)[α(logk˜−logk˜∗)+β(logh˜−logh˜∗)] (3.38)
This follows
˙˜y/y˜ = −λ∗(logy˜ − logy˜∗) (3.39)
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where λ∗ = (1−α−β)(n+g+δ) is the convergence rate in the vicinity
of steady-state.
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Augmented Neoclassical
Growth Model: A
Replication over the
1960-2000 Period
4.1 Introduction
This chapter empirically examines the augmented neoclassical growth
model suggested by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, MRW henceforth).
We attempt to answer whether MRW provide an appropriate bench-
mark model in order to investigate the relationship between long run
economic growth and openness (more generally any particular growth
theory) for the 1960-2000 period. For this we replicate MRW using up-
dated and revised data for several samples, and compare our findings
with those obtained by MRW.
As noted in Chapter 3, the framework provided by MRW is the
workhorse in the empirical cross-country growth literature and most of
the studies in this literature are based on MRW. However, our repli-
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cation is different from these studies in some aspects: First, most of
the studies in the literature estimate MRW over the 1960-1990 or the
1970-1990 period. In this chapter, we estimate MRW over the period
of 40 years, which should be sufficiently long to reflect long run growth
dynamics; second, many previous studies employ a proxy variable for
the initial level of human capital stock rather than the saving rate for
human capital. In this chapter, we strictly follow MRW by employing
the secondary school enrolment rate.
Our findings are consistent with the theory and support the results
of MRW. Both our cross-country regression results and those obtained
by MRW show that the investment rates of both physical and human
capital significantly contribute to the growth rates of countries, while
the rate of population growth has a negative effect on growth in the long
run. In addition, we obtain more reasonable coefficient estimates on
capital shares. We also check for geographical differences and for out-
lying countries. We conclude that the inclusion of continental dummy
variables does not change the basic results and any outlier effects are
very small.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 firstly describes the
basic framework of MRW and data and then reports and discusses basic
findings. Section 3 seeks geographical differences. Section 3 deals with
the outlier problem. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Replication of Augmented Neoclassical Growth
Model by MRW
In this section, we estimate the augmented neoclassical growth model
developed by MRW by using updated data over the period 1960-2000
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and compare our findings with those obtained by MRW. In other words,
we set up this model for the period 1960-2000 since we specifically aim
to answer whether augmented neoclassical growth model is an appro-
priate benchmark model in order to investigate the relationship be-
tween long run economic growth and openness. This means that the
explanatory variable in our cross-country growth regressions is growth
rate of output per worker between 1960 and 2000. Our data set typ-
ically covers 107 countries.1 The sample of countries is listed in the
Appendix.
4.2.1 Description of Benchmark Model
As explained and discussed in detail in Chapter 3, MRW produce the
following equation for cross-country growth regression
̺i = π0+π1logyi(0)+π2log(ni+g+δ)+π3logsi,K+π4logsi,H+υi (4.1)
1In this point we follow the standard approach in the literature. More clearly we
randomly select countries according to the criterion of data availability. At the first sight
this approach seems reasonable. However, missing data, especially if the data of some
particular countries are systematically missing (such as very poor countries or countries
in transition) is a serious problem as noted by Durlauf et al. (2005).
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where
̺i = t
−1(logyi(t)− logyi(0))
π0 = g + ηa
π1 = −η
π2 = −η α + β
1− α− β
π3 = η
α
1− α− β
π4 = η
β
1− α− β
υi = µi + ηεi
η = t−1(1− e−λ∗t)
In equation (4.1), yi and (ni+g+δ) denote the level of GDP per worker
and the sum of rates of population growth, technological progress and
depreciation in country i, respectively. Similarly, the terms si,K and
si,H represent the rates of accumulation of both physical and human
capital for country i. Hence, one can see that growth rate of per worker
output, ̺i in equation (4.1) is measured annually over the time period
between 0 and t. However we prefer to construct the growth rate as the
log difference from time 0 to time t in this chapter in order to compare
our results with those of MRW directly and to make interpretation of
results easier. As noted in Chapter 3, measuring the average growth
rate over a particular time period as either annually or log difference is
in essence the same and the results will be identical in the manner that
one can easily convert and interpret results obtained from one approach
to those obtained from another. That is why, we will use the following
specification which is obtained from multiplication of equation (4.1) by
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time t.2
logyi(t)−logyi(0) = γ0+γ1logyi(0)+γ2log(ni+g+δ)+γ3logsi,K+γ4logsi,H+εi
(4.2)
where
γ0 = gt+ θa
γ1 = −θ
γ2 = −θ α + β
1− α− β
γ3 = θ
α
1− α− β
γ4 = θ
β
1− α− β
εi = µi + θεi
θ = tη = (1− e−λ∗t)
As can be seen in both equations (4.1) and (4.2), the augmented neo-
classical growth model basically involves regressing growth rates on the
log of initial income and a set of long-run equilibrium or steady-state
level of income determinants. Put differently, growth rates of output
per worker can vary across countries either because of differences in
the variables determining their steady-state levels namely saving rates
for physical and human capital, and rate of population growth respec-
tively or because of differences in the initial level of output per worker,
logyi(0).
Following MRW, we assume that the sum of rates of depreciation
2Moreover, it is a well-known fact that if the dependent variable is multiplied by a
particular constant, then the OLS intercept and slope estimates are also multiplied by
that constant
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and technological progress is constant and equal to 0.05 across coun-
tries and estimate equation (4.2) over the period 1960-2000. For this
purpose, we measured si,K by the ratio of real investment to real GDP
and si,H by the secondary school gross enrolment rate. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, using the school enrolment rate as a proxy for the saving
rate of human capital is problematic and leads researchers to employ
average years of schooling as more reliable variables for human capital.
We, however, employ the secondary school enrolment rate in order to
follow the theoretical framework more strictly as years of schooling are a
stock rather than a flow variable for human capital. In addition, school
enrolment rates are available for a larger sample of countries. Data are
compiled from standard sources: GDP per capita and investment rates
are taken from the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers
and Aten, 2002); population, labour force and gross secondary school
enrolment rates come from the World Bank World Development Indi-
cators (2002; 2006). Using labour force as the total population between
ages 15 and 64, per capita GDP is converted to per worker GDP. All
of these variables are averaged over the period 1960-2000 except the
initial level of income. The variables and their sources are detailed in
the Appendix.
In summary, our baseline cross-country growth specification for each
country i as follows
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = γ0 + γ1logyi,1960 + γ2log(ni + g + δ)
+ γ3log(Investment ratei)
+ γ4log(School enrolmenti) + εi
(4.3)
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4.2.2 Results
Before evaluating the regression results, we want to emphasise two
points about the regressions. First, in each regression we check the nor-
mality assumption applying median and inter quartile range compari-
son suggested by Hamilton (1992) which is originally based on Hoaglin,
Iglewicz and Tukey (1986) on regression residuals and conclude that
residuals are normally distributed. Therefore, we may assume that
actual errors are normally distributed (at least approximately).
Second, in each regression we also check the constant error variance
assumption by employing the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedastic-
ity. The common practice in the cross-country growth literature for
dealing heteroscedasticity is reporting regression results with the het-
eroscedasticity consistent (White-robust) standard errors since they
work well regardless of heteroscedasticity in the actual errors. However,
these standard errors are consistent but not unbiased. More clearly
they are justified only asymptotically. In small samples, heteroscedas-
ticity consistent standard errors may have distributions that are not
close to those of usual standard errors which means that they may be
larger or smaller than the usual ones. As pointed out by Wooldridge
(2003) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are generally found
to be larger than the usual standard errors. This can affect the subse-
quent statistical inference such that one can conclude that a variable is
statistically insignificant according to t-test based on the heteroscedas-
ticity consistent standard errors even if that variable is significant (at
least marginally) in the case of usual t-test. Therefore, there is no
reason to use heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as long as
the homoscedastic error variance assumption holds and the errors are
normally distributed. Hence, we carry out regression analysis employ-
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ing t-statistics based on the usual standard errors unless we reject the
homoscedasticity assumption. We report t-statistics based on the het-
eroscedasticity consistent standard errors only for the regressions in
which the assumption of homoscedastic error variance is rejected.
Table 4.1 presents the OLS estimates of equation (4.3). In column
1, the model is estimated for a sample of 107 countries whose data are
available over the 1960-2000 period. All variables have the expected
signs and are found to be strongly significant.
In the literature, some studies exclude oil producing countries from
cross-country samples since a substantial part of GDP in these coun-
tries depends on the usage of their oil resources rather than value added.
However, omitting oil producing countries from sample may not be ap-
propriate if the main objective of cross-country growth studies is to
highlight the fundamental determinants of growth differences across
countries. A comprehensive cross-country growth work should also ex-
plain the growth dynamics of these countries. As pointed out by Sachs
and Warner (1997c) in the framework of recent growth theories em-
phasising the role of natural resources in the growth process, dropping
oil countries from the sample may affect the regression results since
oil producing countries are an important sub-group of natural resource
intensive countries. Column 2 displays regression results after five oil
producing countries are excluded from the full sample.3 The estima-
tion results of the non-oil sample are only slightly different from those
of the full sample and hence we can conclude that five oil producing
countries in the full sample are not changing the basic results. There-
fore, we prefer to employ the full sample for our cross-country empirical
investigation.
3These countries are, Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman and Venezuela.
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Table 4.1: Augmented Neoclassical Growth Model: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
Our Estimation Results: 1960-2000 period Estimates of MRW†
1960-1985 Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sample Full NonOil OECDa NonOECD High Income Low Income p-valueb NonOil Intermediate OECD
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.442 -0.423 -0.568 -0.448 -0.465 -0.393 0.68 -0.288 -0.366 -0.398
(6.54) (5.95) (3.63) (6.30) (4.05) (2.56) (4.68) (6.24) (5.67)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.049 -0.906 -0.262 -1.023 -1.302 -0.735 0.73 -0.506 -0.545 -0.863
(2.83) (2.36) (0.39) (1.82) (3.07) (0.96) (1.75) (2.36) (2.56)
log of Investment rate 0.411 0.410 0.588 0.390 0.581 0.389 0.55 0.524 0.538 0.332
(4.47) (4.43) (1.63) (3.07) (3.05) (3.24) (6.03) (3.98) (1.91)
log of School enrolment 0.450 0.449 0.408 0.445 0.333 0.476 0.74 0.231 0.270 0.228
(5.18) (5.08) (0.80) (5.79) (1.98) (4.08) (3.89) (3.12) (1.57)
Constant 2.782 3.014 6.492 2.834 2.522 3.225 0.70 1.874 2.498 4.155
(2.56) (2.72) (2.31) (1.76) (1.63) (1.32) (2.22) (3.15) (4.16)
p-value for heteroscedasticityc 0.66 0.60 0.07 0.13 0.75 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.20
Number of observations 107 102 26 81 52 55 98 75 22
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.46 0.43 0.65
Implied λ∗ 0.0146 0.0137 0.0210 0.0149 0.0156 0.0125 0.0136 0.0182 0.0203
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables, except initial level of income are averaged over the 1960-2000
period. The variable, (ni + g + δ) refers to sum of rates of population growth, technical progress and depreciation.
† Estimates of augmented neoclassical growth model in table V, page 426 of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Dependent variables for these
regressions are log difference GDP per worker over the period 1960-1985.
a Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovak Republic are excluded due to missing data.
b The p-value refers to the hypothesis that individual coefficients are the same for the low and high income samples.
c Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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In columns 3 and 4, the full sample is divided according to the mem-
bership of the OECD. Estimation results for the 26 OECD countries
and for remaining countries are given in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
As can be seen, the results for the OECD sample are not very precise
since, except for the initial level of income, all variables are found to
be statistically insignificant. An important reason is that the sample
size for this regression is small. Therefore, the regression result is very
sensitive to including or excluding observations.4 Another, and more
important, reason is that the relatively high coefficient of initial income
and high level of R2 imply greater absolute convergence for the OECD
countries.5
The results for the remaining non-OECD countries indicate that all
variables are strongly significant with expected signs. In columns 5 and
6, we divide the full sample into low-income and high-income countries
according to initial income level. For this, we calculated the median of
the GDP per worker in 1960 and classified the countries with initial in-
come above the sample median as high income, while those with initial
income below the sample median as low income countries. As can be
seen, almost half the sample consists of high income countries since the
4While estimating the augmented neoclassical growth model for the OECD sample,
we consider all OECD members except Germany, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia.
These countries are omitted due to the missing data. However, one can prefer to select the
OECD sample which consists of only larger countries as in the case of MRW, or to employ
an OECD sample including only members since the foundation of OECD or use the OECD
sample based on only high-income members which means that low-income members such
as Turkey and Mexico excluded as in the case of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2005). We also
check these possibilities and conclude that all variables are insignificant except initial level
of income in each case. However, in some cases (for instance when we estimate the model
for 22 high-income OECD countries) we find that the coefficient of school enrolment rate
is negative. On the other hand in each case the remaining non-OECD samples yield the
regression results which are very close to those reported in the Table 4.1
5Testing of absolute convergence hypothesis for the OECD sample yields the following
cross-country growth regression (heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses)
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = 5.247
(3.94)
− 0.451
(3.21)
logyi,1960 R¯
2 = 0.40
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median is calculated for all countries. Another distinguishing feature
of this separation is that a majority of countries located in East Asia
and Pacific belong to the low income country sample since these coun-
tries start the sample period with a relatively low GDP per worker.6
Estimation results for both groups are displayed in columns 5 and 6.
All variables, except the intercept terms and population growth for the
low income sample, have the expected sign and are strongly significant.
However, the coefficients of the initial income, population growth and
investment rate are higher in the high income sample than those in low
income group while the opposite situation is true for the coefficient of
secondary school enrolment rate. In order to check parameter stability
for these two income groups, a joint test for null hypothesis of equality
of all coefficients across two samples concludes that the null cannot be
rejected with a high probability level.7 In addition, the same test is
carried out across pairs of coefficients. As can be seen from p values
in column 7, test results show parameter stability for each individual
coefficients between two income groups. Therefore, it is possible to con-
clude that parameters are stable across high income and low income
countries.
In general, the regression results presented in Table 4.1 are con-
sistent with the theory and support the results of MRW. In order to
facilitate comparison of our results with those of MRW, we also present
their regression results in the last three columns in Table 4.1.8 Both
6According to our criteria we classified the following countries located in East Asia
and Pacific as low income countries: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Similarly, a majority of the countries
located in Sub-Saharan Africa are defined as low income countries whereas the opposite
situation is true for the many countries in Latin America and Caribbean. See the list of
countries in the full sample depicted in Appendix for further information low and high
income countries.
7The F-statistics and p value are for this joint test is F(5, 97)=0.40 and 0.85, respec-
tively.
8Indeed we estimated the augmented neoclassical growth model by employing the orig-
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our cross-country regression results and those obtained by MRW show
that investment rates of both physical and human capital significantly
contribute to the growth rates of countries while the rate of population
growth has a negative effect on growth in the long run. The outstand-
ing differences between our estimates and those by MRW are that our
regression results show that the effects of investment in human capital
are greater than those found by MRW, while the contribution of the
investment rate in physical capital is found to be lower than MRW. In
addition, we conclude a higher effect of population growth on long run
growth. In the cross-country growth literature, researchers generally
find a weak negative relation between population growth and long run
growth. We expect a negative association between these two due to the
simple reason that it is very difficult to keep a high level of capital per
worker for a given saving rate while the number of workers is growing
at a higher rate. However, it should be remembered that the negative
effect of population growth on GDP growth may be larger due to the
other factors, such as environmental factors and access to safe water
as noted by Temple (1999a). In addition, especially in Western Eu-
rope the aging population strains the social security system, negatively
affecting the public budget and labour force participation because of
higher health care costs of elderly people and the growing number of re-
tirees in population. In particular, the substantially larger and strongly
significant coefficient of population growth in the high income sample
support this claim since a considerable part of this sample consists of
Western European countries. Therefore, we believe that our results
related to population growth seem more plausible.
On the other hand, strong evidence is found in each regression for
inal data and samples of MRW over the 1960-1985 period and reported.
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the hypothesis of conditional convergence in the manner that an econ-
omy with a lower initial value of output per worker tends to generate
higher growth rate of output per worker when other determinants are
controlled. For instance, according to the full sample, the logarithm of
real GDP per worker in 1960 has a cross-country mean of 8.295 and a
standard deviation of 0.854. Therefore, the regression result based on
the full sample indicates that a one-unit standard deviation decrease in
the logarithm of initial income would increase the subsequent growth
rate by 0.377 points over the 1960-2000 period (-0.442*-0.854=0.377).
This is equivalent to a rise in annual growth rate of 0.9 percentage
point over the same period (0.377/40=0.009). Comparing to MRW,
the implied convergence rates in all samples are found to be very close
to those estimated by MRW. However, some authors such as, Barro
(1991), Easterly and Levine (1997), and others point out that this
convergence result is generally quadratic rather than linear. If this
argument is true, the subsequent growth rates firstly rise and then de-
crease with the initial level of income. This implies that the conditional
convergence effect will be weaker for very poor countries while stronger
for middle-income countries. In order to check for a possible non-linear
relationship between initial income and growth rate, we also include
the square of logarithm of initial income in the cross-country growth
regressions in Table 4.1 and reestimate. Table 4.2 presents regression
results. As can be seen from Table 4.2, we could not find any sta-
tistically significant quadratic relationship between the initial level of
income and subsequent growth. In each sample, except for the OECD
and high income samples, the coefficients of both initial income and
initial income squared have the wrong signs if the argument above is
true. Therefore, we conclude that the conditional convergence hypoth-
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Figure 4.1: Growth Rate versus Initial Income: Partial Relation
esis is linear. The graphical visualization of partial association between
growth rate and initial income shows a clear linearity (Figure 4.1).
For a further evaluation of the augmented neoclassical model, fol-
lowing MRW we imposed a restriction on equation (4.3) such that
γ2 + γ3 + γ4 = 0. As can be seen in equations (4.1) and (4.2), the sum
of coefficients of log(ni + g + δ), logsi,K , and logsi,H should be equal
to zero. Therefore, this restriction implies that equation (4.3) can be
expressed as
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = γ0 + γ1logyi,1960
+ γ3[log(Investment ratei)− log(ni + g + δ)]
+ γ4[log(School enrolmeti)− log(ni + g + δ)] + εi
(4.4)
The restricted regression results are presented in Table 4.3. Be-
fore estimating the restricted model, this restriction is tested for each
sample and p-values for test of restriction are given in Table 4.3. As
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can be seen, this restriction is not rejected in all samples. The im-
plied estimates of physical capital share (α), human capital share (β)
and convergence rate (λ∗) are given in the last three rows of Table
4.3. Again we present restricted regression results of MRW through
column 7 and column 9 of Table 4.3. The results show that estimation
of the restricted model slightly improves the coefficients of investment
rates for both physical and human capital. All variables are found to
be highly significant with expected signs in each sample except the
OECD sample.
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Table 4.2: Quadratic Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
Our Estimation Results: 1960-2000 period Estimates of MRW†
1960-1985 Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Full NonOil OECDa NonOECD High Income Low Income NonOil Intermediate OECD
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.086 -0.152 -2.424 0.494 1.747 -0.432 -0.340 -0.358 0.598
(0.10) (0.17) (0.78) (0.41) (0.38) (0.09) (0.45) (0.52) (0.21)
Square of log GDP per worker 1960 -0.021 -0.016 0.102 -0.059 -0.121 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.058
(0.41) (0.31) (0.58) (0.78) (0.48) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.35)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.086 -0.936 -0.427 -1.051 -1.268 -0.735 -0.500 -0.546 -0.795
(2.84) (2.35) (0.53) (1.84) (2.93) (0.95) (1.65) (2.41) (2.00)
log of Investment rate 0.420 0.417 0.578 0.408 0.587 0.388 0.524 0.538 0.325
(4.42) (4.36) (1.54) (2.90) (3.05) (2.80) (5.99) (3.92) (1.82)
log of School enrolment 0.441 0.442 0.369 0.432 0.319 0.476 0.233 0.270 0.209
(4.88) (4.84) (0.67) (5.43) (1.86) (3.80) (3.61) (2.54) (1.32)
Constant 1.222 1.826 14.388 -0.958 -7.488 3.371 2.061 2.469 -0.139
(0.31) (0.45) (1.15) (0.18) (0.36) (0.19) (0.73) (0.86) (0.01)
Number of observations 107 102 26 81 52 55 98 75 22
p- value for heteroscedasticityb 0.67 0.62 0.07 0.12 0.65 0.30 0.24 0.01 0.25
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.57 0.46 0.43 0.63
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables, except initial level of income variables are averaged over the
1960-2000 period. The variable, (ni + g + δ) refers to sum of rates of population growth, technical progress and depreciation.
† Estimation results based on the original data and samples of MRW.
aCzech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovak Republic are excluded due to missing data.
b Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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Table 4.3: Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model: Restricted OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
Our Estimation Results: 1960-2000 period Estimates of MRW†
1960-1985 Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample Full NonOil OECDa NonOECD High Income Low Income NonOil Intermediate OECD
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.438 -0.422 -0.539 -0.450 -0.467 -0.391 -0.298 -0.372 -0.402
(6.55) (6.03) (5.53) (5.00) (4.09) (2.58) (4.93) (6.38) (5.81)
log of Investment rate - log(ni + g + δ) 0.417 0.412 0.548 0.392 0.606 0.387 0.501 0.506 0.395
(4.60) (4.52) (1.91) (3.78) (3.25) (3.27) (6.09) (4.48) (2.61)
log of School enrolment - log(ni + g + δ) 0.465 0.452 0.218 0.457 0.391 0.469 0.235 0.266 0.241
(5.75) (5.47) (0.92) (4.96) (2.65) (4.34) (3.98) (3.08) (1.69)
Constant 3.227 3.124 4.707 3.326 3.449 2.879 2.457 3.090 3.554
(6.61) (6.14) (5.72) (4.97) (3.72) (2.58) (5.19) (6.48) (5.61)
Number of observations 107 102 26 81 52 55 98 75 22
p-value for heteroscedasticityb 0.74 0.62 0.48 0.15 0.62 0.29 0.32 0.02 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.61 0.59 0.47 0.44 0.66
p-value for test of restriction 0.65 0.91 0.46 0.75 0.36 0.90 0.36 0.36 0.36
Implied α 0.32 0.32 0.42 0.30 0.41 0.31 0.48 0.44 0.38
Implied β 0.35 0.35 0.17 0.35 0.27 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.23
Implied λ∗ 0.0144 0.0137 0.0194 0.0149 0.0157 0.0124 0.0142 0.0186 0.0206
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables, except initial level of income variables are averaged over the
1960-2000 period. The variable, (ni + g + δ) refers to sum of rates of population growth, technical progress and depreciation.
† Estimates of restricted augmented neoclassical growth model in table VI, page 429 of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Dependent variables for
these regressions are log difference GDP per worker over the period 1960-1985.
aCzech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovak Republic are excluded due to missing data.
b Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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However, Table 4.3 indicates that our results are different from those
found by MRW in some respects. First, compared with the MRW re-
sults we find a stronger effect of investment in human capital and a
weaker effect of investment in physical capital on economic growth.
Second, we find that the effect of the accumulation of human capi-
tal is stronger than the contribution of investment in physical capital
on economic growth. Third, the implied capital shares based on our
regressions are substantially different from those estimated by MRW.
As a natural result of first two findings we estimate a relatively larger
share for human capital. However, conventionally capital shares are
one-third (Mankiw (1995)); therefore, it is possible to conclude that
our estimates of α and β are more reasonable. However, an excep-
tion to these findings are the regressions based on the high income and
OECD samples. Our findings therefore imply two important conclu-
sions for economic growth. First, accumulation of human capital is
very important, especially in poor countries. Second, physical capital
accumulation is more important in richer countries.
There can be several reasons for these results. First, as we note
in Chapter 3, the secondary school enrolment rate is a crude proxy
for accumulation of human capital and the strong relation between the
school enrolment rate and economic growth in regressions in Table 4.1
and 4.3 may reflect other macroeconomic policies and factors which
are excluded in the analysis. This is more likely in our regressions
because, differently from MRW, we examine the effect of human cap-
ital on growth by using the secondary school enrolment rate over the
schooling age population rather than over the economically active pop-
ulation. We check this possibility and find that the secondary school
enrolment rates are highly correlated with the average inflation rate
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and some institutional quality measures such as rule of law, bureau-
cracy quality, corruption over the 1960-2000 period. However, even
though this explanation is reasonable for our full sample results, it is
not likely to explain the higher coefficient estimate of school enrolment
rate in low income sample since these correlations are weaker for the
low income countries.
Second, as noted by Caselli (2005), a considerable part of world’s
physical capital is produced in technologically advanced countries. This
implies that, whilst the share of investment expenditures in GDP is a
reasonable proxy in high income countries, the ratio of imported cap-
ital goods in GDP is a more plausible proxy for the physical capital
saving rate in low income countries. More importantly, Caselli (2005)
also emphasises the importance of technological progress embodied in
capital goods. If physical capital in high income countries includes
greater technological progress, then the effect of the investment rate
on growth will be higher in these countries. Moreover, as pointed out
by Mankiw (1995), physical and human capital are generally comple-
mentary inputs in the production process and so it is highly likely that
this relation is stronger in high income countries due to the vintage
physical capital. Therefore, the higher coefficient estimate of the in-
vestment rate in high income sample might be partly attributed to the
accumulation of human capital.
Third, the strong association between the school enrolment rate and
growth may be a result of a number of unrepresentative countries. In
Section 4.4 we investigate the outlying countries, and highlight how
Tanzania is an unrepresentative country. When we omit this country
from the regression analysis, we conclude that the effect of the invest-
ment rate becomes stronger relative to the school enrolment rate.
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Finally, the higher coefficient estimate on the school enrolment rate
in the low income sample is a result of sub-Saharan Africa. As men-
tioned before, almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa belong to the
low income sample. Similarly, the majority of countries in East Asia
and the Pacific are in this sample. Sub-Saharan Africa has a substan-
tially lower school enrolment rate with an average value of 17 percent,
than the sample mean which is equal to 48 percent over the 1960-2000
period. By contrast, the average school enrolment rate in East Asia
and the Pacific is 68 percent. It is a well-known fact that sub-Saharan
Africa experienced very poor growth performance over the 1960-2000
period while the countries of East Asia and the Pacific recorded very
much faster growth rates during the same period. Thus, with the poor
performing countries of sub-Saharan Africa with low school enrolment
and the well performing countries of East Asia and the Pacific associ-
ated with greater schooling, the higher coefficient estimate is inevitably
obtained.
Another distinguishing difference between our results and MRW
estimates is that the R2 is higher in our regressions, since the variation
in the explanatory variables, especially the school enrolment rates are
considerably higher over the 1985-2000 period than between 1960-1985.
It is obvious that the most important reasons for the differences
between our results and those obtained by MRW are that we estimate
the augmented neoclassical growth model employing the updated and
revised data for different samples over a different time period. In addi-
tion, in order to make comparison concrete, we have also estimated the
augmented neoclassical growth model using our data and the original
data of MRW for the same samples of countries. The estimation results
are given in the Appendix. However, selecting the same sample does
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not remove all of these differences. This implies that the differences
between our estimations and those by MRW are partly the result of dif-
ferent time period and partly the result of different data. Yet, in spite
of these differences it is possible to conclude that our results confirm
the work of MRW and are consistent with the existing cross-country
growth literature.
Before closing this chapter, we consider two further checks on our
estimation, namely the effect of geographical differences across coun-
tries and investigating possible outlying observations.
4.3 Geographical Differences
In the cross-country growth literature, some studies (Barro (1991), De
Long and Summers (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Lee
(1994b), Easterly and Levine (1997), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)
inter alia) include dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean and East Asia. The reason for employing these
dummy variables is that estimated growth models are not adequate
to explain different growth performances across these regions. Due to
the poor growth performance in Africa and Latin America one can ex-
pect a significantly negative coefficient on dummy variables for these
two regions whereas the opposite situation is true for East Asia and
Pacific.
In order to investigate this claim, in particular for sub-Saharan
Africa, we add to our baseline model three regional dummies. First
column of Table 4.4 reports the results of this estimation. It can be
seen that all dummy variables have the anticipated signs and jointly sig-
nificant. This implies that these three regions exhibit different growth
performances compared to the rest of the world.
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In column 2, we omit the dummy variable for East Asia and Pacific.
Notice that for this regression the reference countries now include the
countries in East Asia and Pacific as well as others. The regression
result shows that dummy variables for both sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America are individually and jointly significant with the negative
signs. This finding clearly shows that both regions experienced a slower
growth performance compared to other countries once the reference
sample includes East Asia and Pacific. In column 3, we drop the Latin
American dummy but keep the Asian dummy with African dummy
and conclude that only dummy for East Asia and Pacific is significant.
Finally, in column 4, we allow only dummy variable for sub-Saharan
Africa and find that its coefficient estimate is not significant.
What can be inferred from these findings and should one employ re-
gional dummies in the cross-country growth regressions? Undoubtedly,
the cross-country growth regressions in Table 4.4 show clear evidence
for different growth performances in these three regions. However, care
must be taken with the reference group of countries. Yet, we think that
the importance of sub-Saharan African dummy may have been exag-
gerated in the previous literature since we find a significant statistical
relationship between growth and this dummy in only regression in Col-
umn 2. 9
To investigate this further, we estimate the benchmark model for
sub-Saharan Africa and rest of the world separately in columns 5 and 6
and carry out a parameter stability test across two samples. However,
we could not reject the null hypothesis of equality of all coefficients
between Africa and non-Africa samples (The F-statistics and p value
for the parameter stability test are F(5,97)=0.95 and p=0.45, respec-
9Studies such as by Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994b), Easterly and Levine (1997)
consistently conclude that the African dummy is significant and negative.
134
Chapter 4: Augmented Neoclassical Growth Model: A
Replication over the 1960-2000 Period
tively). Moreover, the same test for individual coefficients concludes
parameter stability for each variable across two samples as it can be
seen from p values in column 7. This implies that sub-Saharan Africa
does not exhibit a different growth performance compared to the rest
of the world on average.
More importantly, previous studies concluded strong and signifi-
cant relation between regional dummy variables, especially dummies
for Latin America and Africa, and growth may be attributable to the
importance of model selection problem. Put differently, we believe that
employing new growth theories in order to explain different growth
performances of different geographical regions is more informative and
useful than employing simple dummy variables.
Finally, in column 8, we include a landlocked country dummy that
takes the value of 1 for countries that do not have access to interna-
tional waters in order to check the growth performance of these coun-
tries compared with others. Landlocked countries may face higher costs
for any kind of international activities, especially international trade.
Therefore, this dummy variable has been extensively used in cross-
country growth work. However, the regression in column 8 indicates
that there is no significant difference in the growth performance of
landlocked countries. In the last column of Table 4.4 we omit the land-
locked countries in Europe such as Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland
and Hungary, from the dummy variable, since becoming landlocked for
these countries may not create an important disadvantage. When we
use this dummy variable, the regression result shows an improvement
on both coefficient and t-statistics of landlocked dummy, but it is still
insignificant.
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Table 4.4: Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model and Geographical Dummy Variables
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Full Full Full Africa NonAfrica p-valuea Full Full
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.414 -0.421 -0.431 -0.449 -0.406 -0.474 0.36 -0.441 -0.443
(6.23) (6.31) (6.44) (6.61) (2.41) (5.56) (6.49) (6.53)
log(ni + g + δ) -0.970 -0.863 -1.172 -1.076 -1.421 -1.104 0.32 -1.072 -1.059
(2.61) (2.35) (3.20) (2.90) (1.02) (2.52) (2.84) (2.85)
log of Investment rate 0.340 0.359 0.364 0.404 0.296 0.643 0.64 0.414 0.413
(3.73) (3.95) (3.96) (4.39) (2.12) (3.65) (4.47) (4.47)
log of School enrolment 0.382 0.375 0.402 0.398 0.455 0.265 0.31 0.440 0.436
(3.90) (3.81) (4.06) (3.94) (3.10) (1.91) (4.75) (4.75)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.228 -0.299 -0.079 -0.137 - - - - -
(1.52) (2.08) (0.59) (1.01)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.237 -0.294 - - - - - - -
(2.11) (2.75)
East Asia & Pacific 0.198 - 0.290 - - - - - -
(1.51) (2.31)
Landlocked country dummy - - - - - - - -0.039 -
(0.36)
Landlocked country dummy b - - - - - - - - -0.062
(0.50)
Constant 2.648 3.079 2.211 2.747 1.229 3.231 0.31 2.715 2.765
(2.43) (2.90) (2.03) (2.53) (0.35) (2.15) (2.45) (2.53)
p-value for heteroscedasticityc 0.86 0.91 0.83 0.66 0.34 0.10 - 0.72 0.74
F -valued 3.68 4.32 3.19 - - - - - -
Number of observations 107 107 107 107 34 73 - 107 107
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.42 0.53 - 0.61 0.61
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables, except initial level of income variables are averaged over the
1960-2000 period. The variable, (ni + g + δ) refers to sum of rates of population growth, technical progress and depreciation.
a The p-value refers to the hypothesis that individual coefficients are the same for Africa and non-Africa samples.
b The landlocked countries in Europe are dropped.
c Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
d Test for joint significance of the regional dummies.
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4.4 Outliers
An important concern related to the cross-country growth works is that
results may be partly driven by outlying countries. Undoubtedly this
concern is very important since cross-country growth studies are based
on small samples. As Temple (1999a, 2000) points out we should make
sure that our results reflect the tendencies of a majority of data not
those of a minority of observations if we want to reach useful general-
izations about growth.
Before proceeding for outlier checking, we want to make clear the
terminology since the definition of outlier is sometimes unclear and
confused. An outlier is simply an observation which is considerably dif-
ferent from the remaining observations in the sample (Hawkins (1980),
Barnett and Lewis (1994)). This difference between outlying observa-
tion and others may occur either in the dependent variable or in the
explanatory variable(s) or in the both. An outlier in the dependent
variable yields a large residual and is some times referred to as outlier
in the response variable (Chatterjee and Hadi (1988, 2006)) or outlier
in y-direction or vertical outlier (Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987)). Hence,
one can easily detect a single outlier in the response variable by simply
checking residuals. Yet, an outlier may also arise in the explanatory
variable(s) and take a place far from the bulk of data of observed ex-
planatory variables in the sample. This kind of outlier is also known
as the outlier in the predictors or design outlier. Since outlier in the
predictors are far away from the bulk of data, they have high leverage
values and are some times referred to as high leverage points in order to
distinguish them from the outliers in the response variable. Therefore,
detecting an outlying observation by checking residuals is often mis-
leading. The reason is that a high leverage data point pulls the OLS
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regression line towards itself and yields small residuals. In addition,
this data point causes the larger residuals for other observations.
On the other hand, an influential observation is the data point that
has individually or collectively substantial influence on the regression
results with respect to other observations in the sample (Belsley et al.
(1980)). Thus, removing an influential observation from the sample
changes the fitted regression equation considerably. Two points in this
definition deserve special emphasis. First, an observation can be in-
fluential individually or together with a group of other observations.
This implies that while removing a single observation from the sample
does not change the regression result, dropping that observation with
other observation(s) can substantially affect fitted regression equation.
Second, the term of influence in the definition is partly subjective such
that an influential observation can affect the coefficient estimates of
variable(s) or their standard deviations, and hence t-statistics, R2 and
so on. This means that all influential observations do not have equal
influence on the regression results as argued by Chatterjee and Hadi
(1988). One can effect the magnitude and/or sign of coefficient esti-
mates while the other can be influential on the statistical significance
or goodness of fit. Therefore, one should particularly keep in mind
how outliers affect the regression results in terms of the objective of
empirical research.
Even though outliers are not necessarily influential observations,
they are generally have influence on the regression results. Therefore,
an important primary task of regression analysis is to detect influential
outlying observations in the sample in order to conduct useful and reli-
able generalizations. However, identification of outliers in the multiple
regression is not easy especially if the sample includes more than one
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outlier. As a starting point, checking residuals (especially studentized
ones) and leverages after the regression is always suggested.
Many outlier identification methods have been suggested in statis-
tics.10 It is possible to classify these methods under the two main cat-
egories. The first and most common one is the regression diagnostics
such as Cook’s distance, DFITS statistics and Welsh distance. These
diagnostics basically take into account the changes in the fitted regres-
sion equation after a single observation is removed and hence they di-
rectly measure the influence of each individual observation. Therefore,
these diagnostics are some times referred as the direct outlier detect-
ing methods (Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987)). Among these statistics,
DFITS suggested by Belsley et al. (1980) is the most widely used in
the regression analysis and shows the effect of each observation in the
sample on the overall fitted regression analysis. In addition, Belsley
et al. (1980) proposed a similar measure which is known as DFBETA
statistics. Differently from DFITS, DFBETA reveals the influence of
each observation on a particular explanatory variable and thus it is very
useful when the primary interest of researcher is focused on a specific
variable in the regression equation.
As a rule of thumb, observations having large values of these di-
agnostics are considered as influential outliers in the response variable
and/or in the predictors. Moreover, several cutoff points for them are
suggested in the literature. The choice of cutoff points depends on the
sample size and number of explanatory variables. Generally, for small
samples a high cutoff point is plausible (Bollen and Jackman (1990)).
However, instead of using a particular cutoff level, it is better to exam-
ine these diagnostics graphically and identify observations with unusual
10Outlier detection methods from the Bayesian perspective are also suggested in the
statistical literature. See, Guttman et al. (1978), Pettit (1992), Hoeting (1994)
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patterns, as pointed out by Chatterjee and Hadi (1988).
Even though these diagnostic measures are useful, their efficiency
substantially decreases if the sample includes more than one outlier.
The reason is that all diagnostic measures mentioned above are based
on the removing of single observation and they are no longer powerful in
the case of multiple outliers due to the masking and swamping effects.
When the sample includes more than one outlier, some outliers may
be hidden by the others and this effect is known as masking effect. On
the other hand, swamping effect arises due to the fact that outliers,
especially those with high leverage values, make other observations
lie far from the fitted regression equation by pulling the regression
equation towards themselves. Therefore, the best solution of these
problems is to calculate diagnostic measures based on the deletion of
all subsets of observations. However, this is almost practically infeasible
not only because deciding the number of subsets is difficult but also
computation is immense due to the larger number of subsets. 11
The second and in the case of multiple outliers, more efficient class
of outlier detection methods is the robust regressions. These methods
in essence suggest employing robust regression techniques which are re-
sistant to outliers. On the contrary to the common view, robust regres-
sions do not simply ignore outliers. Rather, one can identify outliers
by comparing residuals obtained from a robust regression with those
derived from the OLS. Therefore, regression diagnostics and robust re-
gressions basically serve the same purpose only from the opposite side
as argued by Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987). In statistics many robust
regression techniques such as Least Median of Squares, Least Trimmed
11For instance, if the consideration of all subsets includes only 2 observations and the
sample size is 107 as in the case of our full sample, there are 5671 possibilities. When we
consider 3 out of 107 observations, the number of possibilities is 198485.
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Squares are suggested (See, Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987), Rousseeuw
and van Zomeren (1990), Atkinson (1994)). However, robust regression
gives us an idea such that we can apply weighted least squares analysis
based on the identification of the outliers. If this can be done, the
results of weighted least squares will be less sensitive to the outlying
observations and more plausible with respect to those obtained from
usual least squares.
Hadi (1992b) suggests another measure in order to identify influ-
ential outliers in the data. This diagnostic which measures overall
potential influence of the ith observation is defined as
Hi =
k
1− hi
d2i
1− d2i
+
hi
1− hi , i = 1, ..., n (4.5)
where k is the number of explanatory variables (including constant),
di = ei/
√
SSE and hi is the ith normalized residual and leverage,
respectively. As can be seen, this diagnostic measure is the sum of
two components. The first term on the right-hand side of the equation
(4.5) is a function of the ith normalized residual weighted by the ith
leverage value and measures outlyingness in the response variable. The
second component is also known as the potential function and measure
the outlyingness in the predictors.
The diagnostic measure proposed by Hadi (1992b) has several de-
sirable properties compared to the traditional diagnostics. First, it
measures overall potential influence of an observation. As can be seen,
outlying observations in either response variable and/or predictors will
have large values of Hadi’s measures. Second, Hadi’s measure identifies
potentially influential observations on several regressions rather than
the focusing on a single regression. Third, this measure is an additive
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function of both residual and leverage values.12 Fourth, Hadi’s measure
is monotonically increasing function of both residuals and leverages.
Even though Hadi’s measure is superior than the traditional mea-
sures, it is still designed for a single observations. In order to highlight
multiple outliers in the data set, Hadi proposed two ways. Firstly,
he suggests a simple graph which is based on the formula in equation
(4.5). This graph which is also known as ”potential-residual plot” is
a more powerful tool in order to detect both single and multiple influ-
ential cases. Secondly and more importantly, he proposed a practical
method to search multiple outliers (Hadi (1992a, 1994), Hadi and Si-
monoff (1993)).
In the light of these explanations, we apply the method suggested
by Hadi (1992a,b;1994) for identification of outlying observations in
our baseline cross-country growth regression. However, before applying
Hadi methodology, we investigate outlying observations by employing
diagnostic plots.
The diagnostic plot suggested by Gray (1986) is commonly used in
statistical literature for a quick way of checking influential observations
and shows leverage versus the residual squared. Figure 4.2(a) plots
leverages against the normalised residual squared of baseline cross-
country growth regression based on the full sample. In this figure two
reference lines parallel to horizontal and vertical axes show the mean
values of leverage and normalised residual squared respectively. Ob-
servations that are located far away from reference lines are of great
concern for us. As can be easily seen Tanzania is the most influen-
12Traditional diagnostics such as Cook’s distance and DFITS are the multiplicative
function of residual and leverage values. Since observations with large values yields either
large residuals or large leverages or both, multiplicative diagnostics would be small if one
of these quantities (residuals and leverages) is small and thus could fail to detect influential
outliers.
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tial country with the highest leverage in our sample. The feature of
this country is that it has the smallest school enrolment rate in our
sample and hence it is an outlier in the saving rate for human capital.
In addition, the countries Uganda, Romania, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau, Jordan and Niger have moderately high level of leverages. Fig-
ure 4.2(a) also shows that Congo Democratic Republic (former Zaire)
is the country with the highest residual. Congo Democratic Republic
has the lowest growth performance in our sample and hence this coun-
try is clearly an outlier in the growth rate. Yet, the leverage value of
this country is very close to the sample mean. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to conclude that Congo Democratic Republic is not influential
in spite of its very high residual. In addition to this country, Figure
4.2(a) indicates the countries Guyana, Botswana, Jamaica, Zambia,
Nicaragua, Uganda, Hong Kong and Singapore whose residuals are rel-
atively higher. However, neither of them has a high leverage value.
Therefore, graphical inspection indicates that only Tanzania may be a
candidate as a potential influential outlier. Even though the leverage
of Congo Democratic Republic is low, this country is of concern due
to its high level of the residual. In addition to leverage versus plot
we also present Hadi’s potential-residual plot in figure 4.2(b). As can
be seen, potential-residual plot exactly similar to leverage-residual plot
and hence supports our findings from figure 4.2(a).
When we apply Hadi method on our data set, we conclude only
Tanzania as a potential outlying country. As can be seen, Hadi measure
confirms our findings from graphical inspection.
The most common approach for solving outlier problems is dropping
these observations from the sample. Omitting Tanzania yields the fol-
lowing cross-country growth regression (t-statistics are in parentheses)
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Figure 4.2: Benchmark Growth Model: Diagnostic Plots for Outliers
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logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = 2.779
(2.55)
− 0.443
(6.55)
logyi,1960
− 1.070
(2.88)
log(ni + g + δ)
+ 0.445
(4.44)
log(Investment ratei)
+ 0.421
(4.48)
log(School enrolmenti), R
2
= 0.62
(4.6)
Compared to our previous regression presented the first column of Ta-
ble 4.1, dropping Tanzania from the sample slightly changes the coef-
ficient estimates of initial income and population growth. Therefore,
there is not an important change for the implied convergence rate. Yet
now, the effect of saving rate for physical capital is stronger than the
saving rate for human capital. In addition, R2 of the model increases
by one percent.
However, removing outlying countries from the sample may not be
a good solution in the cross-country growth regressions. The most im-
portant reason is that some countries can behave as outliers due to
the fact that a relevant variable has been omitted from the specified
model. This last point is closely related to model uncertainty problem
and hence removing some observations may be considered another kind
of data mining (Chatfield (1995)). Since the estimated cross-country
growth regression is proposed as a benchmark model in order to inves-
tigate openness-growth connection, we prefer keeping Tanzania in our
full sample. However, detecting outliers in the cross-country growth
works is a noteworthy task. Temple (1999a, p.127) points out “[T]he
identification of possible outliers will not only render generalizations
more robust, but will also highlight countries with atypical growth ex-
periences, ones that are particularly likely to reward further study.”
This is particularly very important when testing new growth theories
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and/or investigating the relationship between economic growth and a
policy variable.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we replicate the augmented neoclassical growth model
using an updated and revised data set over the period 1960-2000. Our
results support findings of MRW, yet are different in some aspects:
First, we find a stronger effect of investment in human capital and
a weaker effect of investment in physical capital on economic growth
compared to MRW; Second, the effect of accumulation of human cap-
ital is stronger than the contribution of investment in physical capital
on economic growth. This finding is more obvious in the low income
countries while results obtained from high income sample are more sim-
ilar to MRW; Third, our coefficient estimates of physical and human
capital shares are more reasonable than MRW. The regression results
based on the largest sample indicates that the shares of physical and
human capital are 32 and 35 percent, respectively. Comparing those
obtained by MRW, our empirical results are more consistent with three
factor Cobb-Douglas production function, Y = K1/3H1/3L1/3.
We also check the effect of geography by employing three region
dummy variables and conclude that inclusion of these dummies does
not alter our main conclusions. In addition, our findings are not driven
by outliers.
To conclude, the estimated growth model in this chapter appears
appropriate for investigating the relation between growth and open-
ness to international trade. Hence, in what follows we carry out our
empirical investigation employing the augmented neoclassical growth
model suggested by MRW as a benchmark model in the rest of this
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dissertation.
4.A Appendix: Descriptions and Sources of Vari-
ables used in Cross-Country Growth Regres-
sion Analysis
Real GDP per capita (RGDPCH) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. Source: Global Development Network Growth Database
(2005) which rely on Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
Population (TP) : Total population is based on the de facto defini-
tion of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship. Source: The World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (2002, 2006).
Labour force (LF) : Labour force or economically active population
defined as the total population between ages 15 and 64. Source:
The World Bank World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Share of labour force (SLF): Share of labour force in total popu-
lation. The exact calculation is LF/TP .
Real GDP per worker (PWGDP) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. The exact calculation is PWGDP = RGDPCH∗(1/SLF ).
Growth : Average growth rate of real GDP per worker over the 1960-
2000 period. The exact calculation is log(PWGDP2000/PWGDP1960),
where PWGDP1960 and PWGDP2000 is the real GDP per worker
in 1960 and 2000, respectively. Because of missing variables, for
the countries Bahamas, Belize, Haiti, Hungary, Malta, Oman,
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Puerto Rico, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tunisia, 1961 values are
used instead of 1960 values.
Initial income (PWGDP1960) : Real GDP per worker in 1960.
Because of missing variables, for the countries Bahamas, Belize,
Haiti, Hungary, Malta, Oman, Puerto Rico, Sierra Leone, Sudan
and Tunisia, 1961 values are used instead of 1960 values.
Population growth (n) : Average rate of population growth be-
tween 1960 and 2000. The exact calculation is (1/40)∗log(TP2000/TP1960),
where TP1960 and TP2000 are total population in 1960 and 2000,
respectively.
(g+δ) : Sum of exogenous rates of technological process and depre-
ciation over the 1960-2000 period and assumed to be equal to
0.05.
(n+g+δ) : Sum of rates of population growth, technical process and
depreciation over the 1960-2000 period.
Investment rate (INV) : Average of investment share in GDP at
constant prices over the 1960-2000 period. The data are averages
for Tunisia and Sierra-Leone over 1961-2000 period, for Hungary
and Malta 1965-2000 period, for Namibia, Cyprus, Botswana,
Mauritania, Haiti, Central African Republic, Guyana and Fiji,
over 1960-1999 period instead of 1960-2000 period. Source: He-
ston, Summers and Aten (2002). In order to increase number of
observations, data of seven countries are filled up by using gross
capital formation data from the World Bank World Development
Indicators (2002, 2006). These countries are Puerto Rico for 1986-
1991 period, Hungary for 1965-69 period, Malta for 1965-1993 pe-
riod and years 1999, 2000, Sierra Leon for years 1997, 1999 and
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2000, Cyprus for 1997-99 period, Angola for 1997-2000 period,
Congo Democratic Republic for 1998-2000 period.
School enrolment rate (SCH) : Average gross rate of secondary
school enrolment over the 1960-2000 period. Gross secondary
school enrollment ratio is defined as the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to the level of secondary education. For countries
Chad, Ethiopia, Portugal, Niger and Mauritania, the variable is
calculated over the 1965-2000 period. Source: The World Bank
World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy (REG SSA) : A dummy variable takes
the value of 1 for the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Source:
Global Development Network Growth Database (2005).
Latin American dummy (REG LAC) : A dummy variable takes
the value of 1 for the countries in Latin America and Caribbean.
Source: Global Development Network Growth Database (2005).
East Asian dummy (REG EAP) : A dummy variable takes the
value of 1 for the countries in East Asia and Pacific. Source:
Global Development Network Growth Database (2005).
Landlocked Country (LANDLOCK) : A dummy variable for land-
locked countries. Source: Gallup et al. (1999)
Landlocked Country without Europe (LANDLOCK WE) : A
dummy variable for landlocked countries, except those in Europe
(Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxem-
bourg, Liechtenstein, Moldova and Switzerland). Source: Gallup
et al. (1999) and author’s calculation.
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Table 4.5: List of Countries in the Full Sample
Algeria* Dominican Republic Japan* Peru*
Angola* Ecuador Jordan* Philippines
Argentina* Egypt Kenya Portugal*
Australia* El Salvador* Korea, Republic of Romania
Austria* Ethiopia Lesotho Rwanda
Bangladesh Fiji* Luxembourg* Senegal
Barbados* Finland* Madagascar Sierra Leone
Belgium* France* Malawi Singapore
Benin Gambia, The Malaysia Spain*
Bolivia* Ghana Mali Sri Lanka
Botswana Greece* Malta Sweden*
Brazil* Guatemala* Mauritania Switzerland*
Burkina Faso Guinea* Mauritius* Syria
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Mexico* Tanzania
Cameroon Guyana Morocco Thailand
Canada* Haiti Mozambique Togo
Central African Rep. Honduras Nepal Trinidad &Tobago*
Chad Hong Kong* Netherlands* Tunisia
Chile* Hungary* New Zealand* Turkey*
China Iceland* Nicaragua* Uganda
Colombia* India Niger United Kingdom*
Congo, Dem. Rep. Indonesia Nigeria United States*
Congo, Republic of Iran* Norway* Uruguay*
Costa Rica* Ireland* Pakistan Venezuela*
Cote d‘Ivoire Israel* Panama* Zambia
Cyprus* Italy* Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe
Denmark* Jamaica* Paraguay*
Note: Countries with asterisk are the high income countries according to the median of
real GDP per worker in 1960.
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics
Variable ♯ of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth 118 0.6728 0.6639 -1.3525 2.3247
log PWGDP1960 118 8.3153 0.8390 6.5737 10.0252
(n+g+δ) 191 0.0696 0.0120 0.0465 0.1396
INV 116 0.1568 0.0777 0.0207 0.4120
SCH 125 0.4841 0.3120 0.0444 1.1460
REG SSA 207 0.2367 0.4261 0 1
REG LAC 207 0.1884 0.3920 0 1
REG EAP 207 0.1691 0.3757 0 1
LANDLOCK 208 0.1923 0.3951 0 1
LANDLOCK WE 208 0.1394 0.3472 0 1
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Table 4.7: Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
Sample Full NonOil Intermediate High Income Low Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Our MRW† Our MRW† Our MRW† Our MRW† Our MRW†
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.503 -0.312 -0.483 -0.289 -0.612 -0.384 -0.541 -0.347 -0.382 -0.344
(6.41) (5.09) (5.70) (4.33) (6.52) (5.76) (4.09) (3.87) (2.36) (2.05)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.214 -0.414 -1.056 -0.345 -0.928 -0.584 -1.228 -0.522 -1.817 0.073
(2.91) (1.70) (2.41) (1.31) (2.13) (2.38) (2.51) (1.62) (1.59) (0.14)
log of Investment rate 0.429 0.572 0.425 0.560 0.445 0.529 0.471 0.661 0.441 0.534
(4.46) (5.11) (4.38) (4.94) (3.90) (3.85) (2.22) (4.30) (3.57) (3.60)
log of School enrolment 0.469 0.214 0.467 0.201 0.644 0.288 0.463 0.101 0.455 0.218
(5.03) (2.99) (4.91) (2.74) (4.84) (2.98) (2.05) (0.67) (3.84) (2.34)
Constant 2.914 1.794 3.169 1.529 4.775 2.710 3.268 2.257 0.449 1.112
(2.58) (2.02) (2.75) (1.59) (3.51) (3.03) (1.93) (1.94) (0.14) (0.76)
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.79 0.08 0.90 0.07 0.31 0.01 0.91 0.33 0.98 0.07
Number of observations 94 94 89 89 72 72 45 45 49 49
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.48 0.61 0.46 0.59 0.43 0.59 0.50 0.59 0.43
Implied λ∗ 0.0175 0.0150 0.0165 0.0136 0.0237 0.0194 0.0195 0.0170 0.0120 0.0169
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported. All variables, except initial level of income are averaged over the 1960-2000
period. The variable, (ni + g + δ) refers to sum of rates of population growth, technical progress and depreciation.
† Estimates of augmented neoclassical growth model using the original data of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) over the 1960-1985 period. Dependent
variables for these regressions are log difference GDP per worker over the period 1960-1985.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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Chapter 5
Openness and Economic
Growth: A Cross-Country
Empirical Investigation
5.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to empirically investigate the long-
run relationship between economic growth and openness using a cross-
country growth regression based on the augmented neoclassical growth
model. In this chapter, we employ a large number of openness mea-
sures suggested in the literature to provide a wider picture in order
to evaluate both existing openness variables and the openness-growth
connection. We also carry out the empirical investigation over the
1960-2000 period and check whether our findings are driven by outly-
ing countries. Finally, we carry out a sensitivity analysis.
The cross-country empirical investigation in this chapter indicates
that many openness variables are positively and significantly correlated
with economic growth. However, in many cases, this result depends
on the presence of a few outlying countries. More importantly, the
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significance of openness variables disappears once other growth deter-
minants, such as macroeconomic stability, institutions, and geography
are accounted for.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides the
basic framework for the empirical cross-country investigation of the
openness-growth connection. Section 3 presents OLS estimates based
on the cross-country growth regressions for the 1960-2000 period. Sec-
tion 4 examines how robust our findings are to model specification. For
this, we carry out a sensitivity analysis accounting for other growth
theories. Finally, Section 5 summarises our results.
5.2 Economic Growth and Openness to Interna-
tional Trade: Baseline Model
In this section we investigate the relationship between economic growth
and openness to international trade in the framework of the augmented
neo-classical growth model over the period 1960-2000. In other words,
we extend this model by adding a proxy variable for openness as follows
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = γ0 + γ1logyi,1960 + γ2log(ni + g + δ)
+ γ3log(Investment ratei)
+ γ4log(School enrolmeti)
+ γ5Opennessi + εi
(5.1)
Once we specify the cross-country growth regression expressed in
equation (5.1), an important problem arises immediately: the endo-
geneity of the openness variable. It is highly likely that countries im-
plementing open trade policies may also follow more liberal domestic
policies and adopt sound and stable fiscal and monetary polices. In
154
Chapter 5: Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country
Empirical Investigation
addition, countries having better institutions and geographical advan-
tages can enjoy much more international trade and hence adapt open
trade policies. Since these factors are also important determinants of
economic growth, it is likely that the openness variable in equation
(5.1) is correlated with the error term, εi. In this case, the coefficient
estimate of openness variable, γ5 will not reflect the true impact of
openness on economic growth. Put differently the OLS estimate of
γ5 will be biased and the direction of causality between growth and
openness will remain unclear.
The best way in order to overcome endogeneity problem is finding
or constructing an instrumental variable (IV) which is correlated with
the openness variable but uncorrelated with the error term. In other
words, IV must affect economic growth only through the openness vari-
able. If one can find a valid IV and estimate the cross-country growth
regression in equation (5.1) by two stage least squares (2SLS), then
the IV estimate of γ5 will reflect the true effect of openness on growth.
However, finding a valid IV is almost impossible in the cross-country
growth works due to the open-endedness of growth theories.1 More
importantly, if IV is not valid, the coefficient estimate will be again
biased and in this case the OLS estimate would be more preferable as
argued by Durlauf et al. (2005).
Therefore, it may be possible to conclude that the cross-country
growth regressions can never reveal the direction of causality. Despite
1Mankiw (1995, p.303) points out “[W]hen looking for instruments, it is easy to fall
prey to temptation.” Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005, p.) argue that “[t]he belief that
it is easy to identify valid instrumental variables in the growth context is deeply mistaken.”
In some studies the lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. How-
ever, predetermined variables do not guarantee that they are directly uncorrelated with
growth and hence they are proper instruments. More importantly, even if they are valid
instruments, whether the instrumental estimate shows the effect of endogenous variable
or of lagged value of that variable on economic growth remain unanswered. According to
Mankiw (1995) the answer is generally neither.
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this fact, the cross-country works still provide useful information be-
tween growth and a variable of interest. Even if we can not establish
the casuality between growth and openness, a statistically significant
partial association can be used to reject alternative hypotheses which
fail to provide statistically significant correlation and one can provide
plausible causal statement (Mankiw (1995), Wacziarg (2002)). For in-
stance, if we conclude that OLS estimate of γ5 is positive and statisti-
cally significant and fail to conclude the statistically significant negative
association between openness and growth, then it is not reasonable to
reach an inference such that openness is harmful for economic growth.2
5.3 Empirical Results
As mentioned before, a large number of openness measures have been
suggested in the literature. That is why, we carry out our empirical
investigation classifying the openness measures under four categories:
trade volumes; direct trade policy measures; deviation measures; and
subjective indexes.
5.3.1 Trade Volumes
We start our estimations with the ratio of trade volume in GDP. We
obtain two measures for this variable: one is from the World Bank and
2For instance, Warner (2003) argues that it is very difficult to attribute a positive co-
efficient estimate on openness variable to reverse casuality from growth to trade polices.
The reason is that there are no specific cases in which countries opened to international
trade, grew slowly and then closed again because of poor economic performance. How-
ever, Rodrik (2005) questions this kind of reasoning since the policy endogeneity in growth
regressions is not only an econometric nuisance but also problematic conceptually when
government policies are used systematically to achieve certain economic and social objec-
tives. Rodrik (2005, p.3) points out that “[a] government that cares about social welfare
(and nothing else) will increase its policy intervention in response to larger market fail-
ures, but not so much as to completely insulate economic performance from their adverse
consequence.”
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the other is from Penn World Tables (Version 6.1). One advantage of
the World Bank measure is that the data are published in terms of
exports and imports. Thus, this allows us to investigate the export-
growth connection and import-growth connection separately. On the
other hand the trade ratio of the Penn World Tables is published only
as a sum of exports and imports at current prices. This data have
the advantage that they are available for a larger number of countries.
This is a very common proxy in the cross-country growth literature and
some times referred to as “current openness”. The simple correlation
between these two trade ratios is almost one (Table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Economic Growth and Trade Volumes: Pairwise Correlations
1960-2000 averages
Average GDP per Exports Imports Trade Current Real Trade
growth worker ratio ratio Ratio open. open. ratio with
in 1960 OECD
Average growth 1.000
GDP per worker in 1960 0.137 1.000
Exports ratio of WB 0.359 0.231 1.000
Imports ratio of WB 0.288 0.004 0.840 1.000
Trade ratio of WB 0.335 0.120 0.958 0.960 1.000
Current openness of PW 0.344 0.152 0.958 0.962 0.996 1.000
Real openness by A&C 0.426 0.381 0.846 0.721 0.812 0.868 1.000
Trade ratio with OECD 0.280 0.184 0.851 0.850 0.876 0.909 0.815 1.000
Trade ratio with NonOECD 0.276 0.036 0.672 0.661 0.687 0.880 0.759 0.687
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Table 5.2 provides the estimation results. Columns 1 and 2 show the
regression results using the ratio of exports and the ratio of imports,
respectively. Column 3 includes the trade ratio as a sum of the ratio
of exports and the ratio of imports. In each regression the coefficient
of the openness variable is to be found positive but not significant.
Therefore, a significant association between growth and openness is
not established using the World Bank data. However, we find that
coefficient estimate of openness is positive and highly significant when
employing current openness of the Penn World in column 4. The re-
gression results indicate a 10 percent increase in trade ratio would raise
the growth by 2.73 percent over the 1960-2000 period. This is equiva-
lent to 0.07 percent increase in annual growth rate over the same period
(2.73/40=0.07). In column 5 we estimate our baseline model with the
variable of real openness suggested by Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004) and
conclude positive and strongly significant coefficient estimate. As can
be seen, the estimated coefficient of real openness is higher compared to
that of current openness and implies that a 10 percent increase would
raise the growth rate 3.99 percentage points over the period 1960-2000
(which is equal to 0.10 percent increase in annual growth rate for the
same period). In columns 6 and 7 we estimate our benchmark model
adding trade ratio with OECD and trade ratio with non-OECD coun-
tries. The rationale is straightforward as Yanikkaya (2003) points out.
In the light of recent endogenous growth theories countries, particularly
the developing ones, can benefit more from trade with technologically
advanced countries in order to stimulate growth. If this argument is
true then one would expect a higher coefficient estimate of trade ratio
with the OECD with respect to that of the trade ratio with non-OECD
countries. However, the regression results in columns 6 and 7 show that
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the coefficient of the trade ratio with OECD is not only less than the
coefficient of trade ratio with non-OECD but also is statistically in-
significant. These results confirm the findings of Yanikkaya (2003) and
imply that technology spillover effects of international trade on eco-
nomic growth are not very important compared to the effects of scale
economies and comparative advantage.
In summary, the regression results in Table 5.2 show a positive as-
sociation between economic growth and international trade and confirm
the findings of previous work (Vamwakidis (2002), Irwin and Tervio¨ (2002),
Dollar and Kraay (2003a), Yanikkaya (2003), Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004)
are a few recent examples). However, it is puzzling that we could not
find any statistically significant relation between trade ratios of the
World Bank and growth despite the very high correlations between
these measures and current openness.3 The reason is that regressions
including trade ratios of World Bank have smaller samples than those
including current openness and real openness. More clearly, some coun-
tries are dropped from the regressions when we use the World Bank
data and hence this implies that the positive and statistically signifi-
cant relation between growth and trade ratios of Penn World data may
be driven by outlying countries.
When we look at the data of current openness, we highlight that
Singapore has the highest trade ratio with a value of 323 percent. This
country not only has the highest trade ratio but also records the high-
est growth rate over the 1960-2000 period. However, Singapore is miss-
ing in the trade ratios of World Bank since data for this country are
available only over the 1974-2000 period. When we add Singapore
3For a comparison see Table 5.1. As can be easily seen, the correlation between current
openness and real openness is smaller than the correlations between current openness and
trade ratios of the World Bank.
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Table 5.2: Economic Growth and Trade Volumes: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the
1960-2000 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.471 -0.456 -0.462 -0.429 -0.464 -0.454 -0.434
(6.46) (6.16) (6.31) (6.46) (6.97) (5.81) (5.66)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.108 -1.063 -1.080 -1.100 -1.021 -1.153 -1.286
(2.66) (2.52) (2.58) (2.93) (2.77) (2.97) (3.38)
log of Investment rate 0.410 0.400 0.403 0.360 0.338 0.507 0.468
(3.80) (3.66) (3.72) (3.98) (3.74) (4.68) (4.38)
log of School enrolment 0.436 0.453 0.445 0.430 0.438 0.391 0.390
(4.28) (4.46) (4.38) (5.11) (5.28) (3.89) (4.00)
Exports ratio of WB 0.388 - - - - - -
(1.58)
Imports ratio of WB - 0.316 - - - - -
(1.37)
Trade ratio of WB - - 0.185 - - - -
(1.51)
Current Openness of PW - - - 0.273 - - -
(2.85)
Real Openness by A&C - - - - 0.399 - -
(3.29)
Trade ratio with OECD - - - - - 0.358 -
(1.74)
Trade ratio with NonOECD - - - - - - 0.787
(2.80)
Constant 2.730 2.734 2.725 2.244 2.731 2.603 2.018
(2.23) (2.22) (2.22) (2.08) (2.60) (2.20) (1.71)
Number of observations 93 93 93 105 105 89 89
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.64 0.81 0.43 0.69
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.66
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
aBreusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
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to the regressions based on the trade ratios of the World Bank using
the average values over the 1974-2000 period instead of the 1960-2000
period, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship be-
tween growth and all three trade ratios of World Bank. This finding
clearly indicates that Singapore is a highly influential country in the
cross-country regressions in Table 5.2.
In order to check possible outliers we apply the Hadi measure on
each data set subject to cross-country growth regressions in Table 5.2.
We identify four countries namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxembourg
and Tanzania as outliers in the regressions including current openness
and real openness. Recall that we have already determined Tanzania as
an outlying country in Chapter 4. Thus, Hong Kong, Luxembourg and
Singapore are clearly outliers in current openness and/or real openness
(See figures 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) for a graphical inspection). The outstand-
ing characteristics of these countries is that they have the highest trade
ratios with an average value of 244 percent according to the current
openness and experience very high growth performances. In addition,
we also identify Hong Kong and Luxembourg as outliers for the data set
including trade ratios of the World Bank. A sample of countries based
on the trade ratios with the OECD and non-OECD concludes that only
Singapore for the data set including trade ratio with the OECD and
five countries namely Congo Democratic Republic, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Malaysia and Hungary for the data set including trade ratio with
non-OECD as outlying observations.
When we drop all outlying countries from our regressions, we find
that all openness variables except trade ratios with the OECD and non-
OECD are negative but statistically insignificant (Table 5.3). There-
fore, our findings such that both current openness and real openness are
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Figure 5.1: Partial Associations between Growth Rate and Trade Shares
significantly and positively correlated with growth may not be robust.
As can be seen from Table 5.3 after dropping outliers we conclude very
similar findings to our first result for the trade ratio with the OECD
such that this variable is still positive but not significant. Contrary to
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our first findings, we find a significantly negative coefficient estimate of
the trade ratio with non-OECD which implies that trading with non-
OECD countries, and hence technologically less advanced countries, is
not beneficial for economic growth.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, omitting outliers may
not be a good solution for cross-country growth analysis. Instead of
dropping these countries an alternative and better way is to carry out
the analysis by employing weighted least squares (WLS). Indeed, omit-
ting some observations from OLS regression is another kind of WLS
estimation such that we assign each observation a weight of 1 if it is in-
cluded in the regression or a weight of 0 if omitted. In contrast to these
extreme weights, WLS gives each observation a weight between 1 and
0 such that outlying cases are down-weighted gradually. Therefore, we
estimate the cross-country growth regressions in Table 5.2 employing
Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS). IRLS is based on itera-
tive computation of case weights obtained from the residuals. Weight
functions for the observations are first Huber weights and second the
Tukey bisquare weights.4 However, the most important shortcoming of
IRLS is that it is not robust to high leverage data points. Therefore, if
one can identify and drop the observations with the high leverage value
and then estimate the sample of remaining observations by IRLS, es-
timation results will be more robust. Hence, before applying IRLS, we
firstly highlight high leverage countries in each data set. For this, fol-
lowing Huber (1981) we determine the countries as risky whose leverage
values are greater than 0.2. In the second step, we delete these risky
countries from each sample and estimate the cross-country growth re-
gressions by IRLS. Table 5.4 provides IRLS regression results. The first
4See Hamilton (1992) for more information about the IRLS.
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Table 5.3: Economic Growth and Trade Volumes: OLS Estimates without
Outlying Countries
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the
1960-2000 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.495 -0.496 -0.496 -0.444 -0.441 -0.458 -0.526
(6.83) (6.67) (6.76) (6.81) (6.64) (5.97) (7.72)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.170 -1.175 -1.174 -1.159 -1.167 -1.269 -1.429
(2.86) (2.84) (2.86) (3.16) (3.17) (3.30) (4.20)
log of Investment rate 0.384 0.385 0.385 0.357 0.355 0.465 0.333
(3.62) (3.62) (3.63) (3.70) (3.66) (4.30) (3.53)
log of School enrolment 0.478 0.474 0.476 0.444 0.441 0.411 0.497
(4.71) (4.76) (4.75) (5.00) (4.95) (4.15) (5.77)
Exports ratio of WB -0.073 - - - - - -
(0.24)
Imports ratio of WB - -0.044 - - - - -
(0.17)
Trade ratio of WB - - -0.031 - - - -
(0.21)
Current Openness of PW - - - -0.071 - - -
(0.49)
Real Openness by A&C - - - - -0.024 - -
(0.12)
Trade ratio with OECD - - - - - 0.132
(0.58)
Trade ratio with NonOECD - - - - - - -1.299
(2.09)
Constant 2.862 2.855 2.860 2.406 2.318 2.327 2.467
(2.36) (2.35) (2.36) (2.25) (2.19) (2.00) (2.34)
Number of observations 91 91 91 101 101 88 84
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.76 0.84 0.74 0.47
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.69
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
aBreusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
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four columns of Table 5.4 shows that both trade ratios of the World
Bank and current openness are significantly and positively associated
with economic growth. However, we could not conclude the same thing
for the real openness. As can be seen in column 5 of Table 5.4, the
coefficient estimate of real openness is positive but not statistically sig-
nificant. In columns of 6 and 7, we report regressions including the
trade ratios with OECD and non-OECD, respectively and conclude
that both are positive. Yet, trade ratios with OECD is not found to
be statistically significant.
Table 5.4: Economic Growth and Trade Volumes: IRLS Estimations
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the
1960-2000 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.492 -0.468 -0.477 -0.442 -0.464 -0.503 -0.487
(7.99) (7.31) (7.60) (7.79) (7.97) (7.64) (7.24)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.157 -1.115 -1.124 -1.302 -1.215 -1.280 -1.307
(3.28) (3.07) (3.14) (4.05) (3.77) (3.87) (3.95)
log of Investment rate 0.394 0.375 0.379 0.331 0.305 0.403 0.425
(4.33) (3.98) (4.08) (3.90) (3.57) (4.34) (4.55)
log of School enrolment 0.442 0.466 0.457 0.427 0.441 0.452 0.434
(5.13) (5.32) (5.26) (5.53) (5.65) (5.30) (5.07)
Exports ratio of WB 0.564 - - - - - -
(2.72)
Imports ratio of WB - 0.385 - - - - -
(1.93)
Trade ratio of WB - - 0.247 - - - -
(2.36)
Current Openness of PW - - - 0.231 - - -
(2.27)
Real Openness by A&C - - - 0.209 - -
(1.29)
Trade ratio with OECD - - - - - 0.279 -
(1.42)
Trade ratio with NonOECD - - - - - - 0.771
(2.07)
Constant 2.741 2.668 2.693 1.805 2.234 2.592 2.423
(2.64) (2.51) (2.56) (1.95) (2.41) (2.59) (2.35)
Number of observations 93 93 93 103 102 88 88
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.70
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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However, the ratio of trade volume in GDP is an idiosyncratic mea-
sure of openness as noted by Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002).5 First, some
large countries may appear closed economy by this measure. For in-
stance, according to the current openness the United States and Japan
are the fourth and seventh most closed economies in our sample. Sec-
ond, the volume of international trade is affected not only by trade
policies but also by other factors such as transportation costs, world
demand, geography, natural resource dependence and so on. Hence, it
is likely that a positive association between trade to GDP ratio and
growth rate implies the impact of international trade rather than the
effect of trade polices on economic growth.
5.3.2 Direct Trade Policy Measures
In the second step we investigate the openness-growth connection by
employing direct trade policy measures namely tariff rates, non-tariff
barriers on imports and black market premium. It is obvious that the
first two measures directly affect a country’s trade volume and reducing
or removing them clearly indicates a more open trade regime. Yet, the
use of the black market premium as a measure of trade barriers is
debated in the literature. Authors such as Sachs and Warner (1995)
and Warner (2003) argue that a high black market premium causes
increases in the price of imports relative to domestic prices and thus
plays the same role with tariff and non-tariff barriers. Others, such as
Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000), claim that a high black market premium
5The ratio of trade volume in GDP is defined as follows:
openness =
X +M
A+X −M
where X is exports, M is imports and A is domestic absorbtion (sum of consumption and
investment). Assume that the world economy consists of two identical countries. In this
setting the country running trade deficit will be more open than the other country.
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generally shows macroeconomic imbalances rather than trade barriers.
Undoubtedly, both tariff rates and non-tariff barriers are ideal mea-
sures in order to capture a country’s degree of openness to international
trade. Yet, unfortunately we do not have good data for these mea-
sures across countries and over time. The most common data for these
measures in the literature come from the data set by Barro and Lee
(1994a). In this data set, tariff rate and non-tariff coverage ratios are
weighted averages by the product shares in a country’s overall imports.
However, both variables cover the only imports of intermediate inputs
and capital goods over the 1983-1985 period. In addition, they have a
problem of downward bias since both measures are weighted by their
own-import value. Finally, it is not likely that all non-tariff barriers
can be measured and they accurately reflect the intensity of non-tariff
barriers.
Employing these two measures as an openness variable, we estimate
our baseline model. The estimation results are reported in Table 5.5. In
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.5, we only include tariff rate and non-tariff
barriers, respectively. Both measures enter the regressions with nega-
tive but insignificant coefficient estimates. In column 3, we allow both
tariff rate and non-tariff barriers together. As can be seen, tariff rate
and non-tariff barriers are neither individually nor jointly significant.
In the fourth column, we replace tariff rate with the collected import
duties as a ratio of imports over the 1970-1998 period and find a posi-
tive but insignificant coefficient estimate. It is well known fact that the
ratio of collective import duties in a country’s overall imports is a prob-
lematic measure in order to reflect a country’s tariff structure due to the
fact that a country with very high tariff rates may appear open by this
measure. In column 5, we include unweighted average tariff rate over
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the 1990-2000 period that is provided by Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
The difference between this measure and tariff rate of Barro and Lee
(1994a) is that the former is simply averages of ad valorem tariff rates
across commodities subjected to imports. The estimated coefficient of
unweighed tariff rates is negative but again statistically insignificant.
We include average black market premium over the 1960-2000 period
in column 7 and find that the black market premium is negatively and
significantly associated with economic growth. In columns 8 and 9,
we replace average black market premium with two dummy variables,
respectively. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the av-
erage black market premium exceeds 20 percent in the 1960s or the
1970s or the 1980s or the 1990s while the second one is equal to 1 if
the average black market premium is higher than 20 percent over the
1960-2000 period. Our aim in constructing for these dummies is to
check the relation between growth and a larger level of black market
premium. Following Sachs and Warner (1995), we assume 20 percent as
a threshold level. As can be seen, in each case the dummy variables are
negatively correlated with growth and strongly significant. In column
10, we include tariff rate, non-tariff barriers and average black market
premium jointly. The result is essentially same. Both tariff rates and
non-tariff measures are not significant but black market premium is. In
the last column, the regression is exactly the same as the regression in
column 10, the only difference is that we replace average black market
premium with the dummy variable for black market premium. As can
be seen, the result is unchanged.
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Table 5.5: Economic Growth and Direct Trade Measures: OLS
Estimates†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.485 -0.476 -0.497 -0.446 -0.479 -0.484 -0.499 -0.506 -0.493 -0.505
(5.82) (5.74) (5.78) (5.29) (6.14) (7.30) (7.24) (7.59) (6.88) (7.46)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.291 -1.274 -1.229 -1.109 -1.061 -1.092 -0.996 -1.043 -1.269 -1.194
(2.85) (2.77) (2.65) (2.60) (2.80) (3.09) (2.74) (2.98) (3.54) (3.39)
log of Investment rate 0.428 0.433 0.420 0.443 0.400 0.327 0.323 0.329 0.319 0.336
(4.20) (4.24) (4.07) (4.02) (4.14) (3.53) (3.42) (3.61) (2.49) (2.77)
log of School enrolment 0.423 0.426 0.440 0.445 0.448 0.475 0.495 0.483 0.441 0.436
(4.08) (4.12) (4.21) (4.14) (4.79) (5.57) (5.63) (5.71) (4.85) (5.06)
owtia -0.327 - -0.290 - - - - - -0.309 -0.096
(1.12) (0.93) (1.07) (0.33)
owqib - -0.116 -0.050 - - - - - 0.088 0.019
(0.60) (0.24) (0.48) (0.10)
Import Dutiesc - - - 0.377 - - - - - -
(0.44)
uwtid - - - - -0.477 - - - - -
(0.90)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.5 – Continued
log (1+BMP)e - - - - - -0.233 - - -0.224 -
(2.84) (2.26)
BMP dummyf - - - - - - -0.199 - - -
(2.32)
BMP dummyg - - - - - - - -0.263 - -0.275
(3.22) (3.01)
Constant 2.556 2.495 2.821 2.654 3.109 2.937 3.357 3.301 2.523 2.874
(1.96) (1.91) (2.08) (1.88) (2.56) (2.78) (3.00) (3.11) (2.14) (2.51)
Number of observations 87 85 85 93 101 101 101 101 83 83
p-value for heteroscedasticityh 0.82 0.70 0.83 0.59 0.81 0.30 0.47 0.39 0.12 0.11
F -valuei - - 0.61 - - - - - 2.09 3.51
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.63
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 %
level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported.
† Dependent Variable is the log difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period
a Own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
b Own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
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c Collected import duties as ratio of imports over 1970-1998 period.
d Unweighted average tariff rate over the 1990-99 period.
e Logarithm of one plus average value of black market premium over the 1960-1999 period.
f Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds 20 % in either the 1960s or the
1970s or the 1980s or the 1990s.
g Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds 20 % over the 1960-2000 period.
hBreusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
i Test for joint significance of openness variables.
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As a result, our empirical investigation between growth and di-
rect trade policy measures indicates that the significant association
with economic growth is established only for the black market pre-
mium. However, Warner (2003) points out that the time period should
be 1970-1990 for testing the impact of trade protection through tariff
rates. The reason is that the majority of developing countries have
liberalised their trade regime during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In other words, the large cross-country variation in tariff rates in the
earlier period was eliminated after the 1980s. In addition, he indi-
cates that India is a clear outlying observation. Therefore, according
to Warner (2003), one can find a negative and significant correlation
between growth and tariff rate if he omits India from the sample and
estimates the growth regression over the 1970-1990 period.
In order to test Warner’s claim we estimate our baseline model over
the period 1970-1990 for the same sample without India. The regression
result is given in the first column of Table 5.6 and shows a negative but
statistically insignificant coefficient on the tariff rate. In addition to
India, we identify three more countries namely Burkina Faso, Guyana,
and Tanzania as outliers applying the Hadi methodology on the data
set over the 1970-1990 period. In the second column of Table 5.6, we
drop these countries as well as India from the regression and conclude
that tariff rate is again negative but not significant. Therefore, our
findings indicate that Warner’s claim is not valid over the 1970-1990
period. However, it may be more reasonable to investigate growth-
tariff connection over the period 1960-1990, the reason is that most of
the developing countries followed protectionist trade polices not only
during the 1970s but also during 1960s and it is more likely that their
trade policy measures did not change substantially over the 1960-1980
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period. In addition, most of them experienced relatively higher growth
performance during the 1960s. Therefore the time period suggested by
Warner (2003) might be biased since it does not include the growth
information of 1960s. In columns 3 and 4, we estimate our baseline
specification with the tariff rate over the 1960-1990 period. In col-
umn 3, we omit India from the regressions and conclude that tariff
rate is negative but insignificant. In column 4, the other outlier coun-
try, Tanzania, is omitted and the coefficient estimate of tariff rate is
again found to be negative but insignificant. Indeed, we think that
the time period 1960-2000 is more plausible in order to investigate the
relationship between tariff rate and economic growth. First, the period
1960-2000 is sufficiently long in order to reflect long run growth dynam-
ics. Second, the period 1970-1990, especially the period 1975-1985 can
be considered as a transition period from protectionist trade policies
to more liberal trade regimes for the majority of developing countries.
Therefore, even though the tariff rate of the Barro-Lee data set is mea-
sured for only the 1983-1985 period, it is likely that this tariff rate
reflects the average tariff rate across countries over the period 1960-
2000. Therefore, in column 5, we estimate our baseline growth model
with the tariff rate whilst dropping India and conclude that coefficient
of tariff rate is negative and significant at the 11 percent significance
level. In addition if we also omit Tanzania from the regression in col-
umn 6, we find that tariff rate is negative and significant at 9 percent
significance level. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that tariff rate is
negatively associated with economic growth over the 1960-2000 period
at the marginally significant level once we take into account outlying
countries.
In summary, our cross-country empirical investigation indicates that
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Table 5.6: Economic Growth and Tariffs: OLS Estimates under Different
Time Period and without Outliers
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker
1970-1990 1960-1990 1960-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log of Initial GDP per worker -0.289 -0.357 -0.392 -0.401 -0.488 -0.494
(4.64) (6.33) (5.37) (5.49) (5.87) (5.95)
log(ni + g + δ) -0.494 -0.818 -0.658 -0.705 -1.151 -1.209
(1.57) (2.69) (1.85) (2.08) (2.47) (2.59)
log of Investment rate 0.302 0.364 0.368 0.432 0.424 0.493
(4.57) (5.40) (4.32) (4.93) (4.17) (4.30)
log of School enrolment 0.193 0.174 0.271 0.216 0.420 0.355
(2.92) (2.51) (3.42) (2.82) (4.07) (3.10)
owti -0.360 -0.444 -0.582 -0.637 -0.725 -0.762
(1.12) (1.48) (1.39) (1.53) (1.64) (1.73)
Constant 2.280 2.140 3.236 3.258 3.006 2.990
(2.45) (2.46) (3.16) (3.34) (2.22) (2.21)
Number of observations 86 83 86 85 86 85
p-value for heteroscedasticityb 0.36 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.86 0.80
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.61
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
b Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
among the direct trade policy measures only tariff rate and black mar-
ket premium are negatively correlated with economic growth. However,
we conclude that this correlation is marginally significant in the tariff
case while strongly significant for the black market premium.
Black Market Premium: A Proxy for Trade Policy or Macroeco-
nomic Imbalances?
As mentioned above, whether the significant association between black
market premium and economic growth reflects the relationship between
growth and restrictive trade policies or the connection between growth
and other poor macroeconomic polices rather than trade polices is de-
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batable. Now, we consider this point further.
Our data for black market premium come from Global Development
Network (2005). Unfortunately, we lack data on the black market pre-
mium for several countries in the 1960s. In addition, for many countries
data are missing during the mid 1990s. In order to increase the number
of observations, we take the averages of black market premium for the
18 countries over the 1970-2000 period instead of 1960-2000 period. Of
course, this approach implicitly assumes that for these countries the
black market premium in the 1970s reflects the black market premium
in the 1960s. Indeed, this assumption is not very realistic since we do
not observe a certain pattern on the black market premium during the
1960s and the 1970s for the countries whose data are available in both
decades. Among the 103 countries we identify, 43 of them experience
a higher level of black market premium in the 1970s compared to the
1960s. Most of these countries are located in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. On the other hand only 39 countries mostly located in the Middle
East, North Africa, East Europe, Asia and Pacific have a lower level
of black market premium in the 1970s with respect to the 1960s. 21
developed countries have zero black market premium in both decades.
Table 5.7 provides summary statistics of black market premium for
each decade. As can be seen, for the first and largest sample in Table
5.7, both the mean and standard deviation of black market premium is
higher in the 1960s compared to the 1970s. In order to provide a bet-
ter comparison we also report the summary statistics of black market
premium for 103 countries whose data are available in each decade (the
second largest sample). Again both the mean and standard deviation
of the black market premium is higher in the 1960s compared to the
1970s. Therefore, it is likely that we underestimate average black mar-
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Table 5.7: Black Market Premium (%): Summary Statistics
Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Observations value Deviation value value
The Largest Sample
BMP 1960-2000 121 259.701 2114.377 -0.442 23235.250
BMP in 1960s 103 48.685 228.780 -0.090 2276.400
BMP in 1970s 121 36.319 72.469 -6.960 451.790
BMP in 1980s 121 129.106 600.604 -1.410 6406.610
BMP in 1990s 121 1205.328 12627.680 -0.350 138935.900
The 2nd Largest Sample
BMP 1960-2000 103 297.5641 2291.072 -0.442 23235.250
BMP in 1960s 103 48.68505 228.7795 -0.090 2276.400
BMP in 1970s 103 39.39447 77.2462 -1.290 451.790
BMP in 1980s 103 139.4033 648.8455 -1.410 6406.610
BMP in 1990s 103 1411.573 13686.08 -0.350 138935.900
The Regression Sample
BMP 1960-2000 101 66.520 199.778 -0.442 1796.679
BMP in 1960s 90 47.521 241.983 -0.090 2276.400
BMP in 1970s 101 32.399 64.711 -6.960 451.790
BMP in 1980s 101 137.674 654.984 -1.410 6406.610
BMP in 1990s 101 30.501 124.572 -0.350 1199.310
The Smallest Sample
BMP 1960-2000 90 67.668 209.826 -0.442 1796.679
BMP in 1960s 90 47.521 241.983 -0.090 2276.400
BMP in 1970s 90 33.895 67.323 -0.870 451.790
BMP in 1980s 90 142.192 692.166 -1.410 6406.610
BMP in 1990s 90 32.662 131.741 -0.350 1199.310
ket premium over the 1960-2000 period by using the 1970-2000 averages
for the countries whose data are missing during the 1960s. However,
since we conclude that a negative and highly significant association be-
tween black market premium and economic growth over the 1960-2000
period, this bias in the data makes our result stronger.
The other important point is that the mean of the black market
premium is substantially higher in the 1990s compared to the other
decades in the largest sample. At the first sight, this might be thought
to be surprising because most of the developing countries have liber-
alised their capital accounts since the late 1980s and one would expect
very low black market premium for these countries during the 1990s.
However, this is mainly a result of a small number of countries with
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the extreme values of black market premium in this decade such as
Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Syria and Libya. As can be seen,
not only is the mean value of black market premium substantial but
also its standard deviation is high during the 1990s. Of course, from
our point summary statistics of regression sample are of great concern
rather than those of the largest samples. When we consider only the
regression sample, both mean and standard deviation of black market
premium in the 1980s are considerably higher than other decades. In
addition, the statistics of black market premium based on the small-
est sample consisting of the countries whose data are available in each
decade support this fact. This implies that the negative and statisti-
cally significant association between black market premium and eco-
nomic growth over the 1960-2000 period may be as a result of both the
high level and variation of the black market premium during the 1980s.
Therefore, in Table 5.8 we estimate our baseline model with the
averages of black market premium in each decade. In column 1, we al-
low average black market premium in each decade to vary continuously
and conclude that none of them are statistically significant despite a
negative sign. In addition, they are jointly insignificant. However, the
t-statistics of black market premium in the 1980s is relatively higher.
In columns 2-5, we insert average black market premium in each decade
separately and find that the only average black market premium in the
1980s is negatively and significantly correlated with growth. Therefore,
it is possible to conclude that the significant and negative correlation
between black market premium and economic growth over the 1960-
2000 period mainly depends on the high level and high variation in
the black market premium during the 1980s in which many developing
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Table 5.8: Economic Growth and Black Market Premium: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000
period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.514 -0.507 -0.483 -0.456 -0.475
(7.14) (6.39) (8.00) (6.99) (6.92)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.032 -1.180 -1.222 -1.008 -1.070
(2.94) (3.05) (3.64) (2.85) (2.91)
log of Investment rate 0.294 0.324 0.341 0.336 0.362
(2.69) (3.17) (3.14) (3.68) (3.84)
log of School enrolment 0.511 0.506 0.452 0.453 0.470
(5.93) (5.11) (6.05) (5.36) (5.34)
log (1+BMP) in 1960s -0.113 -0.132 - - -
(0.76) (1.16)
log (1+BMP) in 1970s -0.068 - -0.244 - -
(0.26) (1.16)
log (1+BMP) in 1980s -0.130 - - -0.186 -
(1.35) (3.07)
log(1+BMP) in 19990s -0.034 - - - -0.181
(0.28) (1.52)
Constant 3.318 2.855 2.560 2.925 2.941
(2.84) (2.53) (2.50) (2.79) (2.64)
Number of observations 90 90 101 101 101
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.08 0.53 0.11 0.21 0.91
F -valueb 1.81 - - - -
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.62
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
b Test for joint significance of log of average black market premium in the decades.
countries launched the liberalisation programs after the debt crises in
the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Hence, it is more likely that neg-
ative and significant connection between black market premium and
economic growth over the period 1960-2000 reflects the adverse rela-
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Table 5.9: Economic Growth and Black Market Premium Dummy: OLS
Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log Difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000
period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.560 -0.511 -0.517 -0.476 -0.545
(6.24) (6.43) (7.63) (8.46) (7.96)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.117 -1.139 -1.181 -1.001 -1.266
(3.64) (2.97) (3.39) (3.18) (3.67)
log of Investment rate 0.321 0.318 0.340 0.334 0.380
(2.70) (3.10) (3.75) (3.21) (4.25)
log of School enrolment 0.488 0.520 0.476 0.452 0.445
(5.32) (5.11) (5.64) (5.97) (5.36)
BMP dummy in 1960sa -0.026 -0.137 - - -
(0.21) (1.26)
BMP dummy in 1970sa -0.150 - -0.261 - -
(1.34) (3.17)
BMP dummy in 1980sa -0.103 - - -0.275 -
(0.85) (3.38)
BMP dummy in 1990sa -0.173 - - - -0.385
(1.01) (3.65)
Constant 3.555 3.007 3.022 3.138 3.052
(3.11) (2.62) (2.88) (3.06) (2.96)
Number of observations 90 90 101 101 101
p-value for heteroscedasticityb 0.09 0.58 0.18 0.12 0.50
F -valuec 3.09 - - - -
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.61 0.65 0.66 0.66
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds 20 %.
b Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
c Test for joint significance of the black market premium dummies.
tion between macroeconomic imbalances and growth. In Table 5.9 we
exactly replicate the cross country growth regressions in Table 5.8. The
only difference is that in Table 5.9 we use a dummy variable which takes
180
Chapter 5: Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country
Empirical Investigation
the value of 1 if the average value of black market premium exceeds
20 percent. As can be seen, the dummy variables are continuously and
separately negative and significant, except the dummy in the 1960s.
This implies that a higher level of black market premium is particu-
larly harmful for economic growth.
In conclusion, our findings about the relationship between economic
growth and direct trade policy measures are not in favour of more
liberal trade policies. We find evidence for the adverse growth-tariff
connection, but the tariff rate is only marginally significant. On the
other hand our finding concerning the statistically significant associa-
tion between black market premium and economic growth may indicate
the negative relation between growth and macroeconomic imbalances
rather than the trade restrictive effect of black market premium.
5.3.3 Deviation Measures
Cross-country growth regressions including only single trade policy
measures have low-power for testing openness-growth connection as
argued by Warner (2003). The reason is that each trade policy mea-
sure takes into account only one aspect of trade policy and hence tells
only part of story (Leamer (1988)). Therefore, we need a single gen-
eral measure encompassing all aspects of trade policy for testing the
protectionism in general. As noted by Warner (2003, p.4) “The right
regression for testing the impact of protectionism would seem to entail
some aggregation of the policy instruments.”
One way in order to overcome this is employing deviation measures.
These measures basically show the difference between predicted and ac-
tual trade and hence can be used as an indicator of the overall level of
trade protectionism. Deviation measures are essentially based on the
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following rationale. According to the traditional small country model,
international trade is determined by the factor endowments, interna-
tional prices, technology, preferences, natural trade barriers and trade
policy instruments (Leamer (1988)). Therefore, differences among the
countries in the level of trade can be considered as trade policy barriers
if the countries are substantially identical in terms of factor endowment,
technology, preferences, and natural barriers or their effects are con-
trolled. This implies that if one constructs a model which sufficiently
explains trade flows across countries, then residuals obtained from that
model can be considered as an overall measure of trade barriers subject
to only trade policy. Of course this approach implicitly assumes that
trade policy barriers are the only important omitted variables and they
are uncorrelated with the other determinants of trade.6
In the literature many deviation measures as an indicator of open-
ness to international trade have been suggested. In this respect as
noted in Chapter 3, outward orientation index by Syrquin and Ch-
enery (1989), openness and distortion indexes by Leamer (1988) and
the recent predicted trade shares by Frankel and Romer (1999) are the
most well-known measures. In addition to these, we also construct a
very simple model as
((X +M)/GDPi) = α0 + α1log(Initial per worker GDPi)
+ α2log(areai) + α3log(Average labour forcei) + εi
(5.2)
The model in (5.2) includes the dependent variable which is the ex-
ports plus imports as a share of GDP and hence already takes into
account the size of country. We employ the real GDP per worker as a
6Both assumptions are not realistic as pointed out by Leamer (1988) and Wacziarg
(2001).
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proxy for factor endowments of country. In order to avoid the possible
endogeneity problem we use the 1960 value of per worker GDP. The
other explanatory variables are the land area and average labour force.
Both variables are expressed in logarithms and represent the country
size. As pointed out by Frankel and Romer (1999) country size is an
important determinant of international trade due to the fact that there
are more opportunities for within country trade in the larger countries.
The specification in (5.2) is of course very simple in many aspects.
First, the dependent variable is the average total trade as a ratio of
GDP rather than the sum of bilateral trades across countries. Obvi-
ously estimating total trade as a sum of bilateral trades by employ-
ing a model including some gravity variables such as distance between
two countries, common border dummy as well as other determinants
would be better. However, unfortunately we lack data on bilateral
trades across countries over the period 1960-2000. Second, this spec-
ification assumes that the only important omitted variables are trade
policy barriers. A better specification therefore would be to include
trade policy barriers such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports
(we will consider this point later). Finally we assume that preferences
and technology are constant among countries. Even though these are
important shortcomings for the model in (5.2), we think that the esti-
mated residuals from this model can be used as a more reliable indi-
cator for openness compared to simple actual trade ratios. Obviously,
a large value of residual implies that the country is more open to in-
ternational trade once the initial factor endowments and country’s size
are controlled.
Employing the current openness as a dependent variable we esti-
mate this model by OLS over the 1960-2000 period. Column 1 of
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Table 5.10: Exports plus Imports as a Share of GDP: OLS Estimates
Dependent variable Current Openness Real Openness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP per worker 1960 0.061 0.050 0.150 0.150
(2.08) (1.59) (5.23) (4.70)
log Area -0.110 -0.106 -0.094 -0.094
(2.57) (2.40) (2.62) (2.54)
log Average Labour Force -0.049 -0.054 0.003 0.003
(1.52) (1.56) (0.11) (0.09)
Landlocked country dummya - -0.072 - -0.005
(0.91) (0.09)
Constant 2.218 2.354 0.222 0.231
(5.73) (5.59) (0.72) (0.67)
Number of observations 111 111 111 111
p-value for heteroscedasticityb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are
in parenthesis.
a The landlocked countries in Europe are dropped.
b Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
Table 5.10 presents the resulting OLS estimate. In column 2, we also
include a dummy variable for landlocked countries in order to control
for natural trade barriers. However, inserting the landlocked country
dummy neither changes the basic results nor improves the fit of the
model. Therefore, we prefer to employ residuals which come from the
first regression as an openness variable and label it as RESID Current
Openness. In columns 3 and 4, we replicate the regressions in the first
two columns. The only difference is that in columns 3 and 4 we use the
real openness as the dependent variable. As can be seen, the regression
results in columns 3 and 4 are different from those in columns 1 and
2 in some aspects: First, when the dependent variable is real open-
ness the coefficient estimate of initial income is considerably larger and
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highly significant. Second, average labour force is not only significant
but also very close to zero. Third, the R2 values of the regressions in
columns 3 and 4 is smaller and hence it is possible to conclude that
these regressions are less precise. On the other hand, as in the case
of current openness, including a landlocked country dummy does not
improve the goodness of fit of the regression in column 3. Therefore, we
again use the estimated residuals in column 3 as an openness measure
and label it as RESID Real Openness.
Table 5.11 reports the estimation results by employing deviation
measures in the framework of our baseline cross-country growth model.
In column 1 we include the outward orientation index by Syrquin and
Chenery (1989) and conclude that its coefficient estimate is negative
but insignificant. However, it is more plausible to estimate this in-
dex over the period 1960-1985 since the index covers 1965-1980 pe-
riod. Therefore, in column 2 we setup our benchmark model over the
1960-1985 period and estimate it with the outward orientation index.
Now, coefficient estimate of index is positive but again insignificant.
In columns 3 and 4 we insert the openness and distortion indexes con-
structed by Leamer (1988), and find that both are positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results are obviously
inconsistent due to the fact that the coefficient estimate of distortion
index should be negative if openness is positively correlated with eco-
nomic growth. Notice that these two regressions are estimated over
the 1960-1985 period since both openness and distortion indexes are
calculated for only 1982. In column 5 and 6 we include RESID Current
Openness and RESID Real Openness and conclude that both variables
are positively and significantly associated with growth. Notice that
this association is stronger for the RESID Real Openness, with the
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RESID Current Openness being only marginally significant. The re-
gression in column 7 includes the Frankel-Romer predicted trade shares
from a gravity model. Since this variable is predicted for only 1985 the
cross-country growth regression covers 1960-1985 period. Estimation
results show that the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share is positive
and statistically significant. Since this variable predicts trade shares
from a gravity model based on the geographical characteristics of the
countries, this result can be only seen as an indication of a positive
impact of international trade on economic growth if one assumes that
geography influences growth only through international trade. In col-
umn 8, we estimate our benchmark model with the Frankel-Romer
predicted trade shares over the 1960-2000 period. For this regression
we employ the predicted trade shares provided by Dollar and Kraay
(2003a). This variable is different from the original Frankel-Romer
predicted trade shares in two aspects: First it is based on the data
on bilateral trade in 1995; Second, it expresses the bilateral trade as
a fraction of GDP at PPP rather than current prices. Therefore, this
variable is identical to real openness once the geographical character-
istics of the countries are controlled. The regression results imply that
the predicted trade share has a positive and significant effect on eco-
nomic growth. As can be seen, this effect is substantially stronger than
in the previous regression.
In conclusion, our cross-country empirical investigation indicates
that adjusted trade ratios and the Frankel-Romer predicted trade shares
are significantly and positively correlated with growth. We, however,
conclude an insignificant association between growth and outward ori-
entation index by Syrquin and Chenery (1989) and inconsistent results
for Leamer’s (1988) openness and distortion indexes.
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Table 5.11: Economic Growth and Deviation Measures: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.480 -0.331 -0.363 -0.343 -0.415 -0.418 -0.340 -0.406
(6.39) (5.87) (5.25) (5.11) (6.09) (6.16) (6.71) (6.22)
log(ni + g + δ) -1.199 -0.339 -0.639 -0.777 -1.198 -1.118 -0.191 -0.817
(3.00) (1.26) (2.08) (2.58) (3.03) (2.91) (0.74) (2.27)
log of Investment rate 0.415 0.296 0.483 0.475 0.359 0.349 0.302 0.397
(4.42) (5.16) (5.30) (5.42) (3.80) (3.66) (5.41) (4.52)
log of School enrolment 0.471 0.266 0.110 0.083 0.429 0.446 0.279 0.405
(5.11) (4.75) (0.97) (0.75) (4.99) (5.22) (5.29) (4.82)
Outward orientation by S&C -0.036 0.082 - - - - - -
(0.42) (1.29)
Openness index by Leamer - - 0.523 - - - - -
(2.53)
Distortion index by Leamer - - - 0.685 - - - -
(3.23)
RESID Current Openness - - - - 0.268 - - -
(1.91)
RESID Real Openness - - - - - 0.323 - -
(2.07)
log F&R predicted trade 1985 - - - - - - 0.091 -
(2.39)
log F&R predicted trade 1995 - - - - - - - 0.209
(3.35)
Constant 2.745 3.283 2.988 2.216 2.038 2.268 3.544 3.672
(2.39) (4.05) (2.83) (2.08) (1.76) (2.04) (4.65) (3.43)
Number of observations 103 103 50 50 105 105 107 107
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.73 0.35 0.20 0.26 0.69 0.71 0.21 0.93
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.53 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.65
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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5.3.4 Subjective Measures
In the fourth and last step, we consider some subjective measures for
openness. These measures are in some sense similar to the deviation
measures such that both try to capture all aspects of trade policy.
The main difference is that they are partly or completely based on the
subjective judgment.
We start with a trade orientation index based on the the World Bank
World Development Report 1987 (WBWDR87 hereafter). As noted in
Chapter 2, the report classifies 41 developing countries according to
their trade orientation as strongly outward, moderately outward, mod-
erately inward and strongly inward over the periods 1963-1972 and
1975-1985. In order to quantify the classification of WBWDR as a sin-
gle variable, we assign the value of 1 if the country is either strongly or
moderately outward oriented and then simply takes the averages of two
sub periods. Therefore our openness measure based on WBWDR varies
between 0 and 1 and reflects the outward orientation of the countries
over the 1963-1985 period. Column 1 of Table 5.12 reports the esti-
mation result of our benchmark specification including this openness
measure over the 1960-1985 period. As can be seen, the coefficient esti-
mate on this variable considerably large (0.639) and highly significant.
This implies that an increase in the WBWDR openness index by one
standard deviation (which is equal to 0.387 over the 1963-1985 period)
would raise the growth rate on impact by 0.247(=0.639x0.387). How-
ever, it is difficult to attribute this to evidence of a positive correlation
between growth and outward orientation in the light of problems of
WBWDR classification which are detailed in Chapter 2. In column 2
we employ the real exchange rate distortion index suggested by Dollar
(1992) as an openness variable. Our data on this variable come from
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Global Development Network (2005) and cover the 1970-2000 period.
As noted in Chapter 3, this measure compares the domestic prices of
tradable goods across countries. Assuming that the law of one price al-
ways holds, a higher level of distortion index indicates a more distorted
trade regime. Our estimation results show that the distortion index is
significantly and negatively associated with growth. However, the coef-
ficient estimate of the index is very small (-0.003!) which implies that
the distortion index does not have any influence on growth. In col-
umn 3, we include the variability index which is simply a coefficient of
variation of the real exchange rate distortion index over the 1970-2000
period and conclude that the variability is negative and significant with
a substantially larger coefficient estimate. However, in a difference to
Dollar (1992), we find an insignificant coefficient estimate of the distor-
tion index when both distortion and variability indexes are included in
the regression together. As can be seen from column 4, the regression
result shows that the distortion index is not only insignificant but also
is very close to zero (-0.001).7
In column 5, we include the dummy variable for openness suggested
by Sachs and Warner (1995, SW henceforth). As pointed out in Chap-
ter 2, the SW dummy variable is a single openness measure covering
all major kinds of trade restrictions. However, different from SW, we
extend the openness dummy over the period 1960-2000 rather than
1970-1989 period. This means that we consider only 26 countries as
7A similar result is obtained by Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000). One important criticism
of Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000) concerning the real exchange rate distortion index is that
Dollar (1992) estimated a very simple growth regression model in which per capita GDP
growth is a function of his real exchange rate distortion and variability indices as well as
investment share. In replicating analysis of Dollar (1992) paper, Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000) conduct alternative specifications such as considering regional dummies, initial
income and initial schooling. They conclude that only variability of real exchange rate
is robust to these alternative specifications while distortion index is not. They attribute
these findings to evidence to show the importance of macroeconomic stability rather than
the liberal trade polices for better growth performance.
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always open during the 1960-2000 period while SW define 33 open
countries between 1970 and 1989. More clearly we define the countries
Taiwan, Jordan, Ireland, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan and Australia
as closed over the 1960-2000 period since these countries opened their
trade regimes during the 1960s according to the SW criteria. Notice
that in our regressions Germany and Taiwan are always omitted be-
cause of missing data on these countries over the 1960-2000 period. In
spite of this difference, we conclude that the SW dummy variable is
statistically significant and positive. Regression result in column 5 im-
plies that in the long run GDP per worker in an open economy would
have 2.6 times that in a closed economy once the other determinants
are controlled.8 9 In addition, in column 6 we employ the SW dummy
over the period 1970-2000 period which is exactly identical to the orig-
inal SW dummy variable. Now the coefficient estimate of the dummy
is larger and indicates that GDP per worker in an open economy would
be equal to 3.2 times the GDP per worker in a closed economy in the
long run. However, the SW dummy variable is heavily criticized by
Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000). The
most important criticism is that the strength of the dummy is mainly
the result of the criteria related to state monopolies on exports and the
8The effect of openness dummy on the long run income level can be calculated as
exp(−γ5/γ0) where γ5 is the coefficient of openness dummy and γ0 is the coefficient of the
initial level of income. According to the regression result in Column 5, γ5 = 0.463 and
γ0 = −0.483, hence the long run level of GDP per worker in an open country would be
2.6 = exp(−0.463/− 0.483) times the GDP per worker in a closed economy.
9Moreover, we test the absolute convergence hypothesis for open economies over the
1960-2000 period. In order to facilitate comparison with SW, we employ annual growth
rate and initial income according to GDP per capita rather than GDP per worker and
conclude the following cross-country growth regression for 24 countries which are always
open during the 1960-2000 period (robust t-statistics are in parentheses).
[logyi,2000 − logyi,1960]/40 = 15.349
(6.14)
− 1.397
(5.00)
logyi,1960 R¯
2 = 0.68
where yi is the real GDP per capita. As can be seen, the coefficient estimate of initial
income is very close to that estimated by SW (They report the coefficient estimate of
initial GDP per capita as minus 1.368 in column 3 of Table 11 p. 48).
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black market premium. According to Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000),
the export monopolies component of the SW dummy acts like a sub-
Saharan Africa dummy while the black market premium component
reflects poor macroeconomic conditions and imbalances rather than
restrictive trade polices. That is why, in column 7 we insert a sub-
Saharan Africa dummy to the regression. The regression result indi-
cates that the coefficient estimate of the SW dummy is now higher and
highly significant. In column 8, we substitute the sub-Saharan African
dummy with a composite regional dummy for both sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America. Now, the coefficient estimate of SW dummy is
relatively smaller, but still statistically significant. In column 9, we in-
troduce the black market premium dummy which takes the value of 1
if the average black market premium exceeds 20 % in any of the 1960s,
1970s, 1980s or 1990s as well as the composite regional dummy variable.
The regression result shows that the coefficient estimate of SW dummy
is not only smaller but also marginally significant at the 7 % level. In
column 10, we substitute the black market premium dummy with loga-
rithm of average black market premium and conclude the same result.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the SW dummy is sensitive
to the black market premium. In column 11, we employ the fraction of
open years according to SW liberalisation dates over the 1960-2000 pe-
riod.10 This variable is more reasonable with respect to the SW dummy
10For the period 1990-2000, we employ the liberalisation dates provided by Wacziarg and
Welch (2003) that updates the SW dummy and liberalsation status. In their systematic
review, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) disagree with SW on the liberalization status or dates
in the case of several countries. Some countries such as Panama and Cape Verde which
were not included in SW are classified in the study by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). There
are five countries namely, Ivory Coast, the Dominican Republic, Mauritania, Niger and
Trinidad and Tobago for which Wacziarg and Welch (2003) disagree with SW assignment
of liberalization dates and four countries which remains closed as of 2001 according to
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) while SW classifies them as open in the early 1990s. These
countries are Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, and India. In this study, we follow the Wacziarg
and Welch (2003) for the disagreement cases. See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg
and Welch (2003) and appendices therein for more information about SW liberalisation
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since SW liberalisation dates are based on the intensive survey of the
country cases as pointed out by Wacziarg (2001). The regression result
indicates that the fraction of open years is strongly and significantly
correlated with economic growth over the period 1960-2000.
dates.
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Table 5.12: Economic Growth and Subjective Measures: OLS
Estimates†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.271 -0.498 -0.520 -0.515 -0.483 -0.478 -0.500 -0.454 -0.469 -0.472 -0.496
(3.46) (6.91) (7.63) (7.42) (7.10) (7.44) (7.37) (6.72) (6.57) (7.81) (7.43)
log(ni + g + δ) -0.086 -1.245 -1.042 -1.041 -0.315 -0.310 -0.294 -0.258 -0.483 -0.506 -0.524
(0.16) (3.29) (2.83) (2.81) (0.79) (0.84) (0.75) (0.66) (1.21) (1.39) (1.44)
log of Investment rate 0.263 0.536 0.526 0.524 0.335 0.316 0.313 0.302 0.278 0.261 0.317
(3.24) (5.49) (5.65) (5.58) (3.71) (3.65) (3.48) (3.38) (2.98) (2.36) (3.57)
log of School enrolment 0.103 0.421 0.466 0.460 0.471 0.426 0.383 0.409 0.424 0.421 0.397
(1.32) (4.36) (5.05) (4.92) (5.65) (5.35) (4.04) (4.76) (4.70) (4.95) (4.84)
Openness measure of WBWDR87a 0.639 - - - - - - - - - -
(5.64)
Distortion Index by Dollar (1992)b - -0.003 - -0.001 - - - - - - -
(2.47) (0.46)
Variability Index by Dollar (1992)c - - -0.468 -0.428 - - - - - - -
(3.81) (2.83)
Openness Dummy (1960-2000)d - - - - 0.463 - 0.510 0.397 0.269 0.244 -
(3.69) (4.03) (3.15) (1.86) (1.89)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.12 – Continued
Openness Dummy (1970-2000)d - - - - - 0.549 - - - - -
(4.88)
Sub-saharan Africa - - - - - - -0.242 - - - -
(1.85)
Latin America and Africae - - - - - - - -0.234 -0.210 -0.234 -
(2.30) (2.06) (2.44)
BMP dummyf - - - - - - - - -0.072 - -
(0.73)
log (1+BMP)g - - - - - - - - - -0.195 -
(2.42)
Fraction of open yearsh - - - - - - - - - - 0.645
(4.31)
Constant 2.918 3.240 3.828 3.831 4.839 4.675 4.971 4.765 4.302 4.269 4.097
(1.91) (2.94) (3.57) (3.56) (4.18) (4.43) (4.34) (4.21) (3.66) (3.51) (3.90)
Number of observations 39 87 87 87 102 102 102 102 98 98 102
p-value for heteroscedasticityi 0.43 0.68 0.82 0.72 0.77 0.37 0.68 0.55 0.26 0.15 0.91
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.67
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on
heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are reported.
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† Dependent Variable is the log difference real GDP per worker over the 1960-2000 period except the regression in Column 1.
a Openness measure based on the classification of the World Bank World Development Report 1987.
b Real exchange rate distortion index. 1970-2000 averages.
c Coefficient variation of real exchange rate distortion index over the 1970-2000 period.
d Dummy variable for open countries according to Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria.
e Composite regional dummy variable for Latin America and Sub-saharan Africa.
f Dummy variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds 20 % in either the1960s or the 1970s or the 1980s or the 1990s.
g Logarithm of one plus average value of black market premium over the 1960-1999 period.
h Fraction of open years according to librealization dates in Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003)
iBreusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic errors.
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Table 5.13: International Trade and Trade Policy Indexes: OLS Estimates
Dependent variable Current Openness Real Openness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP per worker 1960 0.019 0.041 0.091 0.100
(0.47) (1.25) (2.61) (3.29)
log Area -0.124 -0.072 -0.103 -0.055
(2.24) (1.89) (2.28) (1.87)
log Average Labour Force -0.021 -0.055 0.034 0.003
(0.46) (1.46) (0.98) (0.09)
owtia -0.140 -0.063 -0.236 -0.193
(0.72) (0.42) (1.19) (1.20)
owqib -0.237 -0.162 -0.196 -0.115
(2.06) (1.75) (2.01) (1.49)
log (1+BMP)c - 0.016 - -0.038
(0.36) (1.11)
Constant 2.369 2.014 0.403 0.205
(4.10) (4.71) (0.83) (0.52)
Number of observations 85 83 85 83
p-value for heteroscedasticityd 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -valuee 2.19 1.11 2.60 1.76
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.40
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are
in parenthesis.
a Own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
b Own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital goods.
c Logarithm of one plus average value of black market premium over the 1960-1999 period.
d Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
e Test for joint significance of owti, owqi and log(1+BMP)
Finally, following Wacziarg (2001) we construct a simple subjective
openness measure.11 Recall that our simple model for international
trade expressed in equation (5.2). As mentioned above, one of the
weaknesses of this model is the assumption that the only important
omitted variable is trade policy barriers. Now we relax this assump-
tion. For this, we introduce three trade policy instruments namely
tariffs, non-tariff barriers and the black market premium. Our aim is
11A similar approach is taken by Lee (1993)
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to obtain approximate weights for these trade policy instruments in
order to construct a composite trade policy indicator. Estimation re-
sults are given in Table 5.13. Regression results are not very precise
compared to our previous estimations in Table 5.10. First, introducing
trade policy instruments does not improve the goodness of fit. Second,
except for non-tariff barriers, all trade policy instruments are found to
be statistically insignificant. One reason for the less precise results is
that our data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers are not very satisfactory.
Multicollinearity among the policy instruments may be another reason.
However, in spite of the lack of precision, our results indicate that all
trade policy instruments have the expected sign. The only exception
is the regression in column 2 in which the sign of the black market
premium is positive. Hence, except this regression, the coefficient esti-
mates of trade policy instruments can be used as approximate weights.
In the light of the regressions in Table 5.13, we define the following
three trade policy indicators;
Trade policy 1 = −0.14(owti)− 0.24(owqi)
Trade policy 2 = −0.24(owti)− 0.20(owqi)
Trade policy 3 = −0.19(owti)− 0.12(owqi)− 0.04log(1 +BMP )
where BMP is the average black market premium and owti and owqi
denote the own-import weighted tariff rates and non-tariff frequency
on intermediate inputs and capital goods, respectively. Notice that the
higher level of trade policy index implies a more open country since
weights are negative numbers. Thus, one would expect a positive coef-
ficient estimate of the indexes if openness is positively correlated with
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economic growth. Employing these indexes we estimate our baseline
model and conclude them all of them have the positive but insignificant
coefficient estimates (Table 5.14).
Table 5.14: Economic Growth and Composite Trade Policy Measures: OLS
Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.484 -0.489 -0.489
(5.78) (5.81) (5.97)
log(n+g+d) -1.237 -1.221 -1.298
(2.68) (2.65) (2.87)
log of Investment rate 0.431 0.428 0.363
(4.24) (4.22) (3.65)
log of School enrolment 0.432 0.436 0.439
(4.17) (4.20) (4.35)
Trade policy 1 0.574 - -
(0.86)
Trade policy 2 - 0.643 -
(0.99)
Trade policy 3 - - 1.188
(1.40)
Constant 2.682 2.783 2.464
(2.01) (2.06) (1.83)
Number of observations 85 85 83
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.73 0.77 0.37
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.60 0.60
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our findings concerning
the relationship between openness and economic growth in the previous
section. As we note in Chapter 3, most of the studies in the empiri-
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cal cross-country growth literature include a small set of explanatory
variables. However, the main problem in these studies is that their
results are very sensitive to changes in the list of explanatory vari-
ables. The empirical literature on openness and growth is particularly
subject to this problem because many studies in this literature em-
ploy simple growth models and it is likely that many of the results of
these works arise from model misspecification (Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez
(2000)). Therefore, the estimating framework requires a reasonably
comprehensive set of explanatory variables. For this purpose, we re-
define our cross-country growth regression expressed in equation (5.1)
as:
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = γ0 + γ1logyi,1960 + γ2log(ni + g + δ)
+ γ3log(Investment ratei)
+ γ4log(School enrolmenti)
+ γ5Opennessi + γ6Zi + εi
(5.3)
where Z is a vector of other explanatory variables. We determine Z
as follows: First, we include two variables related to macroeconomic
policy, namely inflation rate and government consumption expendi-
tures. Inclusion of these variables is particularly important since an
important criticism on the openness-growth literature is that openness
measures are proxy for other macroeconomic policies rather than trade
policy per se. Second, we employ two variables in order to consider
the effect of institutions and geography. For this, following Keefer and
Knack (1997), Sachs and Warner (1997a) and Hall and Jones (1999),
we measure institutional quality by using a composite index based on
the data set of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published
by a private international consulting company Political Risk Services.
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This index consists of equally weighting an average of four ICRG com-
ponents for the years 1984-2000: i) investment profile as a average
of three subcomponents namely, contract viability, profits repatriation
and payment delays; ii) law and order; iii) corruption; and iv) bureau-
cratic quality. We use the share of population in geographical tropics
in order to capture the effect of geography (Sachs (2001)). Finally, we
include ethnolinguistic fragmentation index (ELF). This index shows
the probability that two randomly selected persons of a given country
will belong to the same ethnolinguistic group and has become a stan-
dard variable in the cross-country growth literature since the important
studies by Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997).
Before carrying out our sensitivity analysis, we estimate an aug-
mented neoclassical growth model with the only Z variables. Table
5.15 reports the estimation results. As it can be seen from the first col-
umn, all Z variables are found to be statistically significant with the
anticipated signs. Moreover, this regression has substantially high ex-
planatory power such that it explains 76 percent of variation in growth
of per worker GDP over the period 1960-2000. However, applying the
Hadi method we identify six countries (namely Brazil, Bolivia, Ar-
gentina, Peru, Nicaragua and Congo Democratic Republic) as outliers.
In the second column we present the regression results without these
six outlying countries and conclude that, except for the inflation rate,
all Z variables are statistically significant. In column 3, instead of
dropping these countries, we estimate the same model by IRLS. Notice
that in this regression we exclude two risky countries, Congo Demo-
cratic Republic and Nicaragua, because of their high leverage values.
We again conclude that all Z variables are statistically significant with
the expected signs, except the inflation rate. Therefore, in column 4 we
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Table 5.15: Other Determinants of Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.617 -0.624 -0.620 -0.650
(8.54) (7.25) (9.01) (8.69)
log(n+g+δ) -0.208 -0.233 -0.246 -0.281
(0.57) (0.55) (0.71) (0.73)
log of Investment rate 0.344 0.318 0.393 0.242
(3.46) (2.84) (4.11) (2.01)
log of School enrolment 0.383 0.385 0.330 0.370
(3.93) (4.26) (3.59) (4.52)
Inflation Rate -0.099 -0.245 -0.005 -
(3.71) (0.68) (0.09)
Government Consumption/GDP -1.855 -1.761 -1.917 -1.725
(2.17) (1.71) (2.36) (1.81)
Institutional Quality Index 0.219 0.215 0.238 0.255
(3.54) (2.44) (4.03) (3.42)
Population in Tropics -0.244 -0.272 -0.308 -0.279
(2.36) (2.90) (3.11) (3.22)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.340 -0.321 -0.253 -0.301
(2.45) (1.97) (1.90) (1.85)
Constant 6.013 5.972 5.852 5.706
(5.54) (4.87) (5.69) (5.03)
Number of observations 80 74 78 80
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.17 0.06 - 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.71 0.75 0.71
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
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omit the inflation rate and estimate the augmented neoclassical growth
model with the remaining control variables. The regression results show
that government consumption, institutions, having population living in
tropics and ELF are significantly associated with growth. This regres-
sion does not include any outliers and hence can be considered as a
reasonable model for sensitivity analysis. In this regard, we set up the
following cross-country growth regression
logyi,2000 − logyi,1960 = γ0 + γ1logyi,1960 + γ2log(ni + g + δ)
+ γ3log(Investment ratei)
+ γ4log(School enrolmenti)
+ γ5(Government Consumptioni)
+ γ6(Institutional Qualityi)
+ γ7(Population in Tropicsi)
+ γ8ELFi + γ9Opennessi + εi
(5.4)
We carry out our sensitivity analysis under four categorizations:
trade volumes, direct trade policy measures, deviation measures and
subjective indexes. However, we focus only on openness variables found
to be significant in the previous section.
We start our sensitivity analysis with trade volumes, with Table
5.16 reporting our estimation results. All openness variables are found
to be positive but not statistically significant. Table 5.17 then presents
the results of sensitivity analysis for direct trade policy measures. As
can be seen from column 1-3, the tariff rate and non-tariff barriers are
neither individually nor jointly significant, albeit they have anticipated
negative signs. In columns 4 and 5, we include the average black market
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Table 5.16: Economic Growth and Trade Volumes: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.638 -0.630 -0.634 -0.644 -0.652
(8.39) (8.28) (8.35) (8.52) (8.67)
log(n+g+d) -0.036 -0.020 -0.028 -0.264 -0.266
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.67) (0.68)
log of Investment rate 0.226 0.224 0.225 0.241 0.243
(1.70) (1.69) (1.70) (1.98) (2.02)
log of School enrolment 0.372 0.377 0.374 0.362 0.368
(4.63) (4.70) (4.67) (4.46) (4.47)
Government Consumption /GDP -1.820 -1.976 -1.901 -2.009 -1.860
(1.82) (1.95) (1.89) (1.93) (1.85)
Institutional Quality Index 0.246 0.249 0.247 0.249 0.244
(3.17) (3.22) (3.20) (3.30) (3.10)
Population in Tropics -0.326 -0.327 -0.327 -0.308 -0.290
(3.62) (3.55) (3.60) (3.64) (3.31)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.344 -0.331 -0.338 -0.297 -0.297
(1.89) (1.81) (1.85) (1.80) (1.81)
Exports ratio of WB 0.256 - - - -
(1.18)
Imports ratio of WB - 0.295 - - -
(1.40)
Trade ratio of WB - - 0.140 - -
(1.31)
Current Openness of PW - - - 0.100 -
(0.92)
Real Openness by A&C - - - - 0.094
(0.71)
Constant 6.256 6.214 6.237 5.713 5.797
(5.18) (5.15) (5.17) (4.93) (5.06)
Number of observations 75 75 75 80 80
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are
in parenthesis.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
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Table 5.17: Economic Growth and Direct Trade Policy Measures: Sensitivity
Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.641 -0.605 -0.635 -0.657 -0.659
(8.89) (7.68) (8.61) (8.93) (8.85)
log(n+g+d) -0.428 -0.561 -0.460 -0.293 -0.230
(1.14) (1.34) (1.14) (0.76) (0.57)
log of Investment rate 0.255 0.237 0.228 0.236 0.233
(2.05) (1.80) (1.80) (1.95) (1.96)
log of School enrolment 0.343 0.346 0.368 0.395 0.405
(3.04) (3.17) (3.18) (4.73) (4.96)
Government Consumption /GDP -3.174 -2.441 -2.896 -1.559 -1.646
(2.66) (2.27) (2.39) (1.62) (1.66)
Institutional Quality Index 0.226 0.221 0.217 0.229 0.219
(3.03) (2.66) (2.77) (2.73) (2.54)
Population in Tropics -0.324 -0.286 -0.317 -0.287 -0.285
(3.26) (3.03) (3.21) (3.23) (3.22)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.194 -0.256 -0.174 -0.271 -0.314
(1.10) (1.45) (0.99) (1.71) (1.92)
owti -0.493 -0.524
(1.95) (2.09)
owqi 0.028 0.122
(0.19) (0.80)
log (1+BMP) -0.057
(0.47)
BMP dummy -0.079
(0.82)
Constant 5.622 4.753 5.422 5.823 6.105
(4.72) (3.71) (4.26) (5.05) (5.00)
Number of observations 69 67 67 78 78
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04
F -valueb 0.09
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.71
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are
in parenthesis. The variables owti and owqi refers to own-import weighted tariff rates
and own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs and capital gods,
respectively. The term log (1+BMP) denotes the logarithm of one plus average value
of black market premium over the 1960-2000. The variable BMP dummy is a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceed 20 % in either
the 1960s or the 1970s or the 1980s or the 1990s.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
b Test for joint significance of owti and owqi.
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premium and a dummy variable for the black market premium, respec-
tively. Both variables enter the regression with negative but insignifi-
cant coefficient estimates. This may be attributed as another evidence
in favour of black market market premium as a proxy for macroeco-
nomic imbalances rather than trade policy. In table 5.18, we estimate
deviation measures for openness. In the first and second columns, we
include adjusted trade ratios for current openness and real openness
respectively, and conclude that both variables are insignificant. In col-
umn 3, we check the sensitivity of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade
shares and find that the coefficient estimate on this variable is posi-
tive but statistically insignificant (Note that this regression is run over
the 1960-1985 period because the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share
is calculated for only 1985). In column 4, we enter the Frankel-Romer
predicted trade shares at PPP in 1995. We again find that this variable
is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, sensitivity analysis on subjective openness indexes is pro-
vided in Table 5.19. In column 1, we include the fraction of open years
according to SW liberalization dates and conclude that this variable
is significant at the 10 percent significance level. In columns 2-4 we
include three composite trade policy indexes with only the third index
being statistically significant at the 9 percent level. The first two in-
dexes are weighted averages of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the third
index includes the black market premium as well. Hence, it is more
likely that the marginal significance of this variable is a result of in-
clusion of black market premium rather than tariff rates and non-tariff
barriers.
In summary, all openness measures are very sensitive to inclusion
of other growth variables and are typically statistically insignificant.
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Table 5.18: Economic Growth and Deviation Measures: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.646 -0.647 -0.454 -0.633
(8.77) (8.76) (6.29) (7.59)
log(n+g+d) -0.300 -0.289 0.361 -0.220
(0.77) (0.74) (1.35) (0.55)
log of Investment rate 0.235 0.239 0.202 0.256
(1.88) (1.92) (2.82) (2.07)
log of School enrolment 0.366 0.370 0.206 0.355
(4.42) (4.50) (2.96) (4.20)
Government Consumption /GDP -1.803 -1.756 -0.427 -1.936
(1.71) (1.76) (0.56) (1.86)
Institutional Quality Index 0.253 0.251 0.172 0.252
(3.43) (3.39) (2.99) (3.35)
Population in Tropics -0.284 -0.279 -0.226 -0.272
(3.31) (3.19) (2.76) (3.14)
Ehnolingustic Fragmentation -0.315 -0.307 -0.086 -0.282
(1.80) (1.83) (0.66) (1.70)
RESID Current Openness 0.057 - - -
(0.27)
RESID Real Openness - 0.040 - -
(0.20)
log F&R predicted trade 1985 - - 0.024 -
(0.62)
log F&R predicted trade 1995 - - - 0.055
(0.90)
Constant 5.633 5.674 5.416 5.941
(4.96) (4.93) (6.14) (5.06)
Number of observations 80 80 80 80
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.71
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. In the regressions where the heteroscedasticity test is
failed to pass at 15 % level t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust)
standard errors are reported.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that our cross-country empirical
analysis does not support that openness is significantly associated with
economic growth in the long run.
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Table 5.19: Economic Growth and Subjective Measures: Sensitivity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log GDP per worker 1960 -0.638 -0.611 -0.618 -0.625
(8.98) (7.71) (7.90) (8.20)
log(n+g+d) -0.138 -0.502 -0.458 -0.432
(0.30) (1.21) (1.12) (1.08)
log of Investment rate 0.231 0.249 0.255 0.254
(2.01) (1.91) (1.98) (1.98)
log of School enrolment 0.333 0.342 0.343 0.352
(3.98) (3.17) (3.17) (3.26)
Government Consumption /GDP -1.519 -2.577 -2.707 -2.751
(1.52) (2.38) (2.45) (2.48)
Institutional Quality Index 0.200 0.221 0.221 0.212
(2.51) (2.69) (2.72) (2.68)
Population in Tropics -0.306 -0.296 -0.306 -0.318
(3.20) (3.13) (3.19) (3.31)
Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation -0.299 -0.246 -0.230 -0.200
(1.85) (1.37) (1.28) (1.11)
Fraction of Open Years 0.278 - - -
(1.66)
Trade policy 1 - 0.257 - -
(0.53)
Trade policy 2 - - 0.498 -
(1.19)
Trade policy 3 - - - 0.967
(1.71)
Constant 6.003 5.026 5.258 5.451
(4.55) (3.91) (4.15) (4.45)
Number of observations 79 67 67 67
p-value for heteroscedasticitya 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.70
Note: t-statistics based on heteroscedastic-consistent (White-robust) standard errors are
in parenthesis.
a Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in which the null refers to the homoscedastic
errors.
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5.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we investigate the openness-growth connection. For
this, we employ a large number of openness measures and classify them
under four categories. We briefly summarise our main findings as fol-
lows:
• We conclude that ratio of trade volume in GDP is positively
and significantly associated with economic growth over the period
1960-2000. However, their significance in OLS estimate is mainly
driven by a few outlying countries. When we repeat the analy-
sis using weighted least squares, giving relatively lower weight to
outlying countries, we find a significant and positive correlation
between growth and trade ratios at current prices. We could not
conclude the same result for the real openness which measures
the ratio of trade volume in GDP at PPP.
• Our findings relating to direct trade policy measures indicate only
weak evidence for the adverse growth-tariff connection such that
the tariff rate is only marginally significant. We could not find any
statistically significant relation between non-tariff barriers and
economic growth while the black market premium is negatively
and significantly associated with growth. However, our empirical
investigation concerning the relation between black market pre-
mium and economic growth implies the negative relation between
growth and macroeconomic imbalances rather than the trade re-
strictive effect of black market premiums.
• We find that adjusted trade ratios and Frankel-Romer predicted
trade shares are significantly and positively correlated with growth.
Our findings, however, show an insignificant association between
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growth and outward orientation index by Syrquin and Chenery
(1989) and inconsistent results for Leamer’s (1988) openness and
distortion indexes.
• Both the Sachs-Warner openness dummy and the fraction of open
years on the basis of Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and
Welsh (2003) liberalization dates are positively and significantly
correlated with economic growth over the period 1960-2000. We
could not find any significant relation between growth and our
composite trade policy indexes consisting of weighted averages of
tariff rates, non-tariff barriers and the black market premium.
We also check the sensitivity of these results to model specification.
For this we expand our baseline model by adding government consump-
tion, economic institutions, geography, and ethnolinguistic fragmenta-
tion. Once we consider this model, the openness measures which are
previously found to be significant become insignificant. Hence, we con-
clude that our cross-country empirical investigation does not support
the proposition that openness is associated with economic growth.
Although our model specification for sensitivity analysis is compre-
hensive, it is still subject to the model uncertainty problem and one
could reach different results by employing different growth variables
and hence models. One promising solution to this problem is to inte-
grate model uncertainty into subsequent statistical inference employ-
ing model averaging techniques. In the following chapter, we employ
Bayesian model averaging technique to take into account model uncer-
tainty issues regarding model specification.
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5.A Appendix: Descriptions and Sources of Vari-
ables used in Cross-Country Growth Regres-
sion Analysis
Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model
Real GDP per capita (RGDPCH) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. Source: Global Development Network Growth Database
(2005) which rely on Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston,
Summers and Aten (2002)).
Population (TP) : Total population is based on the de facto defini-
tion of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship. Source: The World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (2006).
Labour force (LF) : Labour force or economically active population
defined as the total population between ages 15 and 64. Source:
The World Bank World Development Indicators (2006)
Share of labour force (SLF): Share of labour force in total popu-
lation. The exact calculation is LF/TP .
Real GDP per worker (PWGDP) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. The exact calculation is PWGDP = RGDPCH∗(1/SLF ).
Growth : Average growth rate of real GDP per worker over the 1960-
2000 period. The exact calculation is log(PWGDP2000/PWGDP1960),
where PWGDP1960 and PWGDP2000 is the real GDP per worker
in 1960 and 2000, respectively.
Initial income (PWGDP1960) : Real GDP per worker in 1960.
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Population growth (n) : Average rate of population growth be-
tween 1960 and 2000. The exact calculation is (1/40)∗log(TP2000/TP1960),
where TP1960 and TP2000 are total population in 1960 and 2000,
respectively.
(g+δ) : Sum of exogenous rates of technological process and depre-
ciation over the 1960-2000 period and assumed to be equal to
0.05.
(n+g+δ) : Sum of rates of population growth, technical process and
depreciation over the 1960-2000 period.
Investment rate (INV) : Average of Investment share in GDP at
constant prices over the 1960-2000 period. Source: Penn World
Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)) and the
World Bank World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
School enrolment rate (SCH) : Average gross rate of secondary
school enrolment over the 1960-2000 period. Gross secondary
school enrollment ratio is defined as the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to the level of secondary education. Source: The
World Bank World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Trade Policy
Imports share by the World Bank (MGDP WB) : Average share
of imports of goods and services in GDP over the 1960-2000 pe-
riod. The variable is calculated for the countries Bhutan, Hun-
gary, Sao Tome and Principe over the period 1970-2000, for Turkey
over the 1968-2000 period, for the countries Oman, Pakistan and
Mali over the period 1967-2000, for Gambia over the 1966-2000
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period, for Cameroon and Nepal over the period 1965-2000, for
Sierra Leon over the period 1964-2000, for Kuwait over the pe-
riod 1963-2000, for Tunisia and Papa New Guinea over the period
1961-2000. Source: The World Bank World Development Indi-
cators (2002, 2006).
Exports share by the World Bank (XGDP WB) : Average share
of exports of goods and services in GDP over the 1960-2000 pe-
riod. The variable is calculated for the countries Bhutan, Hun-
gary, Sao Tome and Principe over the period 1970-2000, for Turkey
over the 1968-2000 period, for the countries Oman, Pakistan and
Mali over the period 1967-2000, for Gambia over the 1966-2000
period, for Cameroon and Nepal over the period 1965-2000, for
Sierra Leon over the period 1964-2000, for Kuwait over the pe-
riod 1963-2000, for Tunisia and Papa New Guinea over the period
1961-2000. Source: The World Bank World Development Indi-
cators (2002, 2006).
Trade ratio by World Bank (XMGDP WB) : Average share of
exports plus imports of goods and services in GDP over the
1960-2000 period. The exact calculation is XMGDPWB =
XGDPWB + MGDPWB. Source: The World Bank World
Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Current Openness of Penn World (COPEN) : Average share of
exports plus imports of goods and services in GDP in current
prices over the 1960-2000 period. Source: Penn World Tables
Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)).
Real Openness of Penn World (ROPEN) : Average share of im-
ports plus exports in US dollar to GDP in PPP US dollar over the
212
Chapter 5: Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country
Empirical Investigation
1960-2000 period. The Exact calculation isROPEN = (PGDP/100)∗
COPEN , where PGDP is the Penn World variable of price level
of GDP, unit: US dollar=100 in current prices, and COPEN
is the current openness variable of Penn World. Source: Penn
World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)).
Trade ratio with OECD (XM OECD) : Trade with OECD mem-
bers over the 1960-1998 period (Exports plus Imports as a ratio of
GDP). Source: Global Development Network Growth Database
(2005).
Trade ratio with NonOECD (XM NonOECD) : Trade with Non-
OECD countries over the 1960-1998 period (Exports plus Im-
ports as a ratio of GDP). Source: Global Development Network
Growth Database (2005).
Tariff rate (OWTI) : Own-import weighted tariff rates on interme-
diate inputs and capital goods over the 1983-1985 period. Source:
Barro and Lee (1994a),
Non-tariff Barriers (OWQI) : Own-import weighted non-tariff fre-
quency on intermediate inputs and capital goods over the 1983-
1985 period. Source: Barro and Lee (1994a).
Import Duties (M DUTY : Collected import duties as ratio of im-
ports over the 1970-1998 period. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators (2002).
Tariff rate (UWTI) : Unweighted average tariff rates on all com-
modities over the period 1990-1999 period. Source: Wacziarg
and Welch (2003)
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Black Market Premium (BMP) Average of black market premium
over the period 1960-1999. The black market premium is calcu-
lated as (Parallel Exchange rate/Official Exchange rate)− 1.
Source: Global Development Network Growth Database (2005).
log (1+BMP) : Logarithm of one plus average of black market pre-
mium over the period 1960-1999.
Black Market Premium Dummy 1 (BMP Dummy1) : The dummy
variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds
20 percent in the 1960s or the 1970s or the 1980s or the 1990s.
Black Market Premium Dummy 2 (BMP Dummy2) : The dummy
variable is equal to 1 if the average black market premium exceeds
20 percent over the 1960-2000 period.
Outward Orientation Index by Syrquin and Chenery (SCOUT)
: Dummy variable for outward orientation based on Syrquin and
Chenery (1989). Source: Levine and Renelt (1992)
Openness index by Leamer (LEAMER Open) : Measure of over-
all trade openness index based on Leamer (1988) in 1982. Source:
Levine and Renelt (1992)
Intervention Index by Leamer (LEAMER Inter.) : Measure of
overall trade intervention index based on Leamer (1988) in 1982.
Source: Levine and Renelt (1992)
log F&R predicted trade 1985 (F&R85) : Logarithm of the Frankel-
Romer predicted trade shares from gravity model in 1985. Source:
Frankel and Romer (1999).
log F&R predicted trade 1995 (F&R95) : Logarithm of the Frankel-
Romer predicted trade shares from gravity model as a fraction of
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GDP in PPP in 1995. Source: Dollar and Kraay (2003a).
Outward Orientation Index by World Bank (WBWDR87) : Dummy
variable for outward orientation over the period 1963-1985 based
on the World Bank World Development Report (1987). Source:
The World Bank World Development Report (1987).
Exchange rate distortion index (RERD) : The real exchange rate
distortion index over the period 1970-2000. Source: Dollar (1992)
and Global Development Network Growth Database (2005).
Exchange rate variability index (RERV) : Coefficient of varia-
tion of the real exchange rate distortion index over the 1970-2000
period.
Sachs-Warner openness dummy (SW-Dummy) : The Sachs-Warner
openness dummy over the period 1960-2000. Source: Sachs and
Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
Sachs-Warner Open Years( SW-Years) : Fraction of open years
on the basis of Sachs-Warner and Wacziarg-Welch liberalisation
dates over the 1960-2000 period. Source: Sachs and Warner
(1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
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Table 5.20: Summary Statistics of Openness Measures
♯ of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Volumes
MGDP WB 107 0.3377 0.1887 0.0723 1.0051
XGDP WB 107 0.2958 0.1848 0.0656 1.0270
XMGDP WB 107 0.6335 0.3583 0.1453 2.0320
COPEN 114 0.6432 0.4165 0.1477 3.2260
ROPEN 114 0.3734 0.3526 0.0436 2.4601
XM OECD 106 0.3912 0.2627 0.0655 1.7622
XM NonOECD 106 0.1409 0.1636 0.0156 1.2300
Direct Trade
Policy Measures
OWTI 104 0.1688 0.1630 0 1.319
OWQI 102 0.1858 0.2372 0 0.888
M DUTY 117 0.1229 0.0888 0 0.4645416
UWTI 121 0.1496 0.0932 0.003 0.547
log (1+BMP) 121 0.3776 0.6716 -0.004 5.453
BMP Dummy1 121 0.5455 0.5000 0 1
BMP Dummy2 121 0.4463 0.4992 0 1
Deviation Measures
SCOUT 119 0.3445 0.4772 0 1
LEAMER Open 52 0.0310 0.1476 -0.21 0.51
LEAMER Inter. 52 0.2917 0.1393 0.11 0.8
F&R85 148 2.9882 0.7905 0.833 5.639
F&R95 195 -2.8315 0.6409 -4.4070 -0.6378
WBWDR87 41 0.2927 0.3869 0 1
RESID COPEN 111 0.0000 0.3071 -0.5700 1.9100
RESID ROPEN 111 0.0000 0.2706 -0.5495 1.5548
Subjective Measures
RERD 94 114.6070 39.2534 59.2693 358.0221
RERV 94 0.2917 0.3220 0 2.7937
SW-Dummy 114 0.2281 0.4214 0 1
Table 5.20 – Continued
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SW-Years 114 0.4322 0.3832 0 1
POLICY1 102 -0.0684 0.0695 -0.3978 -0.0002
POLICY2 102 -0.0780 0.0729 -0.4942 -0.0002
POLICY3 92 -0.0724 0.0617 -0.3666 0.0001
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Openness and Economic
Growth: Bayesian Model
Averaging Estimate of
Cross-Country Growth
Regressions
6.1 Introduction
The link between openness and growth is one of the oldest issues in
economic theory and has been extensively investigated by empirical
researches. However, the results of this analysis are very sensitive to
model specification. Although some studies address the problem of
model uncertainty, their approaches are neither systematic nor com-
plete. This will have serious policy implications.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between
growth and openness accounting for model uncertainty. For this pur-
pose, a number of existing openness measures as well as various growth
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variables are used in the framework of augmented neo-classical growth
model developed by Mankiw et al. (1992).
The main contributions of this chapter are firstly, differently from
previous cross-country empirical work, this chapter tackles model un-
certainty problem by employing Bayesian model averaging technique
instead of estimating and reporting a small number of cross-country
growth regressions. Secondly, this chapter addresses the issue of proxy
uncertainty to compare alternative proxy variables for openness.
The results obtained from our Bayesian model averaging do not
support the contention that openness is a long run growth determinant.
However, we find substantial evidence in favour of economic institutions
and macroeconomic stability.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 describes
the methodology. Section 3 provides a cross-country growth model for
our Bayesain model averaging application. Section 4 deals with some
difficulties related to implementation of Bayesian model averaging. Our
findings are reported and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
6.2 Methodology
We start this section with a brief summary of Bayesian statistics since
Bayesian model averaging (BMA henceforth) is a direct application of
the Bayesian paradigm. Then we show how BMA is used to solve the
model uncertainty in the context of linear regression model.
6.2.1 Bayesian Statistical Inference
Bayesian statistical inference about a population parameter is based
on probability models. The main feature of the Bayesian approach is
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that probability is used as the fundamental measure of uncertainty.
Generally speaking, in classical statistics we try to make inferences
about the true, but unknown population parameter within a repeated
sampling process since probability is defined in terms of the limits of a
relative frequency of the event and inference is carried out by techniques
with a high probability of giving the correct results.1
However, differently from the classical framework, in the Bayesian
context the definition of probability is subjective such that different
persons can assign different probabilities to the same event. In other
words, probability is defined in terms of degree of belief and this belief
does not necessarily depend on the relative frequency of the event. An
important result of subjective definition of probability, in the Bayesian
context an unknown population parameter is considered as a random
variable such that an unknown population parameter is assigned with
a subjective probability distribution which summarises our knowledge
about that parameter.2 This distribution, which shows the individual’s
prior beliefs or information about the parameter before or prior to ob-
serving data, is called as prior probability. After observing data, we
combine our prior probability distribution of the population parameter
with the sample information with presented data. In other words, we
calculate the conditional probability distribution on observed value of
population parameter. This probability conditional on data is called
posterior probability distribution of that parameter. For this purpose,
assume that data for a random variable Y are generated from the fol-
1It is a well known fact that in the classical framework an unbiased (and also efficient)
estimator is favourable since average value of the sample estimates within the repeated
samples approaches the value of the unknown population parameter.
2This property is another departure from the classical context since in the classical
framework the unknown population parameter is treated as constant and hence a proba-
bility distribution can not assign to that parameter.
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lowing model:
M = {p(θ, y); θ ∈ Ω} (6.1)
where θ is a vector of unknown population parameters in some parame-
ter space Ω, y is a vector of sample observations for Y and p(θ, y) is the
joint density function for θ given y. We can write the joint probability
function for θ and y, given the model described above, as
p(θ, y) = p(y|θ)p(θ) = p(θ|y)p(y) (6.2)
which leads to
p(θ|y) = p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
(6.3)
This last expression is known as Bayes’ theorem. In this expression
p(θ|y) is the posterior probability distribution for θ and characterises
all information about θ after the data is observed; p(θ) is the prior
probability for θ and indicates the non-sample information about θ;
p(y|θ) is the conditional probability function for y given θ. As can
be seen, p(y|θ) is algebraically identical to the likelihood function for θ
given y and contains all sample information about θ. Hence, p(y|θ) can
be expressed as the likelihood function ℓ(θ|y).3 Finally the denominator
of Bayes’ theorem p(y) is the marginal or individual distribution of y
and, before the data y are observed, the distribution of the unknown
but observable y is p(y) =
∫
p(θ)p(y|θ)dθ (or p(y) = ∑θ p(θ)p(y|θ) if θ
is discrete).4 After observing data, p(y) is considered fixed with respect
to θ (p(y) does not depend on θ), and equation (6.3) can be expressed
3As an example suppose that the model M ∼ i.i.d. N(µ, σ2) so that θ=(µ, σ), and
ℓ(θ|y) = (σ√2π)−1exp{−(1/2)(y − µ)2/σ2}. If y consists of n observations, then the
likelihood function is defined by ℓ(θ|y) = ∏n
i=1(σ
√
2π)−1exp{−(1/2)(yi − µ)2/σ2}.
4As pointed out by Gelman et al. (2004), the more informative name of p(y) is the
prior predictive distribution.
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as follows
p(θ|y) ∝ ℓ(θ|y)p(θ) (6.4)
where the symbol ∝ means “proportional to”. In plain English, the
posterior probability distribution of an unknown population parameter
is proportional to likelihood function for that parameter weighted by
the prior probability distribution for that parameter.
The Bayes’ theorem expresses in (6.4) shows that how we combine
our prior information about θ, expressed in terms of prior distribu-
tion p(θ) with the sample information expressed in terms of likelihood
function ℓ(θ|y) in order to obtain posterior information about θ ex-
pressed in terms of posterior density function p(θ|y). For instance a
point estimate of θ is obtained by the posterior mean of θ such that
θ¯ = E(θ|y) = ∫ θp(θ|y)dθ.
As can be seen, incorporation of prior information to statistical
inference is one of the most important differences of the Bayesian ap-
proach from classical inference in which there is no formal mechanism
for incorporation of prior beliefs. However, an immediate point aris-
ing in the Bayesian context is that one needs to specify priors before
observing data. In some cases, one has certain knowledge about θ
and can define definite priors. In such cases, priors are known as in-
formative or proper priors. Yet, in many circumstances there is very
little knowledge about θ, and hence priors do not contain information.
These priors are known as noninformative or improper priors.5 More-
over, even if substantial prior information is available, one may prefer
to employ noninformative priors in order to obtain a more objective
posterior distribution. As a result, noninformative priors lead to a
5Noninformative priors are some times referred to as vague or diffuse priors as our
knowledge about θ is vague or diffuse.
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posterior distribution that is substantially dominated by the sample
information. However, as noted by Judge et al. (1988, p.126) “[t]here
are many statisticians who believe the Bayesian approach to inference
is superior to the classical approach, irrespective of whether or not
substantial prior information is incorporated.”
Finally, one can calculate posterior odds in order to compare alter-
native hypotheses. In the Bayesian context, posterior odds are defined
as the ratio of posterior densities evaluated at points θ1 and θ2 under
a given model
p(θ1|y)
p(θ2|y) =
p(θ1)ℓ(θ1|y)/p(y)
p(θ2)ℓ(θ2|y)/p(y) =
p(θ1)ℓ(θ1|y)
p(θ2)ℓ(θ2|y) (6.5)
The verbal explanation of expression (6.5) is that posterior odds, (p(θ1|y)/p(θ2|y))
are equal to prior odds, (p(θ1)/p(θ2)) multiplied by the likelihood ratio,
(ℓ(θ1|y)/ℓ(θ2|y)). Likelihood ratio is also known as Bayes factor.
These expressions are the technical core of Bayesian statistical in-
ference. Therefore, the primary objective of any specific application is
to develop a model p(θ|y) and perform the necessary computations to
summarise p(θ|y) in an appropriate way.
So far our analysis for Bayesian inference is based on the assump-
tion that we have only one model (or true data generated process for
the random variable Y is known). However, as detailed in Chapter
3, one does not have certain information about whether or not the
selected model is true. In other words, model uncertainty is an impor-
tant problem in most statistical applications. The Bayesian solution
to this problem is to incorporate the model uncertainty into inference
by averaging all possible models. We will now discuss this approach,
which is known as Bayeasian model averaging.
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6.2.2 Bayesian Model Averaging
As mentioned above BMA is a technique used to take into account
model uncertainty. Suppose that the data are generated by a particular
model in the model space which encompasses all possible models. That
is, assume that there are k possible different models and model space
can be defined such that M = {M1, . . . ,Mk}, where M denotes the
model space and Mj is one of its typical element as follows
Mj = {p(θj, y); θj ∈ Ωj} (6.6)
where θj is the vector of unknown population parameters and p(θj, y) is
the joint density function for θ given y in jth model, Mj. In this context,
the likelihood function for model Mj is expressed by ℓj(θj|y,Mj)
In this setting, as pointed out by Wasserman (2000), model selec-
tion refers to problem of using the data to choose one of the possible
models considered in the model space while model averaging refers to
the procedure of estimating the quantity of interest under each possible
model and then averaging those estimates according to the probabil-
ities assigned to each model. Therefore, model averaging takes into
account all possible models instead of focusing on a selected one. That
is, BMA accounts for model uncertainty by integrating the posterior
probabilities of every possible model given the data such that:
p(θ|y) =
k∑
j=1
p(θj|y,Mj)p(Mj|y) (6.7)
where p(Mj|y) is the posterior probability of model Mj conditional on
the data.
As it can be seen, the BMA estimate of parameter vector θ is the
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weighted average of all possible posterior probabilities of θ conditional
on data and each possible model, with weights equal to posterior prob-
abilities of each possible model. The obvious feature of BMA expressed
in equation (6.7) is that model uncertainty is incorporated into sub-
sequent inference by considering the model as a random variable as
well as θ and y. This implies that, in order to obtain a BMA estimate
of θ, we first need to specify prior probabilities p(Mj) for each model
indicating how likely it is the true model given the model space, and
then for each model we need to assign priors to the parameters in that
model, p(θj|Mj). In the light of these explanations, using the Bayes’s
rule, the posterior probability of model Mj can be expressed as
p(Mj|y) = p(y|Mj)p(Mj)∑k
h=1 p(y|Mh)p(Mh)
(6.8)
where
P (y|Mj) =
∫
ℓj(θj|y,Mj)p(θj|Mj)dθj (6.9)
is the integrated likelihood of model Mj. This shows how the observed
data supports the assigned prior probability that Mj is the true model
while assuming that one model in the model space is true. Using the
equations (6.8) and (6.9) one can obtain Bayes factor for model Mj
against the model Mh as:
Bjh =
p(Mj|y)p(Mh)
p(Mh|y)p(Mj) =
∫
ℓj(θj|y,Mj)p(θj|Mj)dθj∫
ℓh(θh|y,Mh)p(θh|Mh)dθh (6.10)
The Bayes factor for model Mj versus model Mh shows the probabil-
ity that model Mj is true vis-a-vis model Mh. For instance if Bjh = 5,
then model Mj is five times likely than model Mh, given the data.
Therefore, we can compare the possible models using the Bayes factors
for these models. However the main objective of BMA is to provide a
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better average value of parameters of interest, not to provide the “best”
model.
Even though BMA is a coherent way in order to tackle model un-
certainty, implementation of this procedure in the context of linear
regression is not easy. There are three important difficulties which a
researcher must overcome.6 First, one needs to assign appropriate pri-
ors to models and their parameters, namely coefficients of regressors
and variances for error term and specifying plausible priors over the
models is challenging. Second, the calculation of integrals expressed in
(6.9) can be extremely difficult. Third, when the potential regressors
and so the number of possible models are enormous (as in the case of
cross-country growth regression), then computation of posterior prob-
abilities of parameters of interest is very difficult, and in some cases
practically infeasible. However, recent Markov chain Monte Carlo tech-
niques can be used to perform the computations necessary for model
averaging.
6.3 Model
Recall the generic presentation of cross-country growth regression model
discussed in Chapter 3
̺i = γ + πXi + ψZi + υi (6.11)
where ̺i is average real growth rate per capita over a particular time
period, γ is intercept, Xi is a set of explanatory variables suggested
by the augmented neo-classical growth model7, Zi is a set of addi-
6Indeed, these difficulties are the main reasons for why BMA was not popular until
recently.
7These are initial level of income, rates of population growth, technological change and
depreciation, physical and human capital savings rates. See Chapter 3 for transformations
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tional control variables suggested by new growth theories and υi is
error term. As noted previously, while X variables are generally fixed
in the cross-country growth studies, there is no consensus about the
Z variables. This is the result of theory and proxy uncertainties relat-
ing to model selection which casues model uncertainty producing many
different models in cross-country growth work. As Brock et al. (2003)
point out, uncertainty concerning functional forms and heterogeneity
about growth process across countries are other important aspects of
model uncertainty. However, in this chapter we deal with only model
uncertainty in terms of theory and proxy uncertainties. Our BMA
application on cross-country growth regression follows closely that of
Ferna´ndez, Ley and Steel (2001a; 2001b; FLS henceforth). We also sub-
stantially benefit from the study by Brock, Durlauf and West (2003,
BDW hereafter), especially in assigning prior probabilities to models
over the model space.
We assume T different growth theories and k different proxy vari-
ables capturing these theories such that k =
∑T
t k
t, where kt is the
number of proxies measuring tth theory. Dealing with theory and proxy
uncertainty, in every model we includes X variables and the intercept
γ. This means that only different proxies capturing different theories
generate different models. Since additional theories are reflected by k
different proxies, our model space consists of 2k different models in-
cluding the null model (with only X variables as a baseline model) and
full model (with all variables: X variables plus k proxies). The ra-
tionale for the model space as defined here is straightforward: Firstly,
there is a complete consensus about the X variables since they are
proximate determinants of growth. Secondly, and more importantly,
of these variables in the augmented neo-classical model
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allowing proximate determinants of growth in every model reveals the
impact of other variables on growth through the productivity channel.
Assuming that the average growth rate for n countries is regressed
on an intercept γ and a set of s fixed regressors X with a number of
additional explanatory variables chosen from a set of k different vari-
ables Z, we can rewrite the generic presentation of cross-country growth
regression model for all variables as follows (for simplicity country sub-
script i is dropped)
̺ = γιn + πX + ψZ + συ (6.12)
where π is a full s-dimensional vector grouping coefficients of s different
fixed regressors, ψ is a full k-dimensional vector including regression
coefficients of k additional explanatory variables, ιn is a n-dimensional
vector of 1’s and σ ∈ ℜ+ is a scale parameter.
As pointed out by FLS, the exclusion of an additional variable from
the regression expressed by equation (6.12) means that the correspond-
ing element of ψ is zero. Therefore, a possible model over the model
space Mj, j = 1...2
k includes kj (0 ≤ kj ≤ k) additional regressors
and can be expressed as
̺ = γιn + πX + ψjZj + συ (6.13)
where Zj is the n × kj submatrix of Z and ψj is the a kj-dimensional
coefficient vector of corresponding additional variables. Thus we can
group the zero component of ψ under the model Mj in a vector ψ∼j ∈
ℜk−kj . Prior distribution for the parameters of the model Mi can be
written as
p(γ, ψj, σ|Mj) (6.14)
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This obviously requires that priors are assigned to models over the
model space as follows
p(Mj) = pj, j = 1...2
k, pj ≥ 0 and
2k∑
j=1
pj = 1 (6.15)
In order to obtain posterior distribution of parameters in model Mj we
need to calculate its posterior probability which can be expressed by
p(Mj|̺) = ℓ(Mj)pj∑2k
h ℓ(Mh)ph
(6.16)
where pj is the prior probability of model Mj and ℓ(Mj) is the inte-
grated marginal likelihood of (Mj) which is explicitly defined as
ℓ(Mj) =
∫
p(̺|γ, ψj, σ,Mj)p(γ, ψj, σ|Mj)dγdψjdσ (6.17)
where p(̺|γ, ψj, σ,Mj) is the likelihood function and p(γ, ψj, σ|Mj) is
the prior distribution of parameters in model Mi. As can be seen, the
expressions in (6.16) and (6.17) are algebraically identical to those in
(6.8) and (6.9), respectively.
6.4 Implementation
As noted before, implementation of BMA is difficult because i) spec-
ifying priors over the models and their parameters is challenging, ii)
computation of integrals expressed by equation (6.17) is very hard,
and iii) when the number of regressors and hence models are enor-
mous, exact calculation of posterior quantities of interest is infeasible.
In this section, we deal with these difficulties.
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6.4.1 Specifying Prior Probabilities
Priors over the Models
We start by specifying prior probabilities over the model space. The
most common approach in the model averaging literature in which
model uncertainty mostly considered as variable uncertainty is assign-
ing uniform prior to each possible model. More clearly, in the case
of linear regression, model uncertainty arises from the presence of k
different regressors and hence a prior probability of 2−k is assigned to
each of 2k models in the model space. Therefore, this prior structure
over the model space implies that the prior probability that a given
variable appears in the true model is 0.5 and the probability that a
particular variable appears in the true model is independent from the
presence or absence of other variables in that model.
This approach is however problematic in the context of cross-country
growth regression even though assigning equal priors to models seems
reasonable. The first problem is that uniform priors over the mod-
els implies the higher weights for larger models (Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004)). Yet there is no a priori reason to believe that the larger mod-
els are more likely than smaller models. The second problem is that
it is very difficult to assume that the probability that one regressor
appears in a growth model is independent from the absence or pres-
ence of other regressors, as indicated by BDW. The reason is that some
regressors, such as alternative proxies for a particular growth theory
(e.g., different openness measures) are quite similar, while some regres-
sors are quite disparate-such as proxy variables belonging to different
growth theories (e.g., ethnolinguistic fragmentation index that mea-
sures population heterogeneity and absolute latitude which measures
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geographical location).8 Therefore, it is obvious that models includ-
ing variables which represent the same theory takes higher weights if
one assigns equal priors to the possible models. For instance, consider
a case in which a particular growth theory is measured by n different
proxies. Hence, 2n−1 different combinations of these proxies give mod-
els including only proxies of that theory. Obviously, in this case, that
theory has a prior probability which is 2n−1 times prior probability of
another growth theory which captured by only one proxy if we specify
uniform priors over the models.
In order to overcome these difficulties, BDW suggest a tree struc-
ture according to different aspect of model uncertainty in growth re-
gression.9 First they identify alternative class of models according to
different growth theories suggested in the literature. Hence, in the first
step they deal theory uncertainty. Second, they highlight proxy uncer-
tainty for each theory class. Third, for each specification of theories
and associated proxies, BDW specify models with and without sub-
Saharan Africa dummy for accounting heterogeneity uncertainty. This
means that their model space generated by theory and proxy uncer-
tainties is doubled by allowing heterogeneity uncertainty. Once this
tree structure is established, they assign a prior probability for each
level of uncertainty as follows. Assuming that prior probabilities with
respect to theory inclusion are equal and independent of presence or
absence of other theories, BDW assigns a prior probability of 0.5 to
each theory and this prior is unaffected by inclusion or exclusion of
other theories. It is obvious that specifying uniform priors over the
8This problem is very similar to red bus/blue bus problem in discrete choice theory
while determining the probability of an individual’s choice of a red bus over the taxi.
Undoubtedly, this probability is affected by the possibility of choosing a blue bus since
blue bus is a quite substitute for red bus. See BDW for a detailed discussion.
9The priors structure over the model space suggested by BDW is indeed motivated by
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
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alternative growth theories is reasonable and also consistent with the
open-ended nature of growth theories since the probability that each
growth theory is included in the true model is equally likely. That
is, for a given growth theory, it is either included or excluded in the
true model and the probability that theory is included (or excluded) in
the true model is equal to 0.5. In the second step, identifying a small
number of proxies capturing each theory, BDW define a uniform prior
on the proxies under the consideration of each theory class. In other
words, BDW assign equal priors to each of the proxy variables of a
theory. In the third stage, for each pair of corresponding model with
and without sub-Saharan Africa dummy, BDW assign a prior of q to
heterogenous model and of 1-q to homogenous model.
The prior structure suggested by BDW seems plausible. It allows us
to distinguish the uncertainty over theories from the uncertainty con-
cerning proxy variables. The important point about this prior structure
is that one should avoid employing empirical proxies which represent
more than one theory. In the light of this discussion, we highlight nine
growth theories (including openness) and 29 proxy variables measuring
these theories in what follows.
Categorization of Growth Theories
i) Institutions: The role of institutions on economic growth and
development has been an important issue in economics since Adam
Smith. In particular, differences in institutions and property rights
among the countries have received substantial interest in explaining
cross-country growth differences in recent years.
According to North (1990, p.3) “[I]nstitutions are the rules of the
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction. In consequence they struc-
232
Chapter 6: Openness and Economic Growth: BMA Estimate of
Cross-Country Growth Regressions
ture incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or eco-
nomic.” The literature on institutions and economic growth points out
that countries with better institutions not only invest more in phys-
ical and human capital but also employ production factors efficiently
(see North (1981, 1990), Schleifer and Wishny (1993), Landes (1999),
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)). The reason is
that countries with good-quality institutions provide incentives for in-
dividuals that encourage investment, the accumulation of skills and
innovative activities. As a result, better institutions lead to higher
economic growth. In addition Keefer and Knack (2002) provide the-
oretical argument and empirical evidence that public investments are
dramatically higher in the countries with insecure property rights. This
increases rent-seeking and reduces the incentive for government to use
tax revenues for productive purposes.
These views have been affirmed by numerous recent works in the
cross-country growth literature.10 For instance, Mauro (1995) con-
cludes that corruption (measured as an average of Business Interna-
tional indexes on corruption, red tape and inefficient judiciary over the
period 1980-1983) has a negative impact on investment and hence eco-
nomic growth. Employing various indicators of institutional quality
(such as rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and contract re-
pudiation) Keefer and Knack (1997) indicate that convergence is slow
in the absence of good institutions. Hall and Jones (1999) find that
differences in capital accumulation, productivity and hence output per
worker are substantially driven by differences in economic institutions
(measured an average of indexes of law and order, bureaucratic qual-
10Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999b), Aron
(2000), Keefer and Knack (1997, 2002), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Dollar and Kraay
(2003a), Rodrik et al. (2004) are few examples among others.
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ity, corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of
contracts.) Similarly, Barro (1996, 1997) provides empirical evidence
for the positive relation between the rule of law index and economic
growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001) document the substantial positive
effects of secure property rights on per capita income.11 Therefore,
economic institutions and the protection of property rights, generally
measured by the rule of law and risk of expropriation, are considered
as the fundamental or deeper determinants of economic growth in the
literature (Rodrik (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2005)).
The recent literature has also emphasised the role of political insti-
tutions on economic growth (La Porta et al. (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2005)). According to Acemoglu et al. (2005), the basic mechanism
works as follows: the political institutions and the distribution of re-
sources shape the form of political power and then the political power
determines the economic institutions. The political institutions which
create incentives and impose constraints on the political actors are the
key for economic success. In this regard, it is likely that the extent of
democracy influences economic growth positively because economic in-
stitutions providing protection of property rights and equal opportunity
for the individuals in the society are difficult to sustain in an autocratic
regime or a dictatorship as noted by Acemoglu et al. (2005). The recent
studies such as Roll and Talbot (2003), Feng (2003), Krieckhaus (2004),
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Rigobon
11The casuality between economic institutions and growth is an important problem in
these studies since it is likely that a country with a good macroeconomic performance may
choose or afford better institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) employing settler mortality
rate in the countries colonized by Europeans as an IV for the present institutions, estimate
large effects of institutions on per capita income. In addition, they point out that their
results are not driven by outliers and are robust to controlling a number of other growth
determinants. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) question settler mortality rate as a valid
IV for current institutions and show that this variable is highly correlated with human
capital. They argue that it is more likely that causality runs from economic outcomes to
institutional quality.
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and Rodrik (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006; 2007), Papaioannou
and Siourounis (2006), conclude a positive and statistically significant
association between growth and democracy. Moreover, Rodrik (1999a)
points out a robust and significant association between democracy and
the level of manufacturing wages.
On the other hand some scholars argue that the relationship be-
tween democracy and growth could reflect a reverse causality and/or
there is no significant relation between these two at all. For instance, as
indicated by Przeworski and Limongi (1993), the idea that democracy
protects property rights is questionable due to the fact that property
rights may be threatened by private actors such as trade unions or
landless peasants as well as the political power. Thus, democracy may
undermine property rights by equalizing the right to influence the allo-
cation of resources and providing a means to expropriate the riches. In
addition, under democratic regimes, the distribution of state-owned re-
sources is subject to pressures from different interest groups and hence
democracy may lead to an expansion of consumption at the cost of
investment and of economic growth. Using the successful economic
performances of East Asian countries (in particular South Korea, Tai-
wan and China) under the autocratic state regimes and poor economic
experiences during the democratization period of Latin America as ex-
amples, another line of literature argues that democracy hinders eco-
nomic growth and autonomous state regime may be more beneficial for
development, especially in developing countries (see Sirowy and Inke-
les (1990), and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for overall reviews and
an assessment of the literature on the relationship between economic
growth and political institutions). There are empirical cross-country
studies finding a negative association or concluding insignificant re-
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lation between growth and democracy.12 For instance, Barro (1996)
finds that the effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative once
the initial level of income, rule of law, free markets, government con-
sumption and level of human capital are controlled for. In addition,
Barro (1996, 1997) suggests a non-linear relationship between growth
and democracy, such that democracy stimulates growth at low levels
of political freedom and depresses it at the moderate levels of political
freedom. Barro (1996, 1997) concludes that democracy is not a key
factor in economic growth.
Finally, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and Djankov et al. (2003)
emphasise the role of factor endowments, cultural heritage, and eco-
logical and geographical environment on determining the economic and
political institutions, rather than the influence of political institutions
on economic institutions. La Porta et al. (1999) and Glaeser et al.
(2004) provide empirical evidence in favour of this view.
In this regard, we consider both economic and political institutions
as possibly important growth determinants and measure them by us-
ing two composite indexes. The first one represents the economic in-
stitutions and comes from a subjective database by “the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)”, published by a private international con-
sulting company Political Risk Services. Following Keefer and Knack
(1997), Sachs and Warner (1997a) and Hall and Jones (1999), the index
is calculated as the average of four ICRG components: i) Investment
profile as a average of three subcomponents namely, contract viability,
profits repatriation and payment delays; ii) Law and order; iii) Corrup-
12Especially results of early studies are not favour of democracy. See Kurzman et al.
(2002) for a summary of these studies. Krieckhaus (2004) points out that choosing time
period strongly influences the empirical result. His findings indicate that democracy is
negatively associated with economic growth in the 1960s while positively correlated in the
1990s. He concludes that there is no statistically significant relation during 1970s and
1980s.
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tion; and iv) Bureaucratic quality. The index is calculated as the equal
weighting average of these four categories for the years 1984-2000. The
higher value of index indicates the greater institutional quality. The
second index measures the level of democracy over the period 1960-2000
and comes from Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. (2005)).
ii) Geography : Another fundamental determinant of economic
growth is geography. This theory points out that differences in the eco-
nomic performance across countries are a result of differences in their
geographical, climate and ecological characteristics. However, in spite
of this fact, the role of geography was neglected in the empirical cross-
country growth literature until very recently. Interest for geography
has mainly raised from the contribution by Sachs and Warner (1997a),
Bloom et al. (1998) and Gallup et al. (1999) and two recent books by
ecologist Diamond (1998) and Landes (1999) which emphasise the role
of geography in economic and social development.
Geography directly influences economic growth since temperature,
soil quality, rainfall, water resources and topography are mainly deter-
mined by it. Especially, geography considerably affects productivity
in agriculture and variety of plant crops. For instance Bloom et al.
(1998, p.227) argue that “[t]ropical agriculture, especially food pro-
duction, is faced with chronic problems of low yields and fragility due
to low photosynthetic potential, high evapotranspiration, low and vari-
able rainfall, highly weathered soils, veterinary diseases, and plant and
animal pests.” Masters and McMillan (2001) and Sachs (2001) pro-
vide empirical evidence regarding how climate and other geographical
factors (such as burden of pest, parasites, disease vector and so on)
matter for agricultural and hence economic performance. According to
these authors, the absence of winter frost is a key factor in the growth
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of pests, parasites and diseases which are an important obstacle for
improvement of agricultural productivity as well as public health. Sec-
ondly, geography may stimulate technological progress. According to
Diamond (1998) cold climates require more innovatory activities since
people need to build warm houses and cloths in the temperate zones
whilst those in the tropics can survive with simpler housing and no
clothing. In addition, presence of long winters at high latitudes pro-
vide people much time for siting indoors and inventing. Thirdly, geog-
raphy is an important determinant of public health through nutrition,
disease burden, prevalence of parasites and so on as noted by Bloom
et al. (1998). For instance Gallup and Sachs (2001) point out that
the location and severity of malaria is mainly determined by climate
and ecology, not poverty per se. They show that countries with severe
malaria prevalence (mainly countries in tropical zone) are almost all
poor and continue to have low economic growth. Therefore, geography
has a direct influence on shaping the quantity and quality of human
capital. Fourthly, the endowment of natural resources is largely deter-
mined by geography. Finally, geography plays an important role on
the diffusion of technology and knowledge across countries (Diamond
(1998), Gallup et al. (1999)).
In addition to these direct effects, geography affects growth via two
other factors, namely international trade and institutions (Bloom et al.
(1998), Sachs (2001), Rodrik (2003)). Undoubtedly, international trade
is costly for landlocked countries or countries with a great distance
from the main trading centres in the world due to the transportation
costs. Geography also influences the quality of institutions and hence
growth. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (2003) geographical re-
gions where crops are produced using large plantations lead to political
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and economic institutions protecting the landlords from peasants and
thievery. These authors argue that different political and economic
outcomes may be result of different crops. For instance, tropical cli-
mates in the Americas lead to large plantation-style agriculture on the
basis of slave labour. In addition, as pointed out by Acemoglu et al.
(2001) and Rodrik (2003), geography may affect current institutions
in many developing countries through colonial experiences in the past.
Especially because of these indirect effects, there has been an ongo-
ing debate on the primacy of geography, institutions and international
trade in explaining growth differences across countries.13 Hence, we
consider geography as an important growth theory. In the literature
the most common proxy variable for geography is absolute latitude
since it directly determines geographical factors such as temperature,
insolation, precipitation and so on. However, as noted by Sachs (2001),
absolute latitude may not be a good proxy for geography. The most
important reason is that countries with the same latitudes may have
different climatic characteristics. Moreover, proximity to main world
trade market is more important than the distance from the equator.
Sachs (2001) empirically demonstrates that latitude per se has very lit-
tle explanatory power when it is tested against various direct climate
and ecological measures.14 Thus, we measure geography by two ad-
ditional variables: the share of country’s land area in tropics and the
share of country’s population living in tropics. Finally, we include a
13See, for instance, Easterly and Levine (2003), Sachs (2003) Rodrik et al. (2004) among
others.
14While explaining differences in rate of spread of food production and inventions on
different continents, Diamond (1998, p.189) argues that “ [I] have been dwelling on lati-
tude, readily assessed by a glance at a map, because it is a major determinants of climate,
growing conditions, and ease of spread of production. However, latitude is of course not
the only such determinant, and it is not always true that adjacent places at the same
latitude have the same climate (though they do necessarily have the same day length).
Topographic and ecological barriers, much more pronounced on some continents than
others, were locally important obstacles to diffusion. ”
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dummy variable for landlocked countries, due to the possibility that
sea-navigable regions are richer than the landlocked countries.
iii) Natural Resources: We investigate the impact of natural re-
sources and economic growth separately, even though natural resource
endowment are partly determined by geographical characteristics as
mentioned above. The reason is that the recent literature on the link
between natural resources and economic growth emphasises the “curse
of natural resources” hypothesis. This hypothesis points out that the
resource rich countries tended to grow slowly than the resource poor
countries since the 1950s.
As noted by Gylfason and Zoega (2006) and Hausmann and Rigobon
(2002), there are four important reasons for the adverse effect of re-
source abundance on economic growth during the last decades. First,
according to Dutch disease models, natural resource abundance or a
resource boom leads to contraction of the tradable non-resource (man-
ufacturing) sector. At first sight, Dutch disease does not necessarily
lead to slower growth since contraction in manufacturing does not imply
any efficiency loss. However, if the positive externalities from natural
resource sectors are less than those from manufacturing (as pointed
out by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984)), and/or manu-
facturing is subject to increasing returns to scale and learning by doing
compared to the natural resource sector or agriculture (as indicated by
Matsuyama (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1999)), then Dutch disease
may cause a slowdown in long run growth. Second, the terms of trade
of primary products and raw materials have secularly worsened (also
known Prebisch (1959) hypothesis). Third, natural resource produc-
tion and/or a resource boom generates economic rents and hence rent-
seeking activities, especially in the absence of good-quality institutions
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(Auty (2001)). These rent-seeking activities may lead to destructive
consequences such as sub-Saharan African’s diamond wars. In addi-
tion, a natural resource abundant country may face the risk of foreign
invasion and thus its military expenditures may be immense, as in the
case of many oil producing and exporting countries in the Middle-East.
Fourth, natural resource abundance may have a negative role on the
incentives for the accumulation of human capital due to the high level
of non-wage incomes in these countries (Gylfason (2001)).
On the other hand, natural resource abundance does not necessarily
imply a curse. Rather it may be a blessing for economic growth and
development. For instance, Botswana was one of the fastest growing
countries during the 1960-2000 period and its rich natural resources
have successfully contributed to its impressive growth performance.
However, in spite of this fact, the negative association between re-
source abundance and economic growth during the last few decades
has been confirmed by many cross-country growth studies.15 More-
over, as argued by Sachs and Warner (2001), this finding is robust to
omitted geographical and climate variables. Therefore, following Sachs
and Warner (1997c), we employ the share of primary exports in total
exports to test the resource curse hypothesis. In addition to primary
exports intensity, we use the ratio of mineral production in GNP in or-
der to show direct effect of mineral production rather than agriculture
on economic growth.
iv) Culture : In the literature, the role of culture as one of the
fundamental explanations of economic performance has been recently
15See, for instance, Sachs and Warner (1997c, 1999, 2001), Gylfason et al. (1999),
Leite and Weidmann (1999), Ross (2001), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), Isham et al.
(2005), Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Gylfason (2007), among others. See Stijns (2001),
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2006) and Brunnschweiler (2007) for a critical evaluation of
empirical basis for the resource curse hypothesis.
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emphasised (Acemoglu et al. (2005), Engerman and Sokoloff (2002)).
Culture may be defined as the values, preferences, and beliefs of in-
dividuals or societies and hence has some implications for economic
growth. For instance, Ve´liz (1994) points out that the different devel-
opment paths in Latin America and North America may be a result
of differences in cultural heritages of these regions. According to Ve´liz
(1994), North America is richer than Latin America since the former
developed on the basis of Anglo-Saxon (British) heritage while Latin
America has been based on Iberian (Spanish) tradition. Similarly, some
authors argue that the fact that former socialist countries in Eastern
Europe such as Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic have experienced
more successful and faster transition period than those in Asia such as
Russia and Ukraine can be explained by the different cultural factors
(Fukuyama (2001)). In other words, the degree of western capitalism
prior to socialist period is a key determinant in explaining different
transition performances of former socialist countries. Another example
can be given from the import substituting industrialisation experiences
of many developing countries. As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the
well-known side effects of the import substitution development strategy
is that it creates rent-seeking activities because of strong role of state
or government in the industrial and economic polices. However, while
import substitution strategy was less effective in Latin America, Africa
and other many developing countries because of rent-seeking and cor-
ruption, generally East Asian countries did not suffer from the same
problem. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that the suc-
cess of industrial polices in East Asian countries is mainly influenced
by their cultural attitudes.
As argued by Fukuyama (2001), the effect of culture on economic
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behaviors and hence economic performance can be summarised as fol-
lows: First, different norms and preferences lead to different organi-
zations for production (e.g., different organizations of an automotive
factory in South Korea and Italy); Second, countries have different at-
titudes towards consumption, saving and work due to their different
values and religions; Third, different cultural norms lead to differences
in institutional quality and thus economic growth; Fourth, culture in-
fluences economic performance by shaping the social networks which
have a key role for information flow in the economy.
Obviously one important aspect of culture is religious beliefs. In
this respect, the well-known link between economic development and
religion is suggested by Max Weber. As noted by Acemoglu et al.
(2005), Max Weber argues that protestantism has an important role
on Western capitalist development since it encourages hard working,
saving, thrift, but other religions such as catholicism do not. There-
fore, according to Weber, Western capitalism is a unique combination
of particular institutions and cultural values and the other areas in the
world such as India, China do not support the development of cap-
italism. Recently, Huntington (2002), emphasises the importance of
religious affiliation as the primary determinant for development and
conflict generated by that development. Huntington (2002) points out
that the world consists of eight different religious zones namely West-
ern Christianity, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Hindu, Japanese, Con-
fucian, Latin American and African areas. Even though all these zones
have integrated to global capitalism, their different religious charac-
teristics or attitudes have persisted for centuries and still have strong
influences on economic outcomes.
The relationship between religious affiliations and economic growth
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has been supported by cross-country growth studies in the literature.
For instance Hoover and Perez (2004) and Hendry and Krolzig (2004)
conclude that fraction of protestants and fraction of confucians are
associated with economic growth in the context of general-to-specific
search for growth determinants. Similarly, these two variables are
found to be robustly correlated with growth in the study by Sala-i-
Martin et al. (2004). Barro and McCleary (2003) show that economic
growth responds positively to religious beliefs, especially belief in hell
and heaven. However, Durlauf et al. (2006) question this finding. Ap-
plying Bayesian model averaging method these authors evaluate the
robustness of the link between religious and economic performance and
conclude that findings of Barro and McCleary (2003) are not statisti-
cally robust.
In the light of this discussion, we consider culture and religious
affiliation as another important growth determinant in our BMA ap-
plication and measure this theory by three variables namely fraction of
catholics, fraction of muslims and fraction of other religious affiliations
in total population. We consider catholic and islamic religions as two
separate variables since these two are the most common religions in the
world. The other religions are captured by one variable. Notice that
other religions do not include the fraction of protestants in order to
prevent multicollinearity problem. We exclude protestantism since our
aim is not to test specifically Weber’s hypothesis. Hence the effect of
protestantism is captured by the intercept term in growth models. We
also employ two more variables related to language. These are fraction
of population speaking English and fraction of population speaking a
major European language except English. Undoubtedly, language is
another important aspect of culture. Employing these variables allows
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us to investigate the effects of Anglo-Saxon and continental Europe
traditions on economic development. In addition, countries with high
fraction of population able to speak English have advantage to adopt
new technologies since English is language of modern science and tech-
nology, as noted by Eris (2005). Furthermore, speaking English or one
of the major European languages may facilitate international trade via
communications.16
v) Population Heterogeneity: The effect of population hetero-
geneity on macroeconomic performance has received considerable at-
tention in recent years. There has been a growing body of the literature
on the relationship among ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, the
quality of institutions and economic growth since the important studies
by Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997). While Mauro (1995)
points out the negative correlation between ethno-linguistic fragmen-
tation index (ELF)17 and the level of investment, Easterly and Levine
(1997) conclude a negative and statistically significant association be-
tween ELF and long run growth.18 These results are generally con-
firmed in other works.19
16Because of this, in the literature these two variables are some times used as IV for
international trade. Hall and Jones (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003a) are few examples
among others.
17The ELF index based on the data from a Soviet atlas (Atlas Naradov Mira, 1964)
shows the probability that two randomly selected persons of a given country will belong
to the same ethnolinguistic group
18In particular, Easterly and Levine (1997) claim that the poor economic performance of
sub-Saharan Africa is mainly a result of ethnic conflicts which leads to poor macroeconomic
polices.
19For instance, Alesina et al. (2003) conclude that ethnic and linguistic fragmentation
indexes have an adverse effect on economic growth but religious fragmentation index does
not. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) find that ethnic and religious diversity mea-
sured by polarization indexes have a large and negative impact on economic development
indirectly through civil wars, investment and government consumption. Eris (2005) con-
clude that religious fragmentation index is negatively and significantly associated with
economic growth. In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) emphasise the role of ethnolinguis-
tic fragmentation on government performance. Similarly, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005b) show that ethnic diversity measured by polarization index have a significant ef-
fect on the incidence of civil wars.
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Population heterogeneity along ethnic, religion and language lines
may have strong conflict dimension and hence may have a direct neg-
ative impact of macroeconomic activities. More clearly, this conflict
dimension may directly introduce some frictions among the economic
agents, prevent the diffusion of knowledge and technology over the
whole economy, and result in inefficient resource allocation. In ad-
dition to these direct effects, population heterogeneity may indirectly
affect macroeconomic performance through domestic violence and civil
wars, rent-seeking activities, corruption and so on. Finally, when the
institutions of conflict management are weak, the conflict dimension
of population heterogeneity substantially increases the economic costs
of external shock such as a sharp deterioration of terms of trade as
pointed out by Rodrik (1999b).
Therefore, we consider population heterogeneity as an important
growth theory in our BMA analysis. For this purpose we employ eth-
nic, religious and linguistic fragmentation indexes provided by Alesina
et al. (2003) instead of using ELF index which has become one of the
standard explanatory variables in the cross-country growth literature.
The reason for this is that these fragmentation indexes are not only
better measures with respect to ELF index but also more useful in
highlighting which dimension of heterogeneity is more important.20
vi) War and Unrest: It is obvious that both external and in-
ternal wars impose substantial costs on an economy. In the empirical
20As noted by Eris (2005), socia-economic fragmentation generally measured by GINI
coefficient is another important line of population heterogeneity. However, we discard
this line since our specific aim is to highlight the relation between openness and eco-
nomic growth while controlling other important growth theories and since the literature
on heterogeneity and growth mainly is focused on ethnolinguistic and religious diversity.
In addition, it would be better to employ polarization indexes rather than fragmentation
ones. However, due to the complexities related to calculation of polarization indexes, we
prefer to use fragmentation indexes. The reader can apply Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005a,b) and Eris (2005) and references therein for more information about the polariza-
tion and fragmentation indexes of population heterogeneity.
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cross-country growth literature, many previous studies have concluded
the negative association between growth and war, social and political
unrest. In this regard, the number of revaluations and coups, num-
ber of assassinations, a dummy variable for external war have been
extensively used in order to capture this effect on economic growth.21
We include two variables namely a dummy for war participation and
number of revaluations.22
vii) Country Size: We consider whether country size has an
effect on economic growth. For this purpose we measure country size
by the logarithm of land area and logarithm of the average labour force.
This theory has not often been considered and hence there are a few
studies accounting the direct effect of country size in the cross-country
growth literature. For instance, Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004) use log of initial level of labour force for capturing
a scale effect although they conclude that country size does not matter
for economic growth.
However, as noted by Alesina et al. (2005), there are some reasons
for believing that the country size has a positive effect on economic
growth. First, the economies of scale in the production of public goods
are higher in the large countries. The reason is that, in a large country,
the per capita cost of many public goods (such as infrastructure for
telecommunications, judical system, public health and so on) is lower
because of large number of tax payers. Second, a large country is less
subject to the risk of foreign invasion and hence the degree of safety
of public goods rises with country size. In addition, smaller countries
21Barro (1991), Barro and Lee (1994b), Sachs and Warner (1995), Easterly and Levine
(1997), Wacziarg and Welch (2003), Alesina et al. (2003) are few examples among others.
22As noted by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), using the number of revaluations and coups
in a cross-country growth regression may not be appropriate due to the double counting
problem.
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spend proportionally higher on military expenditures. Third, larger
countries can better manage cross-regional differences than smaller
countries. Similarly, a large country has more opportunities to over-
come a regional economic recession in its territory. Fourth, in the
light of recent endogenous growth models a positive association be-
tween growth and country size may be expected due to the increasing
returns to scale. Moreover, even technology is subject to constant re-
turns to scale, there are more opportunities for within country trade
as mentioned in Chapter 5.
In this regard, Alesina et al. (2000, 2005) develop a theoretical
model such that there is an inverse relation between openness to inter-
national trade and country size. This means that, in a world of trade
restrictions, large countries enjoy more economic benefit from interna-
tional trade than small countries. However, under the free international
trade, small countries benefit more from international trade. This im-
plies that more open countries benefit less from country size than more
closed countries.
viii) Macroeconomic Stability: It is commonly accepted that
macroeconomic stability is a necessary factor for sustainable economic
growth. As noted by Fischer (1993) a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment can be described by low and predictable inflation, sound and sta-
ble fiscal polices and competitive and predictable real exchange rate.
Hence, we measure macroeconomic stability by three variables: Av-
erage inflation, the share of government consumption in GDP and
standard deviation of black market market premium. One can argue
that standard deviation of black market premium is not an appropri-
ate proxy for this theory since it may also capture some dimension of
trade policy. We have two answers for this objection: First, we employ
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variability of black market premium as proxy for macroeconomic un-
certainties related to monetary and exchange rate polices rather than
the black market premium per se; Second, our empirical investigation
in Chapter 5 shows that it is more likely that black market premium
reflects macroeconomic imbalances rather than its restrictive effect on
international trade.
Consideration of this theory is very important while investigating
growth-openness link because trade policy is closely associated with
other macroeconomic polices as pointed out by Harrison and Hanson
(1999) and Rodrik and Rodr´ıguez (2000).
ix) Openness to International Trade: The final growth theory
is openness, the main subject of this PhD dissertation. As mentioned
in the previous chapters, economic theory is not decisive about the im-
pact of openness on economic growth in the long-run. In other words,
the relation between long-run economic growth and openness to inter-
national trade may be positive or negative. A third possibility is that
there may be no significant association between these two at all.
In order to consider these possibilities, we measure openness by six
proxies: The first two are the ratios of trade volume to GDP, namely
current openness and real openness. Both measures are filtered for
its relation in a regression including initial income and country size.
The fraction of open years based on the Sachs and Warner (1995) and
the Wacziarg and Welch (2003) liberalization dates over the 1960-2000
period is used as third proxy. Finally, we employ three composite trade
policy indexes which consist of weighted the average tariff rate, non-
tariff barriers and black market premium (see Chapter 5 for details of
these measures).
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Priors on Model Parameters
After defining priors over the models in the framework of theory cat-
egorization mentioned above, the second difficulty arises in assigning
priors to the parameters of each model. For this, FLS provide a general
framework for the priors on the parameters within a model. Employ-
ing theoretical considerations and extensive simulations, these authors
suggest priors over the model parameters which have little impact on
the posterior inference. Therefore, following FLS, we employ improper
noninformative priors for the common parameters in all models, namely
γ and σ; and a g-prior structure for the coefficients of additional ex-
planatory variables in each model, namely ψj as follows:
p(γ, σ) ∝ 1
σ
(6.18)
and
p(ψj|γ, σ,Mj) = fkjN (ψj|0, σ2(gZ ′jZj)−1) (6.19)
wheref qN(w|m,V ) is the density function of q-dimensional Normal dis-
tribution on w with mean m and covariance matrix V . FLS point out
that determining g = 1/max{n, k2} yields a reasonable result. Hence,
we choose g = 1/k2 due to the fact that k2 > n in our BMA application.
6.4.2 Computation of Marginal Likelihood of Model, Mj
After specifying priors over the models and parameters, we evaluate
the marginal likelihood of model, Mj which expressed by the integral
in equation (6.17). In the light of prior structure for the parameters of
model, Mj, FLS conclude that this integral can be computed analyti-
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cally as follows
ℓ̺(Mj) ∝
(
g
g + 1
)kj/2 ( 1
g + 1
̺′MYj̺+
g
g + 1
(̺− ¯̺ın)′(̺− ¯̺ın)
)−(n−1)/2
(6.20)
where Yj = (ın : Zj), ¯̺ = ı
′
n̺/n, MYj = In−Zj(Z ′jZj)−1Z ′j and, without
loss of generality, the additional explanatory variables are demeaned
such that ı′nZ = 0. Employing analytical computation of marginal
likelihoods of models, one can calculate the posterior model probabil-
ities expressed in equation (6.16). Then using posterior model proba-
bilities as weights, BMA estimate of coefficient of variables and their
t-statistics which are given in equation (6.15) are obtained. Moreover,
as pointed by Eris (2005), the posterior inclusion probabilities of vari-
able, Zk can be calculated as follows
µk ≡
∑
j:kth component of ψk 6=0 in Mj
p(Mj|̺) (6.21)
where µk is the posterior inclusion probability for additional explana-
tory variable, Zk. Likewise, computation of the theory inclusion prob-
ability for jth theory is given by
µTj ≡ 1−
∑
j:Tt is not in Mj
p(Mj|̺) (6.22)
where µTj denotes the posterior inclusion probability for j
th theory of
T different growth theories.
6.4.3 Computation of Posteriors: MC3 Technique
The exact calculation of the posterior quantities of interest (expressed
in equations 6.7, 6.16 and 6.17) is practically infeasible when the num-
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ber of regressors and hence the size of model space is too large. In
this regard, most applications of BMA use a subset of model space as
a reliable approximation to model space instead of searching all possi-
ble models. One approach, developed by Madigan and York (1995), is
known as Markov chain Monte Carlo model composition (MC3 hence-
forth) technique.23
The MC3 method employs a Markov chain moving through the
model space and it is essentially based on a Metropolis algorithm. A
Markov chain {Mt, t ≥ 0} can be constructed over the model (state)
space such that each time t ≥ 0, the next model is drawn from the dis-
tribution p(Mt+1|Mt) which depends only upon the current model, Mt.
This means that given the current model in the chain, the probability
distribution of the next model does not depend further on the previ-
ous models, {M0,M1, . . . ,Mt−1}. This is known as “Markov property”
and p(.|.) is called as the transition probabilities of the chain. We also
assume that a time-homogenous Markov chain such that transition
probabilities do not depend on time.24 A time-homogenous Markov
chain can be expressed as follows:
p(Mt+1 ∈ A | M0, . . . ,Mt) = p(Mt, A) for ∀ A ⊂M (6.23)
where M denotes the model space as before. The probability distri-
bution of M0 is known as the initial distribution of the chain. In this
regard, the conditional distribution of the current model, given the
initial model is described as:
p(Mt ∈ A|M0) = pt(M0, A) (6.24)
23An alternative approach is Occam’s window which produces a reduced set of models
for calculation of model averaging (See Madigan and Raftery 1994, Hoeting 1995).
24See Gilks et al. (1996) for a nice introduction to Markov chain Monte Carlo technique.
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where pt is the tth iteration (or application) of the chain. The last ex-
pression indicates that the current model in the chain depends directly
on the initial model, M0. Under certain regularity conditions, the chain
gradually forgets its initial state and pt(M0, A) eventually converges to
a unique stationary distribution. If the Markov chain is aperiodic and
irreducible with a unique stationary distribution, then as pointed out
by Smith and Roberts (1993), the typically available asymptotic results
indicate that:
Mt d−→ M ∼ π(.) as t →∞ (6.25)
and
1
t
t∑
i=1
f(Mt) → Eπ[f(M)] as t →∞ almost surely (6.26)
where π(.) is the unique stationary distribution and f(.) is any func-
tion of interest over the model space with respect to π(.). The equation
(6.25) implies that, as t increases, the sampled models {Mt} will be in-
creasingly similar to those from π(.). Therefore, if one simulates a
Markov chain with a stationary distribution sufficiently long, the sam-
pled points on the chain will be a reliable approximation to dependent
samples from π(.). Equation (6.26) indicates that, for any real valued
function of interest with respect to π(.), the average of this function
over the realisations of the chain converges to its expected value as t
approaches infinity, almost surely.
In this framework, in order to compute posterior estimates of pa-
rameters in the growth model, we just need to set π(.)=p(Mj|̺) and
f(M) = p(γ, ψj, σ|Mj, ̺), which are the posterior model distribution
of Mj and the posterior distribution of its parameters, respectively.
In order to construct a Markov chain, we also need to define a
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transition matrix showing the transition probabilities from one model
to another. For this, we follow Madigan and York (1995) and define
a neighbourhood for each possible model Mj, nbd(M) which consists
of the models including the same growth theories as well as the one
more and less theories with respect to the model Mj. In this respect,
we define the transition matrix q as follows
q(Mt →Mt+1) = 0 if Mt+1 /∈ nbd(Mt)
= min{1, p(Mt+1|̺)
p(Mt|̺) } if Mt+1 ∈ nbd(Mt)
(6.27)
The transition matrix indicates that, if the Markov chain is currently
in the model Mt, the next model in the vicinity of current model, Mt+1
is drawn with the probability min{1, p(Mt+1|̺)/p(Mt|̺) and stays in
model Mt with the probability 1− q. It is obvious that the probability
that models outside of the neighbourhood are visited by the chain as
a next model is zero. As can be easily seen, the Markov chain with
the transition matrix in (6.27) visits only models with high posterior
model probabilities.25
6.5 Findings
In this section, we present the findings obtained from our BMA appli-
cation on the cross-country growth model expressed in equation (6.12).
25Notice that the term p(Mt+1|̺)/p(Mt|̺) in the transition matrix is equal to posterior
odds for model Mt+1 vis-a-vis model Mt. Using the equations (6.5) and (6.10), one can
easily obtain Bayes factor for model Mt+1 against Mt such that
Bt+1,t =
ℓ(Mt+1)
ℓ(Mt)
=
p(Mt+1|̺)
p(Mt|̺) ÷
p(Mt+1)
p(Mt)
where p(Mt+1) and p(Mt) are corresponding prior model probabilities. Following FLS,
we also take the advantage of the fact that the marginal likelihood expressed in equation
(6.17) can be calculated analytically through equation (6.20).
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Our dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per worker over the
period 1960-2000. As noted before, we include four variables (namely
initial income, population growth, and the saving rates for physical
and human capital) suggested by the augmented neoclassical growth
model as fixed regressors. In addition, we allow 29 variables capturing
9 different growth theories described in the previous section in order to
account model uncertainty. This means that our model space consists
of 229(= 536,870,912) different models. We employ a completed data
set covering 66 countries. All variables and their sources and summary
statistics as well as list of countries are given in the Appendix.
6.5.1 Posterior Estimates
Since our model space is substantially large, we employ the MC3 tech-
nique. The success of this technique depends on the stationary dis-
tribution which are corrected at each iteration in the simulation such
that the approximate distribution is converging to the true distribution
(Gelman et al. (2004)). This means that the key aspect of the MC3
method is simulating the Markov chain with enough draws in order
to estimate the relevant posterior quantities with reasonable accuracy.
Therefore, we ran our BMA exercise with 400,000 and 500,000 draws of
the MC3 sampler, respectively and then compare the results. We find
that posterior estimates are extremely close to each other. This implies
that Markov chain is converging to true posterior distribution and we
do not need to increase draws. Thus, we report posterior estimates
obtained from 500,000 draws as reliable estimates in Table 6.1.
As can be seen from Table 6.1, the posterior coefficient estimates
of all openness measures are almost equal to zero and they have very
low levels of posterior inclusion probabilities. The posterior theory in-
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Table 6.1: Posterior Estimates of Additional Growth Variables
Posterior
Variable Posterior Posterior Posterior Inclusion
Mean t-statistic t-probability Probability
ICRG measure 0.267 4.103 0.000 0.901
Democracy -0.007 -0.461 0.646 0.213
Absolute Latitude 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.032
Land Area in Tropics -0.042 -0.428 0.670 0.147
Population in Tropics -0.077 -0.798 0.428 0.248
Landlocked Country Dummy -0.002 -0.010 0.992 0.018
Primary Exports 0.000 -0.002 0.998 0.013
Mineral Production -0.120 -0.306 0.761 0.110
Fraction of Catholics 0.005 0.042 0.967 0.020
Fraction of Muslims 0.033 0.276 0.784 0.080
Fraction of Other Religions 0.001 0.006 0.995 0.007
Fraction of English Speaking 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.004
Fraction of European Lang. Speaking 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.004
Ethnic Fragmentation -0.005 -0.028 0.978 0.018
Linguistic Fragmentation -0.007 -0.051 0.959 0.029
Religious Fragmentation -0.027 -0.181 0.857 0.075
War Dummy 0.001 0.006 0.995 0.013
Number of Revaluations -0.001 -0.005 0.996 0.011
Land Area 0.000 0.004 0.997 0.012
Labour Force 0.000 0.004 0.997 0.012
Average Inflation -0.086 -3.451 0.001 0.931
Government Consumption -3.144 -3.195 0.002 0.863
Standard Deviation of BMP 0.000 0.002 0.998 0.038
Current Openness 0.000 -0.001 0.999 0.001
Real Openness -0.001 -0.003 0.998 0.001
Number of Open Years 0.000 0.001 0.999 0.001
Trade Policy 1 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.001
Trade Policy 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Trade Policy 3 0.001 0.000 1.000 0.001
clusion probabilities are reported in Table 6.2. Recall that we assign
equal prior probabilities over the growth theories such that prior prob-
ability that a particular growth theory is included in the true model
is equal to 0.5. Therefore, growth theories with the posterior inclusion
probabilities less than 0.5 do not definitely have a significant relation
with the long-run economic growth once the model uncertainty is ac-
counted for. As can be seen from Table 6.2, openness to international
trade has the lowest posterior inclusion probability amongst the growth
theories. Hence, our BMA exercise does not suggest that openness is
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Table 6.2: Posterior Inclusion Probabilities of Growth Theories
Theory classess Posterior theory inclusion prob.
Institutions 0.902
Geography 0.398
Resource Impact 0.118
Culture 0.083
Population Heterogeneity 0.110
War and Unrest 0.024
Scale Effects 0.023
Macroeconomic Stability 0.984
Trade Openness 0.003
fundamental to growth in the long-run.
Concerning the other growth theories, we conclude that only two
theories have posterior inclusion probabilities higher than 50 percent.
The posterior inclusion probabilities of macroeconomic stability and in-
stitutions are found to be very high (more than 90 percent). When we
consider the proxy variables capturing institutions, our findings indi-
cate that ICRG index, measuring the quality of economic institutions
is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth. The
posterior coefficient estimate of this variable (0.260) implies that an in-
crease in the ICRG index by one standard deviation (which is equal to
1.131 over the 1984-2000 period) would raise the growth rate on impact
by 0.294(=0.260x1.131). However, the same is not true for the average
democracy index. Its coefficient estimate is negative and almost zero
with a very low posterior inclusion probability, implying that there is
no significant relationship between growth and democracy. The high
level of posterior probability for macroeconomic stability stems from
average inflation rate and ratio of government consumption to GDP.
Both variables are negative with high posterior inclusion probabilities,
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while standard deviation of black market premium is found to be almost
zero with very low posterior probability. As in the case of openness,
data evidence is not in favour of the remaining growth theories.
In summary, our BMA exercise shows that economic institutions
and macroeconomic stability related to inflation and government ex-
penditures are important determinants of economic growth. Neither
openness to international trade nor other theories matter for growth.
6.5.2 Bayes Factors and Hypothesis Testings
In this section we carry out hypothesis tests using the Bayes factors.
Different from classical approach, in the Bayesian context hypothesis
tests are based on the comparison of two hypothesis, denoted by H0 and
H1. The posterior probability of each hypothesis shows how much H0
and H1 being correct, given data. In this setting, as we noted before,
the posterior odds ratio in favour of H0 relative to H1 calculated by
K01 =
p(H0|y)
p(H1|y) (6.28)
where y denotes the sampled data as before. As can be seen in (6.28),
the aim of hypothesis testing in the Bayesian context is to provide
the statistical evidence in favour of one hypothesis with respect to
another.26 However, the most common measure for hypothesis testing
is Bayes factors (see Kass and Raftery (1995) and Wasserman (2000))
and defined as follows
B01 =
p(H0|y)
p(H1|y) ÷
p(H0)
p(H1)
(6.29)
26Therefore, different from classical approach, in the Bayesian framework we do not
require to accept or reject each of the hypothesis.
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Table 6.3: Jeffreys’ Criteria for Bayes Factors
Bayes Factor, B01 Evidence in Favour of Ho
1 < B01 < 3.2 Not worth more than a bare mention
3.2 < B01 < 10 Substantial
10 < B01 < 100 Strong
B01 > 100 Decisive
The Bayes factors in (6.29) show how much the data have changed our
prior odds in favour of hypothesis H0 against hypothesis H1.
In this setting, we define the hypothesis H0 as a particular growth
theory t being included in the true growth model and the hypothesis
H1 as that theory being excluded in the true growth model. Since we
assume that each growth theory is a priori equally likely, the Bayes
factors, B01 is equal to the posterior odds ratio and shows the evidence
in favour of that theory. In order to interpret Bayes factors, a criteria
is proposed by Jeffreys (1983) in Table 6.3.27
In the light of these explanations, we test the data evidence in favour
of each theory under the consideration of our BMA application. The
Bayes factors, B01 for the inclusion of each theory is given in Table 6.4.
Together with Jeffreys’ criteria, Bayes factors in Table 6.4 show that
there is no significant data evidence for the inclusion of openness in the
true growth model. However, we find strong data evidence in favour
of macroeconomic stability. Similarly, data evidence for institutions to
be included in the true model is substantial.
The same analysis can be carried out for individual proxies with
the exception of equal priors. For this, we just need to define the
27Table 6.3 is adopted from Kass and Raftery (1995) reporting a slight modification
of Jeffreys’ criteria. In addition, following the standard notation for Bayes factors, we
slightly changed the version by Kass and Raftery (1995) such that in our version Bayes
factors provide evidence in favour of the hypothesis H0.
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Table 6.4: Bayes Factors for the Inclusion of Growth Theories
Theory classes Posterior Bayes
inclusion prob. Factors, B01
Institutions 0.902 9.25
Geography 0.398 0.66
Resource Impact 0.118 0.13
Culture 0.083 0.09
Population Heterogeneity 0.110 0.12
War and Unrest 0.024 0.02
Scale Effects 0.023 0.02
Macroeconomic Stability 0.984 61.89
Trade Openness 0.003 0.00
hypothesis H0 as a particular growth variable being included in the
true growth model and hypothesis H1 as the complement of hypothesis
H0. Table 6.5 reports the Bayes factors for the inclusion of proxy
variables. The results show that there is no evidence for the inclusion
of openness variables under Jeffrey’s criteria. However, we conclude
strong evidence in favour of average inflation. Similarly, we find that
data evidence for the inclusion of economic institutions and government
consumption is substantial.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the robustness of the relationship be-
tween openness and growth applying Bayesian model averaging tech-
nique over the 1960-2000 period in order to account for model uncer-
tainty. We find no evidence that openness is directly and robustly
correlated with economic growth in the long run. We further evaluate
individual proxies for openness, namely current openness, real open-
ness, fraction of open years based on the Sachs and Warner (1995)
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Table 6.5: Bayes Factors for the Inclusion of Additional Growth Variables
Variable Posterior Bayes
Inclusion prob. Factors, B01
ICRG measure 0.901 4.53
Democracy 0.213 0.14
Absolute Latitude 0.032 0.03
Land Area in Tropics 0.147 0.15
Population in Tropics 0.248 0.29
Landlocked Country Dummy 0.018 0.02
Primary Exports 0.013 0.01
Mineral Production 0.110 0.06
Fraction of Catholics 0.020 0.02
Fraction of Muslims 0.080 0.08
Fraction of Other Religions 0.007 0.01
Fraction of English Speaking 0.004 0.00
Fraction of European Lang. Speaking 0.004 0.00
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.018 0.01
Linguistic Fragmentation 0.029 0.02
Religious Fragmentation 0.075 0.06
War Dummy 0.013 0.01
Number of Revaluations 0.011 0.01
Land Area 0.012 0.01
Labour Force 0.012 0.01
Average Inflation 0.931 10.06
Government Consumption 0.863 4.72
Standard Deviation of BMP 0.038 0.03
Current Openness 0.001 0.00
Real Openness 0.001 0.00
Number of Open Years 0.001 0.00
Trade Policy 1 0.001 0.00
Trade Policy 2 0.000 0.00
Trade Policy 3 0.001 0.00
criteria and weighted averages of tariff rate, non-tariff barriers and the
black market premium. However, we find that none is robustly corre-
lated with economic growth. On the other hand, data evidence here
indicates that economic institutions and macroeconomic uncertainties
relating to inflation and government consumption are key factors in
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explaining economic growth.
It is possible to say that our findings support the recent related
work. For instance, estimating regressions of the levels of income on
various measures of openness, institutions and geography, Easterly and
Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) conclude that institutions have
an important effect on the economic growth while geography and open-
ness do not. Differently from these studies, we find that fiscal and
monetary policies are also important for economic growth. One rea-
son for this different finding is that our analysis is based on growth
regressions, and testing the impact of macroeconomic policies in level
regressions may not be appropriate as Rodrik et al. (2004) point out.
Compared to other model averaging studies such as those by Ferna´ndez
et al. (2001a) and by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), we conclude that a
small number of growth variables is robustly correlated with growth.
Obviously one reason for this is differences in data set and time period.
Second, differently from these studies, we keep all variables of aug-
mented neoclassical growth model in each possible model in explaining
the direct effect of growth variables. Finally and more importantly, our
priors over the model space are different than Ferna´ndez et al. (2001a)
and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). A recent study by Durlauf et al. (2007)
applies Bayesian model averaging approach, in some ways very similar
to that in this chapter, on cross-country growth data. These authors
conclude that none of the growth theories is directly and robustly cor-
related with growth.
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6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Descriptions and Sources of Variables used in BMA
Application
Augmented Neo-classical Growth Model
Real GDP per capita (RGDPCH) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. Source: Global Development Network Growth Database
(2005) which rely on Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)
Population (TP) : Total population is based on the de facto defini-
tion of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship. Source: The World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
Labour force (LF) : Labour force or economically active population
defined as the total population between ages 15 and 64. Source:
The World Bank World Development Indicators
Share of labour force (SLF) : Share of labour force in total popu-
lation. The exact calculation is LF/TP .
Real GDP per worker (PWGDP) : 1996 international prices, chain
series. The exact calculation is PWGDP = RGDPCH∗(1/SLF ).
Growth : Average growth rate of real GDP per worker over the 1960-
2000 period. The exact calculation is log(PWGDP2000/PWGDP1960),
where PWGDP1960 and PWGDP2000 is the real GDP per worker
in 1960 and 2000, respectively. Because of missing variables, for
the countries Bahamas, Belize, Haiti, Hungary, Malta, Oman,
Puerto Rico, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tunisia, 1961 values are
used instead of 1960 values.
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Initial income (PWGDP1960) : Real GDP per worker in 1960.
Because of missing variables, for the countries Bahamas, Belize,
Haiti, Hungary, Malta, Oman, Puerto Rico, Sierra Leone, Sudan
and Tunisia, 1961 values are used instead of 1960 values.
Population growth (n) : Average rate of population growth be-
tween 1960 and 2000. The exact calculation is (1/40)∗log(TP2000/TP1960),
where TP1960 and TP2000 are total population in 1960 and 2000,
respectively.
(g+δ) : Sum of exogenous rates of technological process and depre-
ciation over the 1960-2000 period and assumed to be equal to
0.05.
(n+g+δ) : Sum of rates of population growth, technical process and
depreciation over the 1960-2000 period.
Investment rate (INV) : Average of Investment share in GDP at
constant prices over the 1960-2000 period. The data are averages
for Tunisia and Sierra-Leone over 1961-2000 period, for Hungary
and Malta 1965-2000 period, for Namibia, Cyprus, Botswana,
Mauritania, Haiti, Central African Republic, Guyana and Fiji,
over 1960-1999 period instead of 1960-2000 period. Source: He-
ston, Summers and Aten (2002). In order to increase number of
observations, data of seven countries are filled up by using gross
capital formation data from the World Bank World Development
Indicators. These countries are Puerto Rico for 1986-1991 period,
Hungary for 1965-69 period, Malta for 1965-1993 period and years
1999, 2000, Sierra Leon for years 1997, 1999 and 2000, Cyprus for
1997-99 period, Angola for 1997-2000 period, for Congo Demo-
cratic Republic for 1998-2000 period.
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School enrolment rate (SCH) : Average gross rate of secondary
school enrolment over the 1960-2000 period. Gross secondary
school enrollment ratio is defined as the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to the level of secondary education. For countries
Chad, Ethiopia, Portugal, Niger and Mauritania, the variable is
calculated over the 1965-2000 period. Source: The World Bank
World Development Indicators.
Institutions
Economic Institutions (ICRG Measure) A measure of economic
institutions based on four International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
components of Political Risk Services Group: 1) Investment Pro-
file as a average of three subcomponents namely, contract viabil-
ity, profits repatriation and payment delays; 2) law and order; 3)
corruption; 4) bureaucratic quality. The index is calculated as
the equal weighting average of these four categories for the years
1984-2000 (annual observations are calculated as the averages of
the monthly indexes). The higher points indicate the greater in-
stitutional quality. Source: Political Risk Services
Democracy : Institutionalised democracy measure of Polity IV project.
The variable is calculated as the average over the 1960-2000 pe-
riod. The democracy index is constructed from three essential
elements: 1) the competitiveness of political participation; 2) the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and 3) the
constraints on the chief executive. The index ranges between 0
and 10 and the higher points indicate the greater institutionalised
democracy in given country. Source: Marshall et al. (2005)
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Geography
Absolute Latitude : Absolute latitude of country centroid. Source:
Center for International Development at Harvard University
Land Area in Tropics (TROPICAR) : The proportion of the coun-
try’s land area in the geographical tropics. Source: Center for
International Development at Harvard University
Population in Tropics (TROPICPOP) : The fraction of popula-
tion living within the geographical tropics. Source: Center for
International Development at Harvard University
Landlocked Country (LANDLOCK) : A dummy variable for land-
locked countries, except those in Europe (Andorra, Austria, Be-
larus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Moldova
and Switzerland). Source: Gallup et al. (1999) and author’s cal-
culation.
Natural Resources
Primary Exports (PX) : The ratio of primary exports to total ex-
ports in 1970. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997c).
Mineral Production (PGNP) : Share of mineral production in GNP
in 1971. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997c).
Culture
Fraction of Catholics (Catholics) : The share of the population
that belongs to Roman Catholic religion in a given country. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999).
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Fraction of Muslims (Muslims) : The share of the population that
belongs to Islamic religion in a given country. Source: La Porta
et al. (1999).
Fraction of Other Religions (OtherRel.) : The share of the pop-
ulation that belongs to other religions in a given country. The
variable is calculated as the residuals from three most widely
spread religions in the world namely Roman Catholic, Protes-
tant and Muslims and thus does not include Protestant. Source:
La Porta et al. (1999).
Fraction Speaking English (ENGLISH) : The fraction of popu-
lation speaking English as a first language. Source: Dollar and
Kraay (2003).
Fraction Speaking European Language (EUROPE) : The frac-
tion of population that is able to speak one of the major languages
of Western Europe, namely French, German, Portuguese, or Span-
ish, as a first language. Source: Dollar and Kraay (2003) and
author’s calculation.
Population Heterogeneity
Ethnic Fragmentation (ETHNIC) : Ethnic fragmentation index.
The variable shows the probability that any randomly selected
two persons of a given country will be from different ethnic groups
and ranges between 0 and 1. The higher points indicates the
grater ethnic fragmentation. Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
Linguistic Fragmentation (LINGUISTIC) : Linguistic fragmen-
tation index. The variable shows the probability that any ran-
domly selected two persons of a given country will be from dif-
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ferent linguistic groups and ranges between 0 and 1. The higher
points indicates the grater linguistic fragmentation. Source: Alesina
et al. (2003).
Religious Fragmentation (RELIGIOUS) : Religious fragmenta-
tion index. The variable shows the probability that any randomly
selected two persons of a given country will be from different re-
ligious groups and ranges between 0 and 1. The higher points
indicates the grater religious fragmentation. Source: Alesina et
al. (2003).
War and Unrest
War Dummy (WARDUM) : Dummy variable for war participa-
tion between 1960 and 1990. Source: Barro and Lee (1994a).
Number of Revolutions (REVOL) : Number of revolutions per
year over the period 1960-1999. Source: Banks (2001)
Country Size
Land Area (AREA) : Land area in square km. Source: The World
Bank World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Labour Force (LFORCE) : Average labour force or economically
active population over the period 1960-2000. Source: The World
Bank World Development Indicators (2002, 2006).
Macroeconomic Stability
Inflation Rate (INFLATION) : Average inflation rate based on
consumer price index over the 1960-2000 period. For some coun-
tries missing data are filled using the inflation rate based on GDP
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deflator. Source: The World Bank World Development Indica-
tors (2002, 2006) based on International Monetary Fund, Inter-
national Financial Statistics and data files.
Government Consumption (GOVCONS) : The ratio of general
government final consumption expenditure in GDP. Variable in-
cludes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods
and services (including compensation of employees). It also in-
cludes most expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures that are part of gov-
ernment capital formation. Source: The World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators (2002, 2006) based on World Bank national
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Standard Deviation of BMP (SDBMP) : Standard deviation of
black market premium over the period 1960-1999. Source: Global
Development Network Growth Database (2005).
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6.A.2 List of Countries in BMA Application
Algeria Ghana Norway
Argentina Greece Pakistan
Austria Guatemala Paraguay
Bangladesh Guyana Peru
Belgium India Philippines
Bolivia Indonesia Portugal
Brazil Iran Senegal
Burkina Faso Ireland Sierra Leone
Cameroon Italy Spain
Canada Jamaica Sri Lanka
Chile Japan Sweden
China Jordan Switzerland
Colombia Kenya Syria
Congo, Dem. Rep. Korea, Republic of Thailand
Congo, Republic of Madagascar Trinidad &Tobago
Costa Rica Malawi Tunisia
Cyprus Malaysia Turkey
Denmark Mexico United Kingdom
Ecuador Morocco United States
Egypt Netherlands Uruguay
Finland Nicaragua Venezuela
France Nigeria Zambia
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Table 6.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Benchmark Model
GROWTH 0.6823 0.6114 -1.3525 2.0918
log of Initial Income 8.4527 0.8304 6.6964 10.0252
log (ni + g + δ) -2.6921 0.1482 -2.9388 -2.3655
log INV -1.8934 0.5199 -3.5589 -1.1426
log SCH -0.7343 0.6579 -2.8062 0.1363
Institutions
ICRG Measure 3.9638 1.1306 1.3983 6.0453
DEMOCRACY 4.9384 3.7555 0 10
Geography
ALATITUDE 26.8072 18.4467 0.4221 67.4700
TROPICAR 0.4757 0.4771 0 1
TROPICPOP 0.4626 0.4851 0 1
LANDLOCK 0.0909 0.2897 0 1
Natural Resources
PX 0.6992 0.2876 0.07 1
PGNP 0.0635 0.1017 0 0.51
Culture
CATHOLIC 0.3852 0.3933 0 0.9690
MUSLIM 0.2109 0.3498 0 0.9940
OTHERREL. 0.2649 0.2964 0.004 0.9850
ENGLISH 0.0900 0.2645 0 0.9740
EUROPEAN 0.2377 0.3807 0 1.0040
Population Heterogeneity
ETHNIC 0.4350 0.2775 0.0020 0.8791
LANGUAGE 0.3451 0.3018 0.0021 0.8898
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 6.6 – Continued
RELIGION 0.3986 0.2490 0.0035 0.8241
War and Unrest
WARDUM 0.3939 0.4924 0 1
REVOL 0.1706 0.1874 0 0.825
Country Size
log AREA 12.6909 1.6067 8.5429 16.0484
log LFORCE 15.9509 1.5065 12.9059 20.2160
Macroeconomic Stability
INFLATION 0.5492 1.5069 0.034 8.864
GOVCONS 0.1416 0.0426 0.060 0.249
STDEVBMP 223.8899 1062.4580 0 8339.58
Trade Openness
COPEN -0.0106 0.2148 -0.3797 0.7102
ROPEN -0.0075 0.1836 -0.3179 0.5407
OPENYEARS 0.5096 0.3924 0 1
POLICY1 -0.0800 0.0765 -0.3978 -0.0110
POLICY2 -0.0899 0.0813 -0.4942 -0.0116
POLICY3 -0.0754 0.0643 -0.3666 -0.0076
Note: Data cover the only 66 countries subject to BMA application.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, we empirically investigated the relationship be-
tween trade openness and economic growth for a cross-section of coun-
tries over the period 1960-2000. To do this, we firstly tested the aug-
mented neoclassical growth model as a benchmark specification. Our
findings showed that this model explains a considerable part of vari-
ation in growth and thus appears appropriate as a baseline growth
model. Then, employing various openness measures we empirically ex-
amined the openness-growth relation. Two strategies were carried out
in empirical investigation. First, in the framework of augmented neo-
classical growth model, we tested a large number of openness measures
suggested in the literature and concluded that most of them were posi-
tively and significantly correlated with growth. However, in some cases
this result was driven by a few outlying countries. More importantly,
we found that existing openness variables are very sensitive to the inclu-
sion of other growth determinants into the baseline growth model. To
show this, we examined the impact of institutions, geography, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization and fiscal policies as well as trade openness
and other variables of augmented neoclassical growth model. Our find-
ings indicate that openness measures become insignificant whilst other
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variables remain significant with the expected signs.
The second strategy we took was Bayesian model averaging. By in-
tegrating model uncertainty into subsequent statistical inference, this
method serves as a useful robustness check on the determinants of
cross-country growth differences. We classified a wide range of differ-
ent growth theories and their proxies systematically and concluded that
economic institutions, the average inflation rate and government con-
sumption were directly and robustly correlated with growth. Neither
openness nor the remaining growth theories were found to be robustly
associated with growth.
In sum, in contrast to many previous cross-country growth studies,
this dissertation does not support the proposition that openness has
a direct robust relationship with economic growth. In the light of
data evidence here, one may conclude that trade openness does not
matter for economic growth in the long run. However, it may be more
reasonable to conclude that, without better institutions and sound and
stable fiscal and monetary polices, openness to international trade will
not guarantee economic growth. This is also the main policy suggestion
of this dissertation.
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